
































What explains Russian state policies toward Islam during the first two decades 
after the Soviet collapse? Research on secularism and state policies toward religion 
suggests several models of interaction. However, these models are often better at 
describing static relationships than they are at explaining change. This study advances a 
framework for understanding the conditions that presage a transformation of state-
religion relations by examining significant differences between Russian state attitudes 
toward Islam in the early 1990s and the 2000s. In particular, notable changes in the 
licensing of Imams, the building permissions granted for mosques, and registration 
requirements for religious organizations call for explanation. In the 1990s, state-Islam 
relations were accommodationist: the state granted unrestricted access to the Russian 
public sphere for all Muslim communities and allowed a wide range of Islamic religious 
practices. State-Islam relations after about 2000 became regulatory: the state assumed a 
more active interventional role in the domestic Islamic community in order to control 
religious practices of particular Muslim factions and assure a privileged access to the 
Russian public sphere for state-approved “traditional” religious organizations. This study 
finds that, contingent on the interplay among competing national ideologies, which shape 
the country’s ethno-confessional regime, the state may either embrace unrestricted 
religious pluralism or adopt a regulatory stance toward certain religious communities. In 
their turn, structural factors such as public safety conditions and economic performance 
of the country may play an important role in determining the outcome of a struggle for 
ideological dominance. This framework largely explains the dynamics of Russian state 
attitudes toward the largest minority religion in the country during the first two decades 
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after the collapse of the Soviet state and offers analytical insights on the dynamic nature 
of state-Islam relations in other secular states with considerable Muslim populations. 
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One day Molla Nasreddin, a Turkic folk hero, ran into his neighbor in front of the 
house. ‘Molla Nasreddin, said the neighbor, may I borrow your donkey?’ For some 
reason Molla replied that he didn’t have a donkey. At this moment the animal brayed. 
‘But I can hear your donkey braying. It’s there, in the stable,’ the neighbor cried out. 
Molla Nasreddin remained calm and said: “Do you believe me or the donkey?” The story 
doesn’t tell if the dialogue goes on but the moral of the tale is simple: there is a reason 
behind every intelligent statement, even if it is not true. The phenomenon of a post-Soviet 
Islamic revival in Russia and the state’s reaction to this process have recently become a 
subject of intense academic exchange and public concern. Since the late 1990s, after a 
decade of a relatively liberal rule, human rights watch groups, concerned with conditions 
of religious freedom in the country, have become increasingly critical of the state’s harsh 
measures against minority religious groups and particularly some observant Muslims.1  
Post-Soviet Russian state attitudes toward religion as well as their meaning and 
significance in the public eye can be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, 
questioning official policies and rhetoric may be perceived as a natural attribute of any 
democratizing society. On the other hand, usually, there is a deep reason why particular 
policies are formally adopted. The state has justified its restrictive actions concerning 
religious affairs as necessary to maintain peace and stability, condemning the violent acts 
                                                        
1 Fagan, Geraldine. Believing in Russia: Religious Policy After Communism. Routledge, 2012; Alexander 
Verkhovsky, “Anti-extremist legislation and its enforcement”, Sova Center, September 19, 2007. 
http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2007/09/d11595/ (Last accessed on March 20, 
2015); Alexander Verkhovsky, “Inappropriate enforcement of anti-extremist legislation in Russia in 2011,” 
Sova Center. April 27, 2012. http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2012/04/d24302/ (Last 
accessed on March 20, 2015) 
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of Muslim extremists and the spread of militant religious ideologies. Many analysts have 
offered explanations for the dynamics of the relationship between Islam and the post-
Soviet state. This study attempts to shed light on some of the key systemic factors that 
explain state attitudes toward Islam over the first two decades after the break up of the 
Soviet Union.  
Since early Tsarist times Muslims have played an important role in the Russian 
empire. There is an overwhelming consensus among scholars studying Islam in Russia 
that indigenous Muslims took a major part in Russian history, culture, and politics.2  
Since the conquest of Kazan in 1552, Muslims have been the largest minority faith group 
that actively engaged in public life, gradually turning into one of the pillars of the 
Russian state.3 Today, according to different demographic accounts, the number of 
Muslims in Russia varies between 15 and 20 million people, about 10-15% of a country’s 
total population4. In terms of its Muslim inhabitants, contemporary Russia remains the 
largest country in Europe and in the top twenty among all UN member states in the 
                                                        
2 See, for example, works by Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay (1967); Ro’i, (2000); Frank (1998, 
2001); Carrère d’Encausse (1988); Geraci (2001); Kappeler (1992); Khalid (1998); Steinwedel (1999); 
Crews (2009); Malashenko (2007); Kemper (2009). 
3 See the speech of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin at a celebratory event marking the 225th 
anniversary of the founding of the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims. 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6155 (last access March 10, 2015). For a brief historical overview of this 
process and relevant examples, see Werth, Paul W. The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of 
Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia. Oxford University Press, 2014. 
4 Goskomstat/Rosstat does not actually collect information on the religious affiliation of the country’s 
population. Therefore any data-based estimate of Russia’s Muslim population must be limited to 
examination of population totals for Russia’s ethnic groups (“nationalities”) with a Muslim cultural 
heritage or historical background. For a comparison of various estimates, see Eberstadt, Nicholas. Russia's 
peacetime demographic crisis: Dimensions, causes, implications. Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2010. It is important to note, however, that, not all of the members of “historically Muslim” 
ethnic groups regard themselves as Muslim or actually practice Islam. For discussion, see Mikhail 
Alexseev, “Overcounting Russia’s Muslims: Implications for Security and Society,” PONARS Eurasia 
Policy Memo No. 27, Georgetown University, August 2008, 
https://gushare.georgetown.edu/eurasianstrategy/Memos/2008/pepm_027.pdf; and Timothy Heleniak, 
“Regional Distribution of the Muslim Population of Russia,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 47, no. 4 
(2006): 426-448 
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world, including Muslim majority countries (Heleniak 2006; Eberstadt 2010). Being a 
home to more Muslims than Jordan and Libya combined, Russia also maintains a special 
status of an observer state at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, an institution self-
proclaimed as “the collective voice of the Muslim world.”5 Muslims are present in every 
sphere of Russian public and intellectual life and proudly represent it on international 
stage as Russian citizens, from holding offices at international organizations to 
participating in the Olympic games.6  
Table 1: Countries with the largest Muslim minority populations in Europe. 
Countries with largest Muslim minority populations in Europe 
 2009 Muslim Population Percentage of Population that is Muslim 
Russia 16,482,000 12% 
Germany  4,026,000 5% 
France 3,554,000 6% 
UK 1,647,000 3% 
Netherlands 946,000 6% 
Bulgaria 920,000 12% 
                                                        
5 The official website of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). http://www.oicun.org/2/23/ (Last 
accessed March 11, 2015) 
6 For instance, during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Russian athletes won 23 gold medals, 10 of which were 
obtained by indigenous Muslim athletes. See, Elmira Akhmetova, “Islam in Russia” 
http://www.muslimstoday.info/content/story/islam-russia (Last accessed March 10, 2015). Also see the 
speech of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin at a celebratory event marking the 225th anniversary of 
the founding of the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims. http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6155 (last 
access March 10, 2015) 
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Macedonia 680,000 33% 
Source: Pew Forum (2009)7 
 
Projected growth rate of Muslim population in Russia contributes to the 
importance of the subject. According to some data sources, the number of followers of 
the Islamic faith may grow as high as 50 million people by 2050 (Pipes 2005; Goble 
2007).8 Taking into consideration the immigration trends, the developments promise to 
alter the country’s ethnic complexion (Eberstadt 2010). Already within a decade, 
according to some predictions, Muslims may make up a majority of Russia's conscript 
army (Washington Times 2006).9 
Table 2: Expected Growth of Muslim Population in Russia. 
Expected Growth of Russia’s Muslim Population 
 Muslim Population Percentage of Population 
that is Muslim 
2010 16,379,000 12% 
                                                        
7 Pew Research Center, October 2009, “Mapping the global Muslim population: A report on the size and 
distribution of the world’s Muslim population.” 
8 Paul Goble, “Window on Eurasia: What Kind of Muslim Country Will Russia Become?” Window On 
Eurasia Website, March 26, 2007, http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2007/03/window-on-eurasia-what-
kind-of-muslim.html (Last accessed on March 11, 2015); and Daniel Pipes, “Predicting a Majority-Muslim 
Russia,” Daniel Pipes Blog, August 6 2005. http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2005/08/predicting-a-
majority-muslim-russia.html (Last access March 11, 2015). 
9 “Muslim birthrate worries Russia” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/nov/20/20061120-
115904-9135r/?page=all (Last access March 11, 2015). There are two major arguments that are used to 
suggest this. The first is a higher birth rate among the Russian Muslims than among ethnic Russians. The 
second is high immigration from neighboring Muslim majority countries. Both arguments are highly 
contested. So far no research showed concrete evidences to support the claim that these trends are long 
term and likely irreversible. In addition, many Western political scientists even before the Soviet break-up 
“expected the main threat to the Soviet empire to come from the Muslim areas with their high birth rates” 
(Yekelchyk 2002: 382). These expectations proved to be unfounded. 
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2030 18,556,000 15% 
2050 50,000,000 50% 
Sources: Pew Forum (for 2010 and 2030)10 
Commentaries (for 2050)11  
Population estimates are rounded to thousands 
 
Long-term projections are often subject to a great deal of uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, for many students of Western European politics, experienced in debates on 
integration of immigrants, even the most conservative accounts of the increase in Islamic 
citizenry often become a reason for alarm. For Russia, the essence of the question about 
Muslims has never been limited to an issue of integrating immigrants. Although 
occasionally protested by some marginal Russian nationalist groups, there is a deep 
acknowledgement that Russia’s Muslim population is indigenous and is an indisputable 
part of Russian historical heritage (Shenfield 2001). As a matter of fact, dealing with 
Islam today, for the Russian state, implies more than just a population count because of 
the qualitative changes of the past two decades. The post-Soviet revival of Islam led to a 
profound social metamorphosis of the society. The fact is that, unlike their European 
                                                        
10 Pew Research Center, January 2011, “The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-
2030.” http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/ (Last accessed 
on March 10, 2015). 
11 Paul Goble, “What Kind of Muslim Country Will Russia Become?” Window on Eurasia. March, 26, 
2007. http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2007/03/window-on-eurasia-what-kind-of-muslim.html (Last 
accessed on March 15, 2015); Dmitrii Steshin, “Stanet li Rossiia islamskoi?” Komsomol’skaia Pravda. 
October 20, 2006. http://www.kp.ru/daily/23793.4/58867 (Last accessed on March 15, 2015); Roman 
Joch “The Russians are Dying Out – and Lying as Well,” MF Dnes, (Access Russian translation form fram 
20, 2007 at http://inosmi.ru/inrussia/20070320/233513.html, last accessed on March 15, 2015). These 
predictions rely on the assumption that Russia’s population by 2050 would fall down to 100 million and 
Muslims by then would comprise the majority group in Russia. Again, these figures are highly subjective 
and unlikely to reflect the true picture without accurate follow-up data. For the most recent population 
projections, see Pew Research Center, April 2, 2015, “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth 
Projections, 2010-2050.” 
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counterparts, Russian state officials, for the past two decades, have had to learn how to 
deal with religious demands, not of immigrants, but of an indigenous Muslim population 
that has reconnected with the faith after seven decades of enforced atheism.12  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of its atheistic regime set off an 
extraordinary religious revival in the country.13 As the iron curtain fell and the official 
communist ideology was denounced, faithful Muslim citizens sought to return to their 
spiritual roots and reconnect with fellow believers abroad. Increased mobility and 
improved means of communication due to globalization contributed to a much faster 
spread of ideas than one could ever imagine. Foreign proselytism activities, close to 
nonexistent during the Soviet era, thrived as thousands of missionaries flew into the 
country from all over the Muslim world and Islamic literature was widely distributed 
thanks to a religious publishing boom.14 The number of mosques increased from about 
160 in 1991 to several thousand just within a decade, in part with the help of investors 
from Islamic states.15 During the same period, the number of students receiving Islamic 
                                                        
12 See chapters two and three for a fuller discussion of the ways in which Russian policymakers interpreted 
the post-Soviet Islamic revival in the country. The analysis reveals that the question was not whether Islam 
plays a role in the Russian society or about its legitimacy but what kind of influence it has upon the people 
and how its significance compares to that of the Russian Orthodoxy. 
13 For a broader discussion of resurgence of religion, its evidence and implications in recent years, see 
Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2009. Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian 
Militias to al-Qaeda (Comparative Studies in Religion and Society). University of California Press. 
Chapter 1; Hefner, Robert. 1998. “Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a 
Globalizing Age,” Annual Review of Anthropology 27: 83-104; Hansen, Randall. "The Danish cartoon 
controversy: A defense of liberal freedom (Reprinted from EUSA Review, vol. 19, pg 1-6, 
2006)." International migration 44.5 (2006): 7-16. 
14 No reliable statistics are available on this, but various commentators claim that over a thousand 
missionaries of Islam arrived in Russia in the early 1990s mainly from Turkey, Muslim majority states of 
the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia (Goble 2009). 
15 Reportedly, in 1991 philanthropists from the United Arab Emirates allocated 250 thousand dollars for the 
needs of the Muslim Spiritual Board in Ufa. According to unverified sources, in January 1992, Mufti 
Tadzhuddin signed the contract with Islamic Development Bank (Saudi Arabia) about granting to the 
Muftiyat in Ufa up to 1,5 million dollars for construction of mosques in Ufa, Kazan and Moscow, and also 
for opening of several Islamic schools. In July 1992, Kuwaitis, who were present at the opening of the 
“Taube” mosque in Naberezhnye Chelny, donated 140 thousand dollars. In 1991, the Saudi businessman 
  7 
education at foreign Muslim universities such as al-Azhar of Egypt and in the madrasas 
of Southwest Asia and South Asia increased from single digits to more than 1800. More 
than 22,000 of those people have returned to Russia and have facilitated the revival of 
Islam (Goble 2009).16 The annual quota of 20,500 people that Saudi authorities allocated 
to Russia’s Muslims for performing Hajj in Mecca was easily filled and was subsequently 
increased to 25,000. The unofficial trip of another 15,000 pilgrims raised the question of 
increasing limit up to 40,000 people.17 
Table 3: The Period of Islamic Liberalization (1991-1997) 
  
Number of Islamic 
Missionaries from 
abroad 









1990/1991 0 4 160 40 
1997-2001 1000 1800 7000 20500 
 
Most of these developments became possible due to major changes in the Russian 
legal environment. The Gorbachev-era reformers embraced high standards of Western 
legal norms that introduced new levels of religious freedom to the country. Russia’s 1990 
laws on religion, which redefined the rights of religious communities, established 
                                                        
Tarik bin Laden is known to have contributed 20 thousand dollars as an initial installment for the 
construction of the mosque "Abdel Aziz Bin Saudi" in the city of Ulyanovsk.  
16 Goble, Paul. Testimony at the public hearing before The Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe: U.S. Helsinki Commission. December 17, 2009 
17 “Ochered’ za pyatym stolpom” (A Line for the fifth pillar) http://www.islamrf.ru/news/world/w-
monitorings/1041 (Last access March 14, 2015). Also, see Paul Goble’s 2009 testimony. The official Hajj 
quotas are determined according to the estimate of the Muslim population count of the country. The 
formula of 0.1% of a country’s total Muslim population was decided by the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) in 1987. Russia’s quota was increased from 20,500 people to 25,000 in 2007. This was 
interpreted as an effort to improve relations between Russia and the Islamic world.  
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unprecedentedly favorable conditions for various Muslim religious practices in Russia.18 
In many ways, such conditions were not available even under the reign of Catherine the 
Great or the rule of Nicholas II, who issued Edicts of Toleration in 1773 and 1905, 
respectively. Muslim religious communities thrived as the state observed the new law, 
which not only gave much-needed breathing room to the practice of religion in Russia 
after decades of an atheistic regime but also assumed equality among all faith groups, 
including Russian Orthodoxy. The legislation mainly followed the stipulations of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, 
as well as other European conventions (Shterin and Richardson, 2000). The 1993 Russian 
Constitution further reinforced the main principles of this law.19  
For almost a decade, under the new regime, religious communities enjoyed 
exceptional levels of freedom and mobility. Taking advantage of these opportunities, 
various Muslim communities, often acting independently of the official Muslim 
establishment, organized into groups, built mosques, founded publishing houses, and 
established contacts with their fellow believers abroad. Religious life under the 
framework of a modern secular democratizing state seemed to acquire an irreversible 
momentum unmatched by any of the previously known cycles in Russian religious 
history.20 
The euphoric spirit of early 1990s did not last long, however. Despite this 
seemingly irrevocable transformation of state-society relations, the late 1990s and early 
                                                        
18 See chapters two and three for a discussion of similarities and differences between the RSFSR and the 
USSR versions of the law, both of which were introduced in October 1990. 
19 See chapter two for more details on legal provisions for religious communities between 1990 and 1997. 
20 See chapters two and three for a comparative discussion of the post-Soviet experience with that of the 
late Tsarist era. 
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2000s witnessed yet another change. Contrary to the essence of a democratic headway 
made in the period of liberalization (1990-1997), the state soon sought to return to a top-
down approach of regulating religious affairs. Under the pretext that, if left unregulated 
by the state, newly emerging religious groups might abuse people’s rights, the state 
attempted to restore its supremacy over religious life in the country.  Policies were guided 
by conservative hard-liners, who argued that reliance on the "invisible hand" of inter-
confessional competition might lead to “many troublesome problems” (Shterin and 
Richardson, 2000). A heated discussion about whether Russia had a tradition of religious 
pluralism accompanied this argument. In September 1997, the 1990 law was replaced by 
a controversial new law that has largely returned the regulation of religious organizations 
to the state (Bourdeaux, 2004). Since then, numerous policies regulating religious 
institutions and their activities have been adopted in Russia and, as a result, religion has 
become nearly as tightly regulated as it was in Soviet times.21 State authorities have often 
justified this move by their concern about security and responsibility to protect citizens 
from extremist attacks.  
With respect to Islam in particular, the state’s effort to regulate religion in the 
post-1997 period has been reflected in the attempt to draw a distinction between 
“traditional” and “non-traditional” forms of Islam.22 Early debates within official circles 
                                                        
21 For discussion of the consequences for Muslim religious practice in Russia of the legal measures such as 
regulations of the Criminal Code Articles 282 (Parts 1 and 2) and 20.2 (Parts 1 and 2), see chapter three. 
Also, see annual reports of the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis about the use of “Anti-extremist 
legislation” and its impact on Muslim religious practice. For example, Alexander Verkhovsky and Galina 
Kozhevnikova, “Inappropriate Enforcement of Anti-extremist Legislation in Russia in 2008,” SOVA Center 
for Information and Analysis. 21 April 2009. http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-
analyses/2009/04/d15800/ (Last accessed on March 15, 2015). 
22 See the next chapter for a graphical expression of the use of specific Islamic religious terminology and 
particularly the term ‘traditional Islam’ in the Russian mass media. According to the Integrum data, the 
concept ‘traditional Islam’ has been mentioned more than 12,000 times in several key federal and regional 
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on what the “traditional Islam” for Russia is and how it might be strengthened and 
“defended from infiltration by alien ideas” took place in the mid-1990s (Makarov and 
Mukhametshin 2003). As a result of these debates, in some of Russia’s regions clear 
attitudes have been adopted towards ‘alien’ Islams. Thus, in a resolution on Anti-Hanafi 
Tendencies (O Anti-Khanafitskikh Napravleniiakh) passed by a local Islamic Cultural 
Center in 1998 in Kazan, Ahmadiyya, Bahaism, and Wahhabism were declared to be 
nineteenth-century concepts once spread by the British secret services in order to 
undermine the Ottoman Empire and destroy the cultural balance in India and the Muslim 
world (Pilkington and Yemelianova 2003).23 This was followed by an extensive press 
discussion of dangers of Wahhabism and the use of Islam by Wahhabists as a 
contemporary cover to propagate antagonistic and extremist ideas.24 In the meantime, 
official Islamic clerics, encouraged by the secular authorities in the regions, started 
strategic restructurings of Islamic institutions – building a strict administrative hierarchy 
for all Islamic organizations. Throughout the following decade the “official” 
interpretation of Islam, backed by state-approved religious organizations, was being 
strengthened vis-à-vis “non-traditional” forms of religion, allegedly spread by 
autonomous religious groups supported from abroad.25 This compartmentalization of 
                                                        
newspapers between 1990 and 2013. Notably, the spread has not been even over time. The term was barely 
used until 1996 and only got popular in the 2000s. 
23 From the author’s notes on the ninth congress of the Youth’s Islamic Cultural Center Iman (Faith) held in 
Kazan in November 1998. Also see Pilkington, Hilary and Galina Yemelianova, eds. Islam in Post-Soviet 
Russia. Routledge, 2003. 
24 Analysis of the Integrum database suggests that reference to Wahhabism and more lately to Salafism as 
particularly radical interpretations of Islam that allegedly justify violent extremism has increased 
dramatically over the course of several years since the late 1990s. Thus, if in 1996 there were less than 
three dozens references to Wahhabism in Izvestiya and in a few other federal and regional publications 
combined, for the year of 2000 the number of such references exceeded 3,000. 
25 For a more detailed discussion of various definitions and different contexts in which the concepts of 
“traditional” and “non-traditional” Islam have been used, see chapter three. Analysis of the contemporary 
use of the concept suggests that “traditional Islam” has at least four distinct meanings in Russia (Batrov 
2013, Safargaleev 2014). 
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Islam, which gradually penetrated into the official rhetoric, sowed the seeds of unrest 
among Russia’s indigenous Muslim communities and fueled the broader society’s 
concerns about the confessional peace in the country.26 
The freedom that was granted to religious groups during the early 1990s – the 
period of religious liberalization (1990-1997) – and the reverse course over the following 
decade and a half – the  period of religious compartmentalization (1997-2012) – 
produced a nebulous picture. As two decades passed since the Soviet collapse, 
contemporary state attitudes toward Islam can be described as nothing else but a paradox. 
Despite strong allegations of unprecedented in post-Soviet history suppression of Muslim 
religious groups in Russia, since the late 1990s and early 2000s, the state has 
progressively supported development of Islam in the country both materially and 
discursively. Thus, on the one hand, the list of banned Muslim groups and Islamic 
literature has significantly expanded over the past decade, anti-extremist laws have been 
increasingly implemented against religious figures, and legal barriers have been raised for 
registration of new religious groups, among many other regulatory measures. On the 
other hand, the state has invested in strengthening of Islam as one of the pillars of the 
Russian state. In 2007 alone 800 million rubles (approx. $25 million) were allocated for 
promotion of “traditional Islam” in Russia. More than 400 million rubles (approx. $13 
million) have been invested in Islamic education. Most recently, nearly one billion rubles 
                                                        
26 In fact, classification of Islam into “traditional” and “non-traditional” categories is not new. For a 
detailed analysis of “establishment Islam” and “parallel Islam” in the Soviet Union, see Ro’i, Yaacov. 
Islam in the Soviet Union: from the Second World War to Gorbachev, London: Hurst, 2000. 
This study does not argue that Islam is monolith in its nature. It acknowledges the historical existence and 
value of multiple theological interpretations of the Islamic faith. Particularly, it recognizes that in the 
context of Russia, intra-faith debates took various forms depending on geographical specificities, attitudes 
toward religious innovation, or even urban and rural division. What the study emphasizes is that the 
Russian state attitudes toward these debates during the 1990s and the 2000s have not been the same. 
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(more than $300 million) were granted for training of Islamic history and culture 
specialists over the next three years.27 These are only few examples of controversies that 
have recently been noted by careful observers of religious life in Russia. The Islamic 
religious revival has not stopped as a result of these measures, but its pace and character 
have changed. 
This study suggests that relations between Islam and the Russian state in the post-
1997 period can be described neither as a systematic repression nor as unconditional 
support. Rather, the way in which they are connected could be characterized as the one of 
an increased regulation. A more nuanced analysis of major policy debates indicates that 
the state’s approach to the issues concerning Muslim minorities varies both across time 
and space.  
Inevitably, so-called “carrot and stick” method of the post-1997 period, which 
includes both restraint and assistance, has induced a compartmentalization of Islam in 
Russia into “loyal” and “treasonous” factions. While, as of 2012, state officials seem to 
be convinced that the chosen path is the right one, many local and foreign observers 
argue that so far this approach may have been more conductive to the escalation of 
tension in the society rather than to achieving stability and cohesion (Curanovic 2014, 
Goble 2014, Flintoff 2012).28 As it has become evident from unceasing unrest in the 
                                                        
27 See chapter one for details. 
28 Curanović, Alicja. "Weaknesses of the Post-Soviet Religious Model: The Kremlin and “Traditional” 
Religions in face of Interethnic Tensions in Russia."Politics and Religion (2014): 1-30. 
Goble, Paul. “Putin’s offensive against Islam a ‘cover’ for broader attack on non-Russian nations, Kazan 
Tatar says.” The Interpreter: A Special Project of Institute of Modern Russia. Goble refers to an article by 
F. Zagidulla in Zvezda Povolzhya (no. 13 (693), April 10-16, 2014, p.1-2. 
(http://www.interpretermag.com/putins-offensive-against-islam-a-cover-for-broader-attack-on-non-russian-
nations-kazan-tatar-says/ Last accessed on March 15, 2015) 
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Northern Caucasus and a high societal resonance following terrorist attacks on religious 
leadership in traditionally peaceful Tatarstan in 2012, an alliance between secular state 
and “traditional” Islamic organizations has not yet produced a lasting serenity.29 Overall, 
this dissertation shows that state policies toward Islam were less regulatory in the early 
1990s than in the 2000s. Of equal interest from a political science perspective, is an 
assessment of causes and mechanisms that have triggered the change. Why has a secular 
state changed its rhetoric and policies toward religion? More specifically, why have 
Russian state policies toward Islam become more regulatory since the late 1990s? What 
explains Russia’s attempt to support “traditional” Islam vis-à-vis its alternative 
interpretations? 
The following chapters will review the existing frameworks for the analysis of 
religious accommodation practices and introduce a model that aims to explain the logic 
behind the dynamics of state policies toward Islam in Russia since the Soviet collapse. In 
several steps I will develop my argument that explains why over the past two decades 
state policies toward Islam in Russia have transformed in style and function. The next 
theoretical chapter will focus on the main puzzle and elaborate on a framework that 
explains transformation of neutral policies in 1990s into regulatory policies in 2000s. It 
will also discuss selection of the time periods, explain the methodological tools, data 
sources, and define relevant terminology. Then, two empirical chapters will examine in 
detail the state’s approach toward Islam over the course of the 1990s and the 2000s. The 
                                                        
Flintoff, Corey. “Attacks Raise Specter of Radical Islam in Russia” NPR: All Things Considered. August 
22, 2012 (http://www.npr.org/2012/08/22/159822487/attacks-raise-specter-of-radical-islam-in-russia Last 
accessed March 15, 2015).  
29 Although the spread of Islamic radicalism in Russia is part of the explanatory framework, it is not the 
main focus of this study. For an excellent introductory review essay on Islamic radicalization in Russia, see 
Dannreuther, Roland. "Islamic radicalization in Russia: an assessment."International Affairs 86.1 (2010): 
109-126. 
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first empirical chapter will discuss the early 1990s and reasons of the state’s neutral and 
non-involvement approach to Islamic affairs. The second empirical chapter will focus on 
the 2000s and examine reasons of the emergence and development of regulatory religious 
policies toward Islam. The third empirical chapter will discuss some of the principal 
drivers and constraints of religious policymaking in post-Soviet Russia. Finally, the 
conclusion will briefly summarize the dissertation’s main findings, discuss generalizable 
results, provide several policy recommendations, and suggest avenues for further 
research. 
Understanding the dynamics of change in religious policy is important for a 
number of reasons. Development of systemic solutions to confessional discord, 
improvement of social inclusion practices, enhancement of religious freedoms, and 
fulfillment of human rights in general are affected by state attitudes toward religion. The 
state’s leadership in Russia as well as many careful observers of Islam acknowledge that 
resolving these issues remains a priority for the country’s policy makers. So far, however, 
neither recent state attitudes toward Islam, nor the topic of Russian secularism in general 
have been addressed by scholars in detail. Understanding how secular states deal with 
religious pluralism may help overcome some of the social challenges facing 
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The preamble to Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Associations30 is widely regarded as the first formal attempt to introduce the notion of 
‘traditional religions’ to the Russian legal system31. Initially, for many observers of 
religious life in Russia, it was hard to foresee that recognition of a rigid dichotomy 
between traditional and non-traditional faiths might deepen existing confessional 
disputes and precipitate a full-fledged polarization within some of the state-recognized 
creeds, including the Russian Islamic community. Officials originally spoke of protecting 
the "spiritual security" of the country and thus drafted laws that would primarily 
safeguard Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism (i.e. “traditional religions”) 
from the spread of foreign sects, cults, and newer religious movements.32 Soon, however, 
it became evident that such “protection” had serious social and political implications for 
some groups within ‘traditional faiths.’33 
                                                        
30 The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, the 1997 law, and the law will be 
used interchangeably in this study. 
31 The preface to the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations singles out Islam, 
Judaism, Buddhism, and especially Orthodox Christianity as the country’s four “traditional” faiths in 
Russia. Although there is a claim that the ‘traditional religions’ configuration is largely a Soviet construct, 
this terminology was not a salient part of official Soviet rhetoric (Fagan 2012:21). 
32 See the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations. 
33 The issue of security still largely dominates the official rhetoric and remains one of the key themes in 
many studies on Islam in Russia. See relevant sections in chapters two, three, and four for a brief review of 
the literature and pertinent policy debates. This study does not attempt to play down the role of security in 
  16 
This study intends to examine the dynamics of state policies toward Islam and 
Muslims in Russia between 1990 and 2012 in the context of Russia’s post-Soviet ethno-
confessional regimes.34 First, it is puzzling that a secular country would experience two 
distinct patterns of state policies toward religion in such a relatively short time.35 Second, 
it is also interesting why a multinational state would attempt to introduce elements of 
civic nationhood (e.g. by removing the ethnicity line from internal passports in 1997) 
while maintaining ethnic federal structure. In other words, state policies toward both 
religion and ethnicity in Russia have changed over time, and one of the important 
manifestations of this change—and the focus of this study—has been the tendency, or 
lack thereof, toward the compartmentalization of Islam.36  
At the time of liberalization of the Soviet religious policy in 1990, Islam in Russia 
was both legally and discursively regarded as a holistic religion that constituted an 
important part of indigenous Muslim identities; no particular distinction was emphasized 
between various factions following different Islamic schools of thought. During the first 
few years after the collapse of the atheistic regime, all Islamic communities could 
indiscriminately use the permissive environment—or opportunity structure37— to secure 
their religious rights and freedoms, such as registering new organizations, building and 
                                                        
the policymaking process. Rather, it invites to take a different look on the matter and consider ideological 
debates as an explanatory framework for a change in state policies toward religion. 
34 I define ethno-confessional regime as a coherent set of principles, norms, and rules that systematically 
guides state policies toward both religion and ethnicity. 
35 Before and after the passage of the 1997 law. 
36 Sener Akturk has addressed the question of persistence and change in state policies toward ethnicity. For 
his analysis of ethnic policies in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, see Aktürk, Şener. Regimes of ethnicity and 
nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey. Cambridge University Press, 2012. In this study I will focus 
on the dynamics of Russian state policies toward religion. The research, nevertheless, reveals that the two 
are often interconnected. 
37 I borrow the term “opportunity structure” from Tilly and Tarrow (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). In their use, 
political opportunity structure “refers to features of regime and institutions (e.g., splits in the ruling class) 
that facilitate or inhibit a political actor’s collective action and to changes in those features” (Tilly & 
Tarrow, 2007, p. 49).  
  17 
repairing places of worship, and printing religious literature. Of particular importance 
was the right to be present in the Russian public sphere.38 
However, towards the late 1990s, state attitudes regarding various Muslim 
factions in Russia started to change. As Islamic religious terminology gradually made 
inroads into public debates and eventually entered the official state rhetoric, some 
Muslim communities found themselves in a transformed policy environment.  Some of 
the groups that identified with marginal Islamic practices and refused to affiliate with the 
official Muslim establishment now faced challenges in continuing their religious duties 
and rites.39 As a result, the overall growth of registered religious communities and 
construction of mosques slowed down, and the number of students traveling abroad for 






38 There is an ambiguity about a definition of public sphere/space in the Russian law in the sense of J. 
Habermas’s Offentlicheit. See, Habermas, J., The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). For further discussion, 
see Krasin, Jurij Andreevich. "Publichnaia sfera i publichnaia politika v rossiiskom izmerenii." Politija 3 
(2004): 5-23. In this study I use the term public sphere in the meaning of a space to which all citizens have 
access and in which all issues of concern to citizens and all available opinions can be articulated and 
deliberated. See Shearing, Clifford, and Jennifer Wood. "Nodal governance, democracy, and the new 
‘denizens’." Journal of law and society 30.3 (2003): 400-419. Haas, Tanni, and Linda Steiner. "Public 
journalism a reply to critics." Journalism7.2 (2006): 238-254. Refer to the dissertation bibliography for 
definition of the term. 
39 Official Muslim (Islamic) establishment – The body of people ordained by Islamic training and 
recognized by the state as ritual and spiritual leaders of Russia’s Muslim community, the clergy. For 
discussion of the history of the official Muslim establishment in the Soviet Union, see Bennigsen, 
Alexandre, and Chantal Lemercier‐Quelquejay. "“Official” Islam in the Soviet Union." Religion, State and 
Society: The Keston Journal 7.3 (1979): 148-159.  
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The paradox is that, despite strong allegations in various human rights reports and 
international media of unprecedented repression of some Muslim religious groups in 
Russia, since the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Russian state has increasingly supported 
development of “mainstream” Islam in the country, both materially and discursively.41 
While the list of banned Muslim groups and Islamic literature has significantly expanded 
during the 2000s, the state has also invested in strengthening ‘traditional Islam’ as one of 
the pillars of the Russian state.42 In 2006, the nonprofit charitable foundation “The Fund 
for support of Islamic culture, science and education” (hereafter the Fund) was 
established on the initiative and with the support of the state. In 2007 alone, 800 million 
rubles were allocated through the Fund for the promotion of ‘traditional Islam’ in 
Russia.43 The Fund has invested more than 400 million rubles specifically into 
development of Islamic education. Later, nearly one billion rubles (more than $300 
million) were granted for training of Islamic history and culture specialists over the next 
three years.44 
Building on the comparison of the time periods, before and after 1997, this study 
aims to find out what actors, processes, and institutions have promoted this divergence. 
The next section will describe the puzzle in more detail and introduce a new comparative 
conceptualization of state policies toward religion. Accordingly, the time span between 
                                                        
41 See, for example, annual reports of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 
and of the Sova Center reports on the misuse of anti-extremism laws, statements on racism and xenophobia, 
as well as articles on religion and secular society in Russia. 
42 See chapter three for a detailed discussion of the meaning of the concept of ‘traditional Islam’ and its 
various interpretations. 
43 For the charter of the Fund and description of its activities refer to their official website:  
http://www.islamfund.ru/index.php (Last access March 5, 2015). 
44 The Russian government allocated the funds. The Russian Ministry of Education distributed between 
several public universities the responsibility for training specialists with in-depth knowledge of the history 
and culture of Islam and financed their work. See Fayzullina, Albina R., and Regina M. 
Mukhametzyanova-Duggal. "Multi-Confessional Societies in Russia and India: Models of Relations 
between the State and Religious Associations." Review of European Studies 7.1 (2014): p12. 
  20 
the Soviet collapse and 1997 is categorized as a period of “neutral policies” toward Islam. 
This was an era of open access to the Russian public sphere for all Islamic religious 
groups and equal treatment of them by the state. On the other hand, the period from 1997 
onwards was marked by a differentiation of state attitudes toward “traditional” and “non-
traditional” forms of Islam and the groups that practice such beliefs. Therefore, this 
period is described in this study as an era of “regulatory policies.”45    
Building on the existing scholarship on the subject, this study takes an historical 
institutionalist perspective to explain the evolution of state policies toward Islam in 
Russia. The study suggests that over the first two decades since the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, the key factor that accounts both for the stability of and the change of state 
attitudes toward Islam was an ideological struggle between competing national 
philosophies. Two distinct ideological paths separated by a critical juncture allowed for 
development of two different ethno-confessional regimes that guided state policies 
toward Muslims and Islamic religion during the 1990s and the 2000s.46 From this 
standpoint, neutral policies toward Islam in the 1990s were possible because of the 
relative dominance of a Western liberal ideology that allowed for development of a 
multiethnic passive secular regime.47 A commitment of the late Soviet and post-Soviet 
                                                        
45 Disclaimer: The terms ‘neutral’ and ‘regulatory’ are relative rather than absolute and dominance of one 
or another during the period of investigation (1990-2012) is a matter of degree. 
46 Critical junctures, according to James Mahoney “are moments of relative structural indeterminism when 
willful actors shape outcomes in a more voluntary fashion than normal circumstances permit” (Mahoney 
2001:7). Mahoney, James. The legacies of liberalism: Path dependence and political regimes in Central 
America. JHU Press, 2001. According to Kuru, a critical juncture is “a moment when both agency and 
structural conditions are available for a systematic change” (Kuru 2009:27). For Kuru, “when the new 
system becomes consolidated, it creates a path dependence. In the aftermath of this transformation, a new 
change becomes difficult and requires a new critical juncture” (Kuru 2009:28). Kuru, Ahmet T. Secularism 
and state policies toward religion: the United States, France, and Turkey. Cambridge University Press, 
2009. 
47 In the context of this study, Western liberalism is an ideology that focuses on the promotion of human 
rights, civil liberties, market economy, and democratic government broadly defined. While liberalism has 
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reformers to western liberal norms and principles led them to transform key aspects of 
social and political life in Russia, which resulted in adoption of neutral/accommodationist 
policies toward all faiths, including Islam. On the other hand, regulatory policies toward 
Islam in the 2000s were an outcome of a statist ideology, which in its turn has adopted a 
non-ethnic confessional collaboration regime for managing Russia’s diverse population.48 
A consistent set of ideas related to restoring Russia as a sovereign state and a “great 
power” guided the overwhelming majority of political actors across the Russian political 
spectrum, which ended up in adoption of regulatory measures in religious matters, 
including Islamic affairs.49 
 
2. Describing and Defining the Puzzle: Neutral Vs. Regulatory Policies toward Islam 
Over the course of the 1990s, the Russian state pursued neutral policies toward 
Islam in several major areas of religious observance and practice. Primarily this neutrality 
was reflected in the state’s attitude toward religious/Islamic education. The right to open 
religious schools at home and to receive such education abroad was granted to religious 
                                                        
indigenous intellectual history in Russia, it borrows heavily from the Western philosophical tradition and 
experience. Multiethnic passive secularism is a type of ethno-confessional regimes, which allows 
unrestricted access to the public sphere for all religious groups and legally as well as institutionally 
recognizes multiple ethnic categories. For details, see chapter two. Refer to the dissertation glossary for 
definitions. 
48 In the context of this study, statism is an ideology, according to which the state should have substantial 
centralized control over social and economic affairs. Non-ethnic confessional collaboration model is a type 
of ethno-confessional regime, according to which certain religious communities have privileged access to 
the public sphere and multiple ethnic categories are not supported legally and institutionally. For details, 
see chapters three and four. Refer to the dissertation glossary for definitions. 
49 According to Hill and Gaddy, by mid-1996 “practically every political group and party across the 
Russian political spectrum, from right to left, felt that the post-Soviet dismantling of the state had gone too 
far and advocated the restoration of Russian “state power.” Even some of the liberal economists around 
Yegor Gaidar who were at the forefront of pulling apart the old Soviet economy in 1992-93 had moved in 
this direction” (Hill and Gaddy 2013:34). Hill, Fiona, and Clifford G. Gaddy. Mr. Putin: operative in the 
Kremlin. Brookings Institution Press, 2013. 
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groups in 1990, thanks to the new Law On Freedom of Religion. The aforementioned law 
also allowed using public school premises outside regular business hours for religious 
education of the general public. Furthermore, it permitted introduction of religion-related 
subjects into the public schools curriculum on the condition that this would not be 
accompanied by religious rituals and had an ‘informative’ character (Article 9 of the 
RSFSR Law).  
Of particular importance for religious observance and practice were places of 
worship. According to the provisions of the new law, technically, every Islamic 
community which had financial means to do so could build its own mosque and appoint 
own imams (Islamic preachers), including foreigners, to lead the service. If registered as a 
religious organization, religious communities also obtained the right of ownership of the 
property (Article 26 of the RSFSR law). According to some estimates, overall across 
Russia, between 1990 and 1997, the number of functioning mosques increased from 160 
to over 7,000 (Goble 2009).50 Mosques were freely built by various Islamic communities 
both in Muslim-majority and predominantly Russian populated areas.51 Moreover, the 
1990 law allowed for religious worship in military units, hospitals, all kinds of nursing 
homes, prisons, and many other public premises (Article 22 of the RSFSR law).  
                                                        
50 For comparison, note that at the time of the 1917 Revolution, there had been an extensive  Muslim 
establishment on the territory of the Russian Empire, with some 26,000 mosques served by over 45,000 
imams (mullahs). In the region of Turkestan (Central Asia) alone, there were some 8,000 Islamic primary 
and secondary schools (mekteps and madrasas), another 5,000 establishments of Islamic learning were 
found in the regions of Kazan, the Crimea, and the Caucasus. For details, see Takeyh, Ray and Nikolas 
Gvosdev, 2004. The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Radical Political Islam. 
London: Praeger. Pp.106. Aso see Bennigsen, Alexandre and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the 
Soviet State. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983, P.43; Haghayeghi, Mehrdad, Islam and Politics in 
Central Asia. New York: St. Marin’s Press,1995, P.9. 
51 Many of these mosques turned into local centers of Islamic education, some of which soon developed 
into formal religious schools known as madrasas. 
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More broadly, the legal recognition of private ownership and the transition to a 
market economy had a huge impact on the development of the Islamic consumer 
industry. A wide range of products from halal groceries (religiously acceptable according 
to the Muslim law) to alcohol-free perfumes and Islamic women’s clothing became 
available for private consumption. As both supply and demand in the halal market 
increased, no attempt was made to centralize or supervise this area in the early 90s.52  
Overall, for several years Muslim communities thrived, regardless of their 
association with official Islamic institutions or their doctrinal preferences. After surviving 
decades of an atheistic Soviet regime, many Russian Muslims enjoyed a flowering of 
Islamic spirit, education, and culture. Despite growing concerns of communists and other 
ultra-secularist groups about the proliferation of Islamic movements and sects, and 
worries of conservative members of the established Muslim clergy, who disliked the 
competition of newly emerging Islamic authorities, the state did not intervene in religious 
affairs. A diversity of Islamic communities thrived across the country until the late 1990s. 
The official discourse at the federal level during this era maintained a neutral tone with 
respect to Islam and avoided making any deliberate distinctions between different Islamic 
schools of thought or traditions.  
Contrary to the accommodationist attitude of the state in the early 1990s, state 
policies toward Islam in the post-1997 period had a more interventionist character. First 
of all, the 1997 law on religion created two principal categories: ‘religious organization’ 
and ‘religious group’. To enjoy the full benefits of a legal personality and a range of other 
rights, religious communities were required to register with the state as ‘religious 
                                                        
52 For more detailed discussion of Islamic practices in the early 1990s, see chapter two. 
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organizations’.53 Without registration as religious organizations religious communities 
were denied the rights that they enjoyed under the 1990 law.54 Unregistered religious 
groups, among other things, could no longer organize public worship services, 
disseminate religious literature, or hire foreign clergy. Religious bodies created outside 
the borders of the Russian Federation or ‘foreign religious groups’ were altogether denied 
the right to ‘engage in liturgical or other religious activity.55 Furthermore, the state 
reserved the right to liquidate a registered religious organization for any number of 
reasons, including but not limited to threatening the integrity of the Russian Federation, 
infringing on the health of Russian citizens, encouraging believers to disobey civic duties, 
or restricting members from leaving or converting to other faiths. Finally, the 1997 law 
technically allowed the restoration of close regulation of religious life. The ban on 
creation of government organs or posts devoted to freedom of conscience issues was 
lifted.56 State registration would also follow a procedure requiring extensive information 
about a religious organization’s history, beliefs and activities, aw well as the particulars 
of at least ten founders (Fagan 2012:68).  
                                                        
53 To register as a religious organization, a religious community had to obtain an approval from a local state 
authority that it had existed in the vicinity for at least 15 years, or confirmation from a centralized religious 
organization of the same creed. Fully registered religious organizations would enjoy a range of rights 
denied religious groups: to produce, obtain, import, export or distribute religious literature, audio and video 
material; to produce liturgical literature and other religious items; to found mass media; to conduct 
religious rites in various public institutions; to invite foreign citizens for professional purposes, etc. For a 
full list of rights and privileges, see the text of the 1997 law. Also, see Fagan, Geraldine. Believing in 
Russia: Religious Policy After Communism. Routledge, 2012. Pp.66-68. Previously registered religious 
organizations were required to re-register by 2002. Failure to do so would result in liquidation of a religious 
organization. 
54 The only rights that the 1997 law granted religious groups were to conduct religious rites and to teach 
religion to existing followers using premises and property provided by the group. 
55 According to the 1997 law, independent religious activity by foreign citizens was outlawed. Religious 
bodies created outside the borders of the Russian Federation would only be able to open representations in 
Russia attached to local religious organizations. By contrast, the 1990 law had explicitly granted foreign 
citizens and persons without citizenship the right to found religious associations. 
56 One of the intents of the 1990 Law on Religion was to establish a barrier to reconstitution of the Council 
for Religious Affairs. 
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The 1997 Law paved the way for introduction of further rules regulating religious 
life in Russia. Soon, the change was reflected in the adoption of new norms regarding 
religious education and the accreditation of imams. Secular authorities had long suspected 
that foreign-educated clergymen had been spreading radical Islam in the country. In light 
of growing concern that ‘alien’ interpretations of Islam were gaining a foothold in Russia, 
state authorities initially revised the education curricula and activities of several Islamic 
religious institutions, which in a number of cases led to closures or mergers of the 
institutions.57 Moreover, the state got actively engaged in the establishment of new 
Islamic education institutions and the development of a standardized religious 
curriculum.58 Some regions introduced regulatory measures that would require imams 
educated abroad to have their diploma certified by local authorities before they could 
start preaching in Russia. In 2003, for example, the local Muslim spiritual board of the 
Republic of Tatarstan conducted its own re-licensing program.59 
Furthermore, the 2000 update of the National Security Concept of the Russian 
Federation stated that ensuring national security included “countering the negative 
influence of foreign religious organizations and missionaries."60 In 2002, the Federal Law 
on Combating Extremist Activity was adopted. This law targeted some religious groups 
by criminalizing a broad spectrum of their activities. As a result, individuals adhering to 
                                                        
57 For some details of this process, see chapter 4. Also, for discussion of cases related to infamous Islamic 
madrasas ‘Yoldyz’ and ‘Al-Furqan’, see Silantyev, R. Islam v Sovremennoi Rossii: Entsiklopediia. 
Moscow: Algoritm. 2008.  
58 “Edinyj standart islamskogo obrazovanija v Tatarstane: za granicu ne poedem, budem uchit' v svoih 
medrese,” 27 January 2015. http://kazanfirst.ru/feed/38486 (Last access March 5, 2015) 
59 By 2004, about 800 of 1,200 imams in the Republic of Tatarstan passed the re-licensing program. 
http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/print.php?act=news&id=17429 (Last access March 5, 2015) 
60 The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, 2000 (Kontseptsiia Natsional'noi Bezopasnosti 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii). Approved by Presidential Decree No. 24 of 10 January 2000. 
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marginal Islamic factions such as Nursists (followers of Said Nursi and Fethullah Gulen) 
or Tablighi Jamaat, as well as those groups claiming their superiority over mainstream 
Islam, became a subject of various allegations. To the present day, according to 
Alexander Verkhovsky, a leading human rights activist in Russia and the director of the 
SOVA Center, the anti-extremist legislation is being used as a powerful instrument to 
limit freedom of conscience in the country.61 On top of that, in 2006, the government 
passed the Law on Public Associations, which mandated new reporting requirements for 
religious organizations. The required reporting included information about "organized 
events and activities" and funds received from abroad. Failure to file reports or to 
complete them adequately could result in the eventual suspension of the organization’s 
activities. This wide range of restrictions is often interpreted as an attempt to limit foreign 
Islamic influence on indigenous Muslims. 
In the meantime, specific Islamic religious terminology and the ‘traditional/non-
traditional’ dichotomy gradually made their way into Russian public debates, often in 
vaguely defined or outright misleading forms. Although no official or expert definitions 
were provided, notions of “traditional” and “non-traditional” Islam started widely 
circulating in public discourse and finally entered the country’s rhetoric. A content 
analysis of more than eight thousand Russian national and regional news sources, 
including newspapers, magazines, and radio and television transcripts, during the period 
between 1990 and 2012 reveals increasing reference to terms such as ‘wahhabism,’ 
                                                        
61 Verkhovsky, A. Reports on Inappropriate enforcement of the anti-extremist legislation in Russia from 
2009 to 2013. For example, see the report for 2009:  






7) Religion in the military Neutral Regulatory 
8) Islam in the official 
rhetoric 
Neutral Regulatory 
9) Property rights Neutral Regulatory 
 
The post-Soviet relationship between the Russian state and Islam invites the 
following intriguing questions: Why did the Russian secular regime change its policy in 
relation to Islam toward the end of the 1990s? Why have Russian state policies become 
more regulatory? What explains Russia’s attempt to support “traditional” Islam vis-à-vis 
its alternative interpretations?    
I am not arguing that the change in state attitudes toward Islam happened 
overnight with the passage of the 1997 Law or led to a complete, wholesale 
transformation of state-religion relations. Rather, I observe a gradual shift from policies 
of relative neutrality in the 1990s toward policies of relative regulation in the 2000s. 
Moreover, the analysis demonstrates the extreme difficulty of changing state-religion 
regimes completely. Even the exceptional coincidence of ideational and structural 
conditions for change might not be enough for a wholesale transformation of state-
religion regimes that encompasses all policies on religion. As a close study of debates on 
the issue reveals, very few people advocated for the return to the Soviet-style regulation 
of religious affairs and even fewer supported a totally laissez-faire approach toward 
religion. Despite major differences between the 1990s and the 2000s examined in this 
study, I would argue that Russia became a hybrid regime between passive secular and so-
called confessional collaboration models, which I will define below. 
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Finally, the analysis below will also demonstrate that not all policy areas were 
equally debated by Russian policymakers, the expert community, and the general public. 
For example, while the issue of foreign influence on religious education drew a 
significant and constant attention of policymakers at the national level and resulted in 
adoption of legal measures, the question of Islamic dress code came up sporadically, 
what in part accounts for legal ambiguity on the matter, as evidenced in variation of 
practices across the regions.62 In addition, it will show that some issues are better 
understood in the context of interfaith relations rather than state policies toward religion. 
Thus, the issue of difficulties in constructing mosques in traditionally non-Muslim 
regions since the late 1990s has been more often debated in the context of Church-Islam 
relations that state attitudes toward Islam.63  
In my study, I will review the dominant political preferences in each period by 
examining the platforms, statements, and demands of key players. Through analysis of 
the daily press, magazines, legal documents, and official statements, I track the process 
by which the different policy trends were established in the 1990s and 2000s, 
respectively, and the change that happened in between. 
Building on a comparison of the two periods described above, the main purpose 
of this study is to explain the change of state attitudes toward Islam, and identify the 
                                                        
62 See chapters three and four for details on the debate that led to the ban on wearing Islamic headscarves in 
schools in Stavropol region. In Chechnya, on the other hand, authorities are enforcing a compulsory Islamic 
dress code for women. Moreover, women were reportedly targeted for immodest outfit choices. See 
“Chechnya enforcing Islamic dress code,” Human Rights Watch, March 10, 2011. 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/10/russia-chechnya-enforcing-islamic-dress-code (Last accessed on 
March 15, 2015). Also see 
http://rus.azattyq.org/content/chechnya_kadyrov_muslim_dress_code_school_/3549566.html (Last 
accessed on March 15, 2015); and http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/516383/ (Last accessed on March 15, 
2015). 
63 See chapters three and four for details on the debates about construction of Mosques in Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, Sochi, Maloyaroslavets and other “Muslim-minority” areas of Russia. 
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actors, processes, mechanisms, and institutions that have promoted this policy shift. The 
next step is to conceptualize the difference in the policy trends toward Islam in Russia 
during the two periods by introducing the notion of state-religion regime. 
 
2.1. Neutral Policies toward Religion, Regulatory Policies toward Religion, and 
State-Religion Regime 
For analytical purposes, I would like to differentiate the two periods described 
above as periods dominated by two distinct types of state-religion regimes. This 
distinction, nevertheless, is relative rather than absolute and does not represent Weberian 
“ideal types.”64  To be more specific, the state-religion regime of the early 1990s, which 
represents an era of neutral policies toward religion, is called passive secularism.65 Under 
passive secularism the state allows public visibility of religion and refrains from 
intervening in religious affairs. The state respects religious pluralism in general and 
provides equal access to the public sphere for all religious communities. Therefore, the 
goal of these neutral policies is the accommodation of all religious groups and their 
religious practices.  
                                                        
64 Weber introduces an ideal type as “a unified analytical construct” that “cannot be found empirically 
anywhere in reality” (Weber, 2011, p. 90). But, it “will help to develop our skill in imputation in research: 
it is no “hypothesis” but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of 
reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description”(Weber, 2011, p. 90). In 
other words, an ideal type is a utopia, and constructed to address a researchers’ “task of determining in 
each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality” 
(Weber, 2011, p. 90). 
65 For discussion of different types of state-religion regimes and original definition of passive secularism, 
See Kuru, Ahmet T. Secularism and state policies toward religion: the United States, France, and Turkey. 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
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On the other hand, the post-1997 period, which was dominated by regulatory 
policies, can be categorized as an era of collaboration between the state and “traditional” 
religious organizations.66 Under the confessional collaboration model the state may allow 
for public visibility of religion, but it is less tolerant toward religious pluralism. 
Specifically, it grants a privileged access to the public sphere for some religious 
communities, often by conferring on them exclusive rights such as permission to use 
mass media (broadcasting and the press) and public premises.67 For example, the state 
under the confessional collaboration model need not ban religious education, but it may 
either indirectly influence the religious learning process through its leverage over public 
infrastructure, service network, and media, or directly intervene in the process by 







66 By confessional collaboration I mean the relationship between the state and traditional religious 
organizations (most notably between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Kremlin) which manifests itself 
in cooperation taking place in selected areas of the public sphere, in education and social care. In this study, 
the term ‘traditional religious organizations’ refers to state-registered religious organizations representing 
traditional religions in Russia. More broadly, these are religious organizations that have demonstrated that 
they had significantly influenced the formation and development of Russian statehood, played an important 
historical role in the development of national consciousness and that a significant proportion of Russian 
citizens belonged to or expressed a preference for it. For details, see chapters three and four. For 
definitions, refer to the dissertation glossary 
67 See chapter three for a detailed discussion of ‘traditional religions paradigm’ – a pattern of thought based 
on the assumption that some religious communities deserve special privileges because of their size, 
geographical range, as well as the history of presence in Russia. The idea has been established in the 
preamble of the Russian Federation 1997 “Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.” 
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Table 6: Five Symptoms of State-Religion Regime Type in Post-Soviet Russia. 
Types of State-Religion Regimes in Post-Soviet Russia  
 Neutral policies / 
Passive Secularism 
(Russia in the 1990s) 
Regulatory policies /  
Confessional Collaboration 
(Russia in the 2000s) 
1. Toleration of pluralistic 
religious education  
in Religious schools 
High Low 
2. Toleration of pluralistic 
religious education  




3. Toleration of religious 
pluralism in the public sphere 
High Low 
4. Toleration of religious 
dissent 
High Low 
5. Likelihood of persecution for 
religious practice  
Low High 
 
The existence of different state-religions regimes and their characteristics in 
various contexts have been well-researched and documented over the past two decades 
(Wald 2002; Sezgin 2003, 2007; Monsma and Soper 1997; Kuru 2007, 2009).68 The 
                                                        
68 Sezgin, Yuksel. "Can Israeli Status Quo Model Help the Post-February 28 Turkey Solve its 
Problem?" Turkish Studies 4.3 (2003): 47-70. 
Sezgin, Yüksel. The State's Response to Legal Pluralism: The Case of Religious Law and Courts in Israel, 
Egypt and India. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Washington, 2007. 
Wald, Kenneth. "The religious dimension of Israeli political life." Religion and Politics in Comparative 
Perspective: The One, the Few and the Many (2002): 99-122. 
Stephen V. Monsma, and J. Christopher Soper. The Challenge of Pluralism: Church and State in Five 
Democracies. Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. 
Kuru, Ahmet T. Secularism and state policies toward religion: the United States, France, and Turkey. 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
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By defining and describing the two periods (Russia in the 1990s and the 2000s) as 
eras dominated by passive secularism and a confessional collaboration model, 
respectively, I aim to explain why Russian state policies toward Islam changed over time. 
What actors, processes, and institutions caused this divergence? Why did the Russian 
state pursue “neutral policies” toward Islam until roughly the end of the 1990s and why 
did it change its attitudes and followed relatively “regulatory policies” starting in the 
2000s? More broadly, why—and under what conditions—does a secular state transform 
its religious policies? 
 
3. Literature Review: Islam and the state approach toward religious pluralism 
in a post-communist secular society. 
The topic of Islam in Russia has long been a focus of scholarly research. Several 
generations of historians and ethnographers have made invaluable contributions to our 
understanding of indigenous Muslim communities in Russia.70 However, the relationship 
of Muslim religious organizations with the Russian state on the institutional level has 
                                                        
70 See, for example, Bennigsen, Alexandre and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay. Islam in the Soviet Union. 
New York, Praeger, 1967; Carrère d’Encausse, Hélène. (1988). Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and 
Revolution in Central Asia, tr. Quintin Hoare. Berkeley: University of California Press; Kappeler, Andreas. 
(1992). “Czarist Policy Toward the Muslims of the Russian Empire.” In Muslim Communities Reemerge: 
Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia, ed. Andreas Kappeler et al. Durham, NC: Duke University Press; Frank, Alan J. (1998). 
Islamic Historiography and “Bulghar” Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia. Leiden, 
Netherlands: Brill; Ro’i, Yaacov. (2000). Islam in the Soviet Union: From the Second World War to 
Gorbachev. New York: Columbia University Press; Malashenko, Aleksei Vsevolodovich. Islamskoie 
vozrozhdeniie v souremennoi rossii. Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegui, 1998; Khalid, Adeeb. (1998). The 
Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press; 
Khalid, A., Islam after communism: religion and politics in Central Asia, Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2007. 
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been largely neglected until recently.71 Moreover, state-Islam relations in the context of 
the turbulent post-Soviet transformations still remain largely underexplored. This study 
demonstrates that an investigation of Russia’s more recent experiences accommodating 
Islamic religious practices helps understand and explain both the historical dynamics in 
Russia and some of the contemporary dilemmas facing other secular states as they seek to 
ensure and protect religious freedom. First, I discuss broader themes in the religion and 
politics literature to provide a framework for the analysis of secularism and state policies 
toward Islam in Russia. Then I review the Russian area studies literature to place post-
Soviet experience in historical context. Analysis of Russia’s encounter with Islam during 
the first two decades after the Soviet collapse provides useful insights that advance the 
extant literature in both directions. 
3.1. Secularism and State Policies toward Religion 
The growing complexity of our world as well as the rapid pace of socio-political 
and economic transformations observed in the post-Cold War era make studying religion 
an increasingly challenging but nonetheless very interesting task (Curanovic 2010).72 
With the rise of the modernization theory in the 1950s, religion gradually seemed to lose 
its explanatory power and was fading away as a focus of scholarly research for many 
social scientists. The emerging secularization paradigm predicted that the importance of 
religion in public affairs would inevitably decline.  However, a series of political events 
in the 1970s and 1980s came as a shock to many who had believed that religion was 
                                                        
71 Crews, Robert D., For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006; Tasar, Eren Murat. Soviet and Muslim: the institutionalization of 
Islam in Central Asia, 1943-1991. Diss. Harvard University, 2010. 
72 Curanovic, A., “Relations between Orthodox Church and Islam in Russian Federation,” Journal of 
Church and State (2010) vol. 52 no. 3, pp. 503–539. 
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spent as a political force. The Iranian revolution, the rise of the Christian Right in the 
United States, and the active involvement of the Pope and the Catholic Church in 
supporting the Solidarity movement in Poland were some of the early indicators of 
religion’s resurgence as a moral and political force. Today, many acknowledge that the 
impact of religion on politics has not declined but, rather, has changed in complex ways 
(Bruce 2003; Casanova 1994; Mohseni and Wilcox 2006). Notably, as higher levels of 
socioeconomic development throughout the world correlate with the decreasing 
separation of religion and the state, modernization and global processes only seem to be 
contributing to the growth of religion’s role in politics (Fox 2006).73 
The phenomenon of the post-Soviet religious revival in Russia became a novel 
case for traditional as well as emerging theories of secularism and the study of state 
accommodation of religious practices (Norris and Inglehart 2004, Fetzer and Soper 2005, 
Fox 2008, Kuru 2009). Given the history of state-enforced atheism, the Russian 
experience presents a valuable case for the examination of state attitudes toward religion 
in the public and private spheres and the meaning of secularism in general (Calhoun et al. 
2011).  
One of the most illuminating studies in the recent scholarship on religion and 
politics has identified different models of interaction between religion and a secular state 
                                                        
73 It is important to note, however, that there are important West European exceptions. For more on the 
return of religion to the public sphere, see Casanova, José. Public religions in the modern world. University 
of Chicago Press, 2011; Casanova, José. "Religion, the new millennium, and globalization." Sociology of 
religion (2001): 415-441; Stark, Rodney. 1999. “Secularization: RIP.” Sociology of Religion 60 (3): 249-
273; Bruce, Steve. 2001. “Christianity in Britain, R.I.P.” Sociology of Religion 62(2):191-203; Keddie, 
Nikki R. 1998. “The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why do “Fundamentalisms” Appear?” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 40, 4 (October): 696-723; Ferguson, Niall. 2004. “Economics, 
Religion and the Decline of Europe.” Economics Affairs (December): 37-40; Kim, Andrew E. 2000. 
“Korean Religious Culture and its Affinity to Christianity: The Rise of Protestant Christianity in South 
Korea.” Sociology of Religion 61(2): 117-133.  
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(Kuru 2009). Kuru’s discovery of passive and assertive types of secularism offers an 
original perspective on religious policies under secular regimes. Passive secularism, 
according to Kuru, implies that the state maintains neutrality toward various faiths and 
allows for the public visibility of all religions. Assertive secularism, on the other hand, 
suggests that the state “favors a secular worldview in the public sphere and aims to 
confine religion to the private sphere” (Kuru 2006:137).74 This typology is useful in 
explaining variation across secular states. However, as this study of Russia’s post-Soviet 
experience shows, these models are less able to explain the dynamics of change in state 
attitudes toward religion. Thus, Russian state attitudes toward Islam during the 1990s 
resemble the passive model of secularism, whereas state policies in the 2000s, in many 
ways, signify a departure from this accommodationist state-religion regime. Rather, as 
this study suggests, Russian state-Islam relations since the late 1990s approximate to a 
hybrid mode of interaction between religion and the state, which I call a confessional 
collaboration model. Similar to passive secularism, the state under the confessional 
collaboration model allows public visibility of religion. However, it does not provide 
equal access to the public sphere for all religious communities.  
Having said that, if states may change their religious policies over time, what 
accounts for this transformation? Scholars of religion and politics have produced several 
theories that provide valuable insights into the possible variation of states’ attitudes 
toward religion. Particularly, the insights from resource mobilization theory, political 
opportunity structures, church-state relations, and rational choice approaches have all 
                                                        
74 In contrast to the public sphere defined earlier, the private sphere is widely perceived as an area of 
individual choice and autonomy. According to Graham, the private domain is the domain of the home, 
where social relations are based on family and kin. See Graham, Hilary. "The concept of caring in feminist 
research: the case of domestic service." Sociology 25.1 (1991): 61-78. Refer to the dissertation glossary for 
definitions of the public and private sphere. 
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proven useful in explaining the accommodation of Muslim religious practices in the West 
(Tatari 2009). Thus, resource mobilization theory argues that relations between the state 
and certain religious groups may depend on the political resources that any given group 
possesses (Fetzer and Soper 2005). This theory predicts that prosperous and politically 
significant religious communities might have greater bargaining capacity than relatively 
indigent groups. Religious policies, as a result, take shape under the influence of these 
dynamics. 
The political opportunity structure approach, on the other hand, suggests that 
political institutions may largely define communities’ capability for political involvement 
and activism. Thus, the activities of religious groups would depend on the larger system, 
which either constrains or facilitates them (Tatari 2009). A church-state relations 
approach argues that a dominant religious institution (e.g. a Church in Christian-majority 
countries) may significantly influence state policies toward religious minorities in any 
given society (Ferrari 2003, Cesari 2004, Nielsen 2005, Vetvik 1992). As Fetzer and 
Soper described in their analysis of the demands of Muslim minorities in Britain, France, 
and Germany, it is primarily Church-state structure that informs states policies toward 
Islam in these countries (Fetzer and Soper 2005). In addition, national ideas about 
citizenship, nationhood, and assimilation may also influence state attitudes toward 
minority religions (Tatari 2009). According to these so-called ideological theories, in 
France, for instance, the republican ideals of citizenship and laïcité guide state policies 
toward minority faiths (Kuru 2009). Last but not least, according to Tatari, relations 
between religious groups and the state may also depend on the internal dynamics of 
particular religious communities (Tatari 2009). In her study on the accommodation of 
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Muslim religious practices in the West, Tatari demonstrates that the institutional 
framework of Islam partly accounts for the success and failure of Muslim minorities in 
advancing their religious agenda.   
In addition to the historical institutionalist approaches described above, Anthony 
Gill has explored the role of institutional incentives in state-religion relations. Gill 
employs rational choice theories to show that the interests of civic and religious leaders 
must be considered in explaining both the development of religious liberty and why 
governments choose varying levels of regulation of religious markets (Gill 1999, 2008; 
Gill and Keshavarzian 1999).75 He offers several propositions to explain the rise (or 
decline) of religious liberty in any society (Gill 2008). His analysis is sophisticated and 
nuanced, but at its root is the conviction that religious and political leaders support 
religious liberty when it is in their interest to do so.  Thus, for him, cooperation between 
secular and religious institutions is likely in the initial stages of the state-building process 
(Gill and Keshavarzian 1999).  
All of the above theories and approaches have strong explanatory power in 
accounting for state attitudes toward religion in different societies. However, none of 
them alone can fully explain the experience of post-Soviet Russia, whose encounter with 
Islam since 1991 has been complicated by outbreaks of violence, internal splits, 
ideological confrontations, personal grievances, and multifaceted after-effects of state-
enforced atheism. Deeper knowledge of the history of Islam in Russia is, therefore, 
                                                        
75 Religious market is a physical and virtual space where Islamic religious ideas and goods are exchanged. 
See Sengers, Erik. "The religious market and its regulation: A sociological perspective." Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal 9.03 (2007): 294-301. 
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required in order to assess the dynamics of the post-communist era. Hence, I turn to an 
analysis of the Russian area studies literature. 
 
3.2. Islam and the Russian Area Studies Literature 
Russian area studies specialists in the West as well the scholarly community in 
Russia have devoted much time and energy to studying the daily life and experiences of 
Muslim minorities in Russia. Anthropologists, ethnographers, sociologists, theologians, 
and, above all, historians have deeply explored various aspects of religious life in the 
country. Their subjects have ranged from the geography and demography of Russia’s 
Muslim population throughout its history to interfaith-dialogue and sophisticated 
theological debates about Islamic practice in a Christian-majority state.76 Much less 
attention, however, has been paid to state-Islam relations in Russian history at the 
institutional level (Crews 2006). Despite growing interest in the issue during the first two 
decades following the Soviet collapse, many political science questions about the state’s 
approach toward Islamic religious pluralism and institutions in Russia remain largely 
unexplored.  
Part of the reason why state-Islam relations in Russia have just recently become a 
topic of interest for political scientists is that political science research on national 
minorities living in Russia has traditionally focused on their secular ethnic identity rather 
than their religious identity (Graney, 2009; Gorenburg, 1999; Hale, 2004; 
                                                        
76 For a good review of the scholarship on the subject since the Soviet collapse, see Gregory L. Freeze, 
“Recent Scholarship on Russian Orthodoxy: A Critique,” Kritika 2, 2 (2001): 269–78 and Werth, Paul W. 
"Lived Orthodoxy and Confessional Diversity: The Last Decade on Religion in Modern Russia." Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 12.4 (2011): 849-865. 
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Sharafutdinova, 2000). This is to be expected: citizenship and national identities have 
traditionally been regarded as central elements of political systems and still remain key 
themes in nation-state building projects (Duchesne 2005, Akturk 2011). As Paul Werth 
suggests, since the rise of nationalism, there emerged other and seemingly better ways of 
conceptualizing human collectivities in Russia than classifying people in religious terms. 
“Nationality,” in his words, “became a privileged category of analysis” for scholars 
(Werth 2014: 5-6).77 
Additionally, historical studies on Islam in Russia in the pre-revolutionary and 
Soviet eras mostly in the Western scholarship have often focused on the conflict between 
the state and its Muslim subjects and have thus largely omitted discussion of the state’s 
efforts to forge cooperative links with indigenous Muslims through Muslim Spiritual 
Boards (Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay 1967).78 Many studies of the post-Soviet 
era follow a similar pattern (Yemelianova 2010, Dannreuther 2010, Hahn 2007, 
Pilkington and Yemelianova 2003, Siant’yev 2008).  
 Geographically speaking, most of the extant literature on Islam in Imperial and 
Soviet Russia examines the dynamics of life in the traditional Muslim areas of Central 
Asia; indigenous Muslims residing along the Volga River, in the North Caucasus, and 
across Siberia have remained on the margins of scholarly attention (Khalid 2007, Crews 
2006, Akiner 1996, Roi 2000, Saroyan, 1997, etc.).  
                                                        
77 According to Werth, scholars recognized that the national idea grew in significance over the course of the 
nineteenth century, and to a growing degree the imperatives of nationalism shaped the actions and 
perspectives of both tsarist administrators and the empire’s subjects. Analyses of the Soviet period and the 
collapse of the USSR pulled scholars inexorably toward “nationality” as a category of analysis. 
78 Bennigsen, Alexandre and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union. New York: 
Praeger, 1967. 
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Last but not least, although many students of Islam in Russia agree that the 
official treatment of Islam by the Russian state has varied historically, few studies thus 
far have attempted to identify objective criteria that would explain the historical 
dynamics of state-Islam relations in Russia or state-religion regimes more broadly. 
Nevertheless, the enormous success of earlier scholarship in pointing out some of the 
most persistent trends in Russia’s historical encounter with Islam presents a strong 
foundation for this kind of research. On the one hand, there were periods, such as during 
the reign of Ivan the Terrible, when Islam was repressed and believers faced systematic 
discrimination (Khalid 2004). On the other hand, there have also been intervals when the 
religion has been tolerated and even protected. One of the conventional explanations has 
been that, since the reign of Catherine the Great, state rulers used officially sponsored 
Islamic religious institutions to regulate indigenous Muslim community and thus 
strengthen the stability of the Russian Empire (Crews 2006). However, few studies so far 
have attempted to address the issue of Islamic diversity in Russia and examine the role of 
loosely integrated Islamic groups in the formation of different state-religion regimes.79 
With the revival of religious life after the Soviet collapse, Russia became an 
excellent laboratory for developing, testing, and refining various social science theories. 
This has generated a new wave of scholarship on the topic of Islam in Russia. Scholars 
                                                        
79 Many important distinctions between local Islamic practices in Russia’s Volga-Ural region and the North 
Caucasus have been covered in detail. However, the diversity of Islamic cultures within those traditionally 
Muslim-populated areas, especially its changing nature in the post-Soviet era, is yet to be fully elucidated. 
For a brief introduction to the debates about local popular religion, see Yarlykapov, Akhmet A. "" Folk 
Islam" and Muslim Youth of the Central and Northwest Caucasus." Anthropology & Archeology of 
Eurasia 46.3 (2008): 9-35; Ware, Robert Bruce, and Enver Kisriev. "The Islamic Factor in 
Dagestan."Central Asian Survey 19.2 (2000): 235-252; Ware, Robert Bruce, and Enver Kisriev. "Ethnic 
parity and democratic pluralism in Dagestan: A consociational approach." Europe-Asia Studies 53.1 
(2001): 105-131; Knysh, Alexander. "Contextualizing the Salafi–Sufi conflict (from the Northern Caucasus 
to Hadramawt)." Middle Eastern Studies 43.4 (2007): 503-530; Mukhametshin, Rafik. "Islam v 
obshchestvennoi i politicheskoi zhizni tatar i Tatarstana v XX veke." Kazan: Tatar Book 
Publishing (2005); Khakimov, Rafael. "Where is our Mecca." Kazan: Magarif (2003): 40. 
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have examined many new questions and revisited older debates about Islamic practice in 
the country. Their work has led to cutting-edge investigations of local religious traditions 
and the modernization of Islamic thinking in Russia (Tuna 2009; Colak 2011); the role of 
officially sponsored Islamic institutions in relations between the state and Muslim 
population (Crews 2006; Tasar 2010); sources of Islamic fundamentalism (Yemelianova 
2010) and religious freedom (Fagan 2012); linguistic aspects of the Islamic revival 
(Bustanov and Kemper 2012), and even a political-geographic perspectives on faith 
(Derrick 2012). In addition, the post-Soviet Islamic resurgence has given new life to 
some broader dilemmas that students of Russian politics have been debating for decades. 
Academics have began to rethink, inter alia, Russian national identity (Brubaker 1994, 
Smith 1998), reconsider the Russian nationalities policy (Smith 1996, Trenin and 
Malashenko 2010, Akturk 2012), reexamine religious pluralism and Church-state 
relations in the context of a multi-confessional state (Papkova 2011, Baran 2006), as well 
as re-contextualize Russia’s relations with the wider Muslim world (Dannreuther 1993, 
Trenin 2007, Malashenko 2007, Katz 2006). 
Overall, both the scholarship on secularism and studies on the history of 
indigenous Muslims offer important insights into the analysis of post-Soviet state 
building in Russia. However, no theory has yet been able to offer a clear explanation for 
emergence, development, and the change of state-religion regimes in the country during 
the first two decades after the Soviet collapse.80 This study aims to engage with both 
scholarly domains to systematically examine the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism and 
explore the Russian state response to it. It suggests that the analysis of domestic 
                                                        
80 For a brief discussion of strengths and weaknesses of modernization and rational choice theories and the 
civilizational approach in the study of state-religion regimes, see Kuru (2009). 
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ideological debates may offer a nuanced reading of different policy trends in the 1990s 
and the 2000s. 
 
4. Struggling Ideologies: Western Liberalism and Statism 
I argue that state policies toward Islam in post-Soviet Russia are the result of 
ideological struggles. Similar to many other societies, where the key sources of public 
policy making on religion have historically been either various interpretations of the 
communist ideology (North Korea, China, Cuba, or Russia between 1918 and 1990), 
diverse understandings of Islamism (Iran and Saudi Arabia), or struggles between leftist 
and rightist groups (Greece and Denmark), in post-communist Russia, I argue, the main 
contestation that guided religious policies has been between advocates of Western 
liberalism and proponents of Statism.81  
Indeed, the analysis of local archival records, expert interviews, and more than 
eight thousand Russian national and regional news sources between 1990 and 2012 points 
to the significance of ideological struggles in the formation of Russian state policies 
toward Islam during the first two decades after the Soviet collapse. Policy implications of 
ideological debates over the nature of Russian national identity and the direction of its 
future development, as this study suggests, largely explain the persistence of neutral 
attitudes toward Islam in the early 1990s and the establishment of regulatory measures in 
the 2000s. Thus, relative dominance of ideas and ideals of Western liberalism in the late 
perestroika and early post-Soviet years led to the adoption of passive secular state-
                                                        
81 For broader discussion of various sources of public policy making on religion, see Kindopp and Hamrin 
2004; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Kuru 2009. 
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religion regime, which guided accommodationist policies of the state toward Islam in 
Russia. Renouncing the ideology of Westernism in favor of the norms and principles of 
Statism in the late 1990s resulted in a change of state-religion regime, which then 
gradually took the shape of a collaboration between state institutions and “traditional” 
religious organizations. Transition to the confessional collaboration model accounts for 
more interventionist attitude of the state toward Islam in the 2000s.  
A transition from Western liberalism to Statism, as described in this study, was 
compelled by structural imperatives, which represent a critical juncture between the two 
ideological paths. In this framework, I discuss the economic hardships of the 1990s and 
the violent upheaval in the Northern Caucasus to emphasize the structural underpinnings 
of the ideological shift in Russian politics at the turn of the 21st century. 
A theoretical foundation of the argument that ideology has major explanatory 
power is rooted in the historical institutionalism literature. This approach sees institutions 
as the mechanism that structures options and preferences through rules and norms. 
Institutions, therefore, are inclusive of factors such as ideas, beliefs and culture (Tatari 
2009:280). Historical institutionalism explains ‘the way institutions shape the goals 
political actors pursue and the way they structure power relations among them, 
privileging some and putting others at a disadvantage’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 940).  
According to some scholars, ideology can be seen as a crucial “independent 
variable” in explaining institutional outcomes (Hanson 2010, Kuru 2009). Despite the 
fact that many social science paradigms downplay the causal significance of ideas 
[ideologies], ideologies play an important role in the formation of individuals’ 
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preferences (Kuru 2009: 237). If there are human actors who embrace particular 
ideologies, form specific policy preferences based on them, and struggle to realize these 
policy preferences, ideologies can impact policies and form the regimes. In part, for these 
reasons, according to Hanson, ideologies must be placed at the very center of inquiry in 
political science and should be treated as a major driver of political outcomes (Hanson 
2010: xix).  
Moreover, in a social science research, which relies on causal relationships, 
ideologies can also be a “dependent variable” (Kuru 2009). The establishment of a new 
ideological dominance either requires a long historical process or an exogenous shock 
that could have a universal impact on the social actions of the people who lived through 
it. In the context of this study, the ideological dominance of western liberalism, for 
example, was established largely as a result of the collapse of communism. The 
emergence and development of the ideas of statism, on the other hand, developed in the 
context of a post-Soviet economic turmoil, international “humiliation,” and a major 
security threat spreading from the North Caucasus to the rest of the country. 
As a rule, ideologies first emerge in the works of some native thinkers, or they are 
imported from other intellectually influential countries. Then they find followers among 
the elite and policymakers through publications, the electronic media, and public 
discussions. Next, these followers organize and mobilize to challenge the dominant 
ideology. Finally, these activists replace the dominant ideology with the new one. The 
last step usually requires suitable structural conditions. (Kuru 2009: 238).  
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In the context of this study, I define ideology as a set of ideas that refer to an ideal 
socio-political system.82 According to Hanson, what makes ideology distinct from culture 
is its formal, explicit, and relatively consistent nature (Hanson 2003: 356). From this 
perspective, the ideological approach suggests that it is primarily national ideas about 
citizenship, nationhood, assimilation, and belonging to the society that determine state 
attitudes toward religion.  
I identify two major ideologies that, in one way or another, inform some of the 
key debates about state policies toward Islam in post-communist Russia. These are 
Western liberalism and Statism. Roots of these ideologies reach back to the 19th-century 
Russian philosophical debate between Westernizers and Slavophiles. Broadly defined, 
Westernizers were advocates of the Western-oriented path for Russia’s development, 
who supported the expansion of political and civil freedoms. Their intellectual critics and 
ardent policy rivals, the Slavophiles, defended a nativist course for Russia’s evolution, 
arguing that Russia should follow its own special path. In the 1920s, Eurasianists joined 
the conversation between the two, claiming that Russia possessed a hybrid and 
encompassing Eurasian identity. Westernizers, Slavophiles, Eurasianists, and their 
intellectual heirs have historically held significantly different perspectives on the role of 
religion in the society.83 Post-Soviet state policies toward Islam, as this study suggests, 
                                                        
82 In a narrow sense, ideology is a set of proposals made by individuals to define clear and consistent 
criteria for membership in a proposed polity. More broadly, and in the context of this study, ideology is a 
collection of ideas that refer to an ideal socio-political system. Ideologies need to be formal, explicit, and 
relatively consistent. See the dissertation glossary for definition of the key term. In that sense, my definition 
of the concept agrees with Kuru’s interpretation of the term (Kuru 2009:10). Unlike Kuru, however, I don’t 
refer to ideology as a utopia. In my opinion, not all ideologies are tied to utopias. 
83 For discussion of Westernism, Slavophilism, and Eurasianism as Russia’s major philosophical traditions 
and their historical perspectives on religion, see Edie, James M.; Scanlan, M. P.; and Zeldin, Mary-Barbara, 
eds. (1965). Russian Philosophy, Vol 1: The Beginnings of Russian Philosophy: The Slavophiles; The 
Westernizers. Chicago: Quadrangle Books; Walicki, Andrzej. (1975). The Slavophile Controversy: History 
of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought, tr. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka. Oxford: 
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can also be read as the continuation of their struggle for dominance in the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries.  
 
5. Post-Soviet State-Religion and Ethnicity Regimes 
To elaborate on the causal link between post-Soviet ideologies and state policies 
toward Islam I focus on the dynamics of state-religion and ethnicity regimes in Russia 
between 1990 and 2012. First, I explain how the transformation of the post-communist 
state-religion regime in Russia was reflected on the expression of Islamic religious 
pluralism. More specifically, I demonstrate how a transition from passive secularism to 
the model of confessional collaboration between the state institutions and traditional 
religious organizations affected activities of various Islamic groups in the country. I 
argue that the emergence and strengthening of a so-called ‘traditional religions’ paradigm 
led to compartmentalization of Islam according to the attitudes of Muslim communities 
toward the secular regime and the Russian Orthodox Church.84 “Traditional” Islamic 
organizations were granted privileges by the state, whereas non-conformist Islamic 
                                                        
Clarendon; Walicki, Andrzej. (1979). A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism, 
tr. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; Devlin, Judith. (1999). Slavophiles 
and Commissars: Enemies of Democracy in Modern Russia. London: Macmillan; Shnirelman, Viktor, and 
Panarin, Sergei. (2001). “Lev Gumilev: His Pretensions as a Founder of Ethnology and his Eurasian 
Theories.” Inner Asia 3:1–18; Florovsky, Georges. Ways of Russian Theology. 2 vols., tr. Robert L. 
Nichols. Belmont, MA: Nordland; Kline, George. (1968). Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Zenkovsky, Vasilii. (1953). A History of Russian Philosophy, 2 
vols., tr. George L. Kline. New York: Columbia University Press. 
84 In this study the term ‘traditional religions paradigm’ refers to a pattern of thought based on the 
assumption that certain religions in Russia deserve special privileges because of their size, geographical 
range, as well as the history of presence in Russia. The idea has been established in the preamble of the 
Russian Federation 1997 “Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.” For definition of 
the key term, see the dissertation glossary. 
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groups were marginalized and deprived of access to the public sphere.85 The desire of 
state authorities, inspired by the statist ideology, to cultivate a patriotic version of Islam 
through Muslim Spiritual Boards explains greater involvement of state authorities into 
Islamic affairs in Russia since 1997. The vision of a strong state with multiconfessional 
patriotic society replaced the earlier model, in which religion was considered merely as 
an element of culture.  
Importance of ethnicity in self-determination of Russia’s indigenous Muslim 
communities is the reason why I also examine ethnicity regimes to explain the state’s 
policy toward Islam. I suggest that a movement from a multiethnic toward a non-ethnic 
regime reflects the change in how state authorities treated indigenous Muslims in the 
1990s and the 2000s. More specifically, I show how the Russian state’s full support for 
institutionalization of ethnicities in the 1990s relates to perception of Islam as an element 
of indigenous ethnic cultures. Similarly, I explain how the emergence and strengthening 
of a civic ‘Rossiyanin’ identity, an indicator of a movement toward a non-ethnic regime, 
relates to the development of a ‘traditional religions’ paradigm and the increasing 
reliance of the state on “traditional” Muslim organizations to foster patriotism.86 
The combined analysis of state-religion and ethnicity regimes leads me to suggest 
that two distinct ethno-confessional regimes can be identified in the post-Soviet history of 
Russia. These are Multiethnic Passive Secularism and Non-ethnic Confessional 
                                                        
85 In this study, the term ‘traditional religious organizations’ refers to state-registered religious 
organizations representing traditional religions in Russia. More broadly, these are religious organizations 
that have demonstrated that they had significantly influenced the formation and development of Russian 
statehood, played an important historical role in the development of national consciousness and that a 
significant proportion of Russian citizens belonged to or expressed a preference for it. For definition of the 
key term, see the dissertation glossary. 
86 These discussions will also reveal the evolution of the perception among secular policymakers about the 
essence of a religion (what it is) and its function (what it can do in the society).  
  51 
Collaboration model between secular state institutions and “traditional” religious 
organizations. The table below summarizes the dynamics of Russia’s ethno-confessional 
regime since the end of the communist era. 
Table 7: Matrix of Ethno-confessional Regimes 
Ethnicity Regimes87  
Mono-ethnic Multi-ethnic Non-ethnic 




  Russia, 1997-2012 
Passive Secularism  Russia, 1990-1997  














Anti-religious    
 
 
6. Preparing the Conditions: Structural underpinnings of the shift 
A transition from Multiethnic Passive Secularism to Non-ethnic Confessional 
Collaboration model, which reflected a shift from Western liberalism to Statism, was 
instigated by a set of structural factors. These factors, I argue, prepared necessary 
conditions for an ideological change to take place. In this framework, I discuss the 
economic hardships of the 1990s and the outbreak of a violent conflict in the Northern 
                                                        
87 The literature on nationalism and state policies toward ethnicities identifies several models of ethnicity 
regimes. According to this typology states can either be monoethnic, multiethnic, or antiethnic (non-
ethnic). See Aktürk, Şener. Regimes of ethnicity and nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey. 
Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
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Caucasus to show how circumstances like these contributed to the formation of the 
environment that led to a major shift in Russian politics at the turn of the 21st century. 
The liberal ideology of the early 1990s, having in many ways deconstructed the 
economic, social benefit, and most importantly the upward mobility systems of the Soviet 
era, was largely unable to establish a well-functioning and efficient market economy. It 
also failed to deliver security as the violence in the North Caucasus spread into other 
Russian regions and organized crime gradually turned into business. The statist approach, 
which came to replace the liberal ideology in the late 1990s, promised to reestablish the 
order. Being able to stabilize the economy and restore control over the situation in the 
North Caucasus, statism gained legitimacy in rising popular demands for the rule of law, 
discipline, and preservation of traditional values. Relying on the confessional 
collaboration with traditional faiths, the statist ideology sought to build a patriotic 
consensus based on morality.88 Nevertheless, growing concerns about transparency and 
accountability of decision making under statism and increasing public awareness of 
corruption and opaque system of cover-ups raised questions about the persistence of 
statism as a dominant ideology in Russia. 
To summarize, every nation-state follows its own independent path, defined, 
among other things, by particular structural configurations, ideological variations, and 
                                                        
88 See chapter three for the discussion of a collaboration between the state and official institutions of 
Islamic administration in contemporary Russia. For an historical perspective on earlier models of state-
religion relations in the country, see Paul Werth, The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of 
Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia. Oxford University Press, 2014; Robert D. Crews, “Empire and the 
Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia,” American Historical 
Review 108, 1 (2003): 50-83. According to Paul Werth, for example, religious institutions were key 
mediators between the state and its subjects in imperial Russia. To describe the system of governing the 
diverse people in the country between the late 18th and early 20th centuries, Werth uses the term "multi-
confessional establishment." In part, the present analysis of Russia’s ethno-confessional regime between 
1997 and 2012 relies on inferences drawn from Werth’s historical account of religious policies in late 
imperial Russia. 
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ethno-confessional regimes. These factors, according to this study, determine the tone of 
the relationship between religion and the state and its level of stability. I suggest that the 
changing dynamics of state policies toward Islam in Russia during the first two decades 
after the collapse of communism depended on the ideological struggle between Western 
liberalism and Statism. Two distinct ethno-confessional regimes, which formed under the 
influence of dominant ideologies, explain the persistence of neutral policies in the 1990s 
and the interventionist attitude of the state in the 2000s. The continuity of the ideological 
dominance of Western liberalism in the early 1990s was in part obstructed by structural 
impediments. Thus, security and economic concerns prepared structural conditions for 
replacement of Western liberalism with Statism as a guiding set of principles for secular 
decision-making. The discussion of these dynamics sheds light on the developments of 













89 This approach can also be helpful in interpreting earlier periods of state-Islam relations in Russia. For 
further discussion, see the conclusion chapter. 
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7. Methodology and Sources 
The logic of my comparison of the two time periods is based on Mill’s method of 
agreement and difference (Mill 1851).  The method of difference looks for causes of 
different results in similar cases, while the method of agreement compares similar results 
in different cases. My cases relate to each other according to the method of difference. As 
described above, the two periods evolved in one country, Russia, and ended with two 
      Transformation of state policies toward Islam in Russia between 1990 and 2012 
Policy periods 1990-1997 1997-2012 
State policies 
toward Islam 
Neutral (non-involvement) Regulatory/interventionist 










Passive Secularism Confessional Collaboration with 




Multiethnic Non-ethnic  
Dominant 
Ideology 
Western Liberalism Statism  
Islam Element of culture Foundation of a patriotic 
consensus among indigenous 
Muslims 




Security threat to the regime and economic hardships 
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different results in terms of the state’s attitudes toward Islam.  Having said this, I also 
acknowledge the hardship of “the absolute elimination of adventitious elements,” and that 
“one can never be even approximately certain that two societies [cases] agree or differ in 
all aspects save one” (Durkheim, Solovay, Mueller, & Catlin, 1938, pp. 129-130). In fact, 
my two case periods contrast with each other on a number of points. However, in my 
assumption, these differences all serve as complementary factors. In other words, many 
other differences between the periods existed—but ideological struggles held greater 
sway over state policies and behavior.  
Taking into consideration the inherent and potential difficulties in making 
effective use of Mill’s method in the context of one country and being aware of the 
challenges associated with the comparative method in general (Lijphart, 1971, 1975; 
George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 153-160; Mill, 1851), I employ process-tracing 
methodology as “an essential supplement to all forms of case comparisons to reduce the 
dangers of false positives and false negatives”  (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 159).  
Process-tracing “attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and 
causal mechanisms—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of 
the dependent variable” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 208). In other words, it “can 
identify single or different paths to an outcome, point out variables that were otherwise 
left out in the initial comparison of cases, check for spuriousness, and permit causal 
inference on the basis of a few cases or even a single case” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 
215). My aim in using process-tracing is to overcome two challenges. First, showing the 
primacy of ideological debates and, second, displaying the link between them and the 
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adoption of particular policies—neutral or regulatory—toward Islam in Russia in the 
1990s and 2000s, respectively.  
My research is also designed according to George and Bennett’s “method of 
structured, focused comparison” (George & Bennett, 2005). The method is structured in a 
way that the researcher is expected to ask “general questions that reflect the research 
objective; these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize 
data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of 
the cases possible” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 67). The method is “focused” in that it 
deals only with certain aspects of the cases under examination (George & Bennett, 2005, 
p. 67). Following this method, I ask the same questions for each time period and focus on 
only one aspect of the two cases: state policy toward Islam. 
This study uses data gathered from three main sources. Primarily it depends on 
primary sources, such as political and legal documents. I examined the late Soviet and 
post-Soviet era laws, relevant committee reports, meeting proceedings, and court 
decisions on the federal and regional levels. In particular, I focused on the contents of and 
the discussions on the 1990 and 1997 Russian laws on religion. The research also 
extended to the memorandums and speeches of politicians and senior members of the 
established clergy. I gathered these data through archival research (e.g. National Archive 
of the Republic of Tatarstan and Central Historical Archive of the Republic of 
Bashkortostan), online sources (e.g. the Official website of the President of Russia or the 
website of the Council of Russia’s Muftis), and anthologies (e.g. Arapov 2011, Islam i 
Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo, a collection of documents related to the Soviet state policy 
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toward Islam between 1944 and 1990).90 I also, surveyed newspapers and magazines 
through the largest Russian-language database of national and regional newspapers 
(Integrum).91 
The second data source is the elite interviews that I conducted during my field 
research in Russia (Moscow, Kazan, and Ufa) with academics, politicians, bureaucrats, 
and religious leaders. The third source is books and articles (secondary literature) on the 
theory of state-religion regimes in general and the history of and current debates on state-
Islam relations in Russia in particular. 
8. Conclusion 
This chapter has laid out a theoretical framework for the analysis of two distinct 
policy trends toward Islam in Russia between 1990 and 2012. Seeking to explain the 
transformation of neutral policies in the early 1990s into regulatory policies in the 2000s, 
I propose that the main reason behind the transformation was an ideological shift from 
Western liberalism to Statism. Two different ethno-confessional regimes that formed 
under the influence of dominant ideologies describe the persistence of laissez faire 
attitudes of the state toward Islam from 1990 until around 1997 and the state’s continuous 
involvement with Islamic affairs since then onwards. I particularly emphasize the 
importance of structural factors that ultimately prepared necessary conditions for an 
ideological change.  
                                                        
90 http://kremlin.ru/ - the Official website of the President of Russia (last access March 9, 2015) 
http://www.muslim.ru/ - the website of the Council of Russia’s Muftis (last access March 9, 2015) 
Arapov, D. Yu. Islam i Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo (1944-1990): Sbornik Dokumentov. Vypusk 3. Moscow: 
Mardzhani. 2011. 
91 Integrum World Wide. http://www.integrumworld.com/ (last access March 9, 2015) 
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The next two chapters will separately discuss state-Islam relations during the 
1990s and the 2000s in the context of dominant ethno-confessional regimes: Multiethnic 
passive secularism and Non-ethnic confessional collaboration between the state and 
“traditional” religious organizations. The third empirical chapter will examine Russia’s 
post-Soviet ideologies in more detail and elaborate on the reasons of their persistence and 
change. Finally, the concluding chapter will review the empirical chapters and discuss 
their generalizable results. 
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Chapter 2 
Russia’s Muslims and Islam under the Multiethnic Passive Secularism, 1990-1997 
 
“Ever since they came to power in 1917, the Soviet Union's Communist rulers fought 
hard to expel God from their new society. Then [under Gorbachev’s rule] they 
astonished the world by agreeing to let Him in.” 
 
The Economist  
September 15, 199092 
 
Ikhtil¯af al-umma rahma 
(Difference within the Islamic tradition is the sign of God’s mercy) 





What explains Russia’s benevolent state approach toward Islam during the 1990s? 
Research on the political dynamics in Russia in the early post-Soviet era frequently refers 
to liberal and democratic norms that guided state’s social policies but seldom provides a 
conceptual framework or explains the mechanism of religious policy-making in the 
country. This chapter begins to fill this gap. I advance the hypothesis that state policies 
toward Islam in Russia between 1990 and 1997 were a product of a new ethno-
confessional regime that was designed according to Western liberal norms and principles. 
Employing process tracing techniques and historical data, I argue that judgment about 
religion, and particularly Islam, as an element subordinated to national identities induced 
the late Soviet-era reformers to adopt norms of passive secularism and to maintain the 
multiethnic ethnicity regime. Adoption of multiethnic passive secular regime entailed 
noninvolvement in religious affairs and reliance on ethnic federalism to govern Russia’s 
diverse population. Granting all religious groups equal access to the Russian public 
sphere and supporting the institutionalization of ethnic diversity facilitated the Islamic 






92 "Gorbachev, Glasnost and the Gospel." The Economist [US] 15 Sept. 1990: 117. Gale Biography In 




The Acem mosque is often referred to as a gemstone among the Muslim places of 
worship in the middle Volga city of Kazan’. Built in the architectural style of national 
romance eclecticism and decorated in the Medieval Oriental traditions, the mosque is one 
of the most admired prayer houses in the city. Since its opening in the late 19th century, 
the prayer house served the local Muslim community until the Soviet authorities 
converted it to a secular use in the 1930s. For the following six decades, for many local 
believers, the mosque became one of the symbols of a struggle against the atheist regime. 
In 1992, Acem was returned to believers and in less than a decade has restored its status 
as one of the most vibrant Islamic centers in the region. Hundreds of Muslims, young and 
old, began regularly attending weekly Friday sermons, filling the mosque to overflowing 
capacity, as its calls for prayer from a 51-meter minaret echoed throughout the district 











93 A minaret is a tall slender tower of a mosque with a balcony from which Muslims are called to prayer. 51 
meters equals to about 167 ft. 
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The resurrection story of the Acem mosque is not the only one of its kind in 
Russia’s post-Soviet history. It is exemplary of hundreds of other places of worship that 
reopened throughout the country soon after the Gorbachev regime dramatically changed 
state attitudes toward religion and introduced an era of unprecedentedly high religious 
freedom in the country. Arguably, every other town and village with a significant Muslim 
population has an “Acem story” of its own. Over the course of several years, after the fall 
of communism, Muslim communities not only restored abandoned prayer houses and 
built larger mosques.94 They founded new religious schools, published religious 
literature, raised charity for social services, and, along with other elements of Muslim 
lifestyle, publicly celebrated religious festivities (Derek Davis 1997). Most importantly, 
they did these under legal protection of the state, which granted religious communities 
unrestricted access to the public sphere and guaranteed basic human rights and freedoms. 
In the words of local believers, after decades of suffering, Allah blessed them with their 
dreams.95  
One of the earliest puzzles, which perplexed some observers of a post-Soviet 
religious revival in Russia at the time, was the question of why the collapse of an anti-
religious ideology gave rise to a centrifugal trend within the country’s indigenous Muslim 
community, resulting in an emergence of a number of discordant Islamic groups instead 
of a stronger Muslim ummah united around the Islamic faith (Silantyev 2002).96 Indeed, 
although many Muslims shared the negative view about Communisms’s anti-religious 
                                                        
94 Since 1990, the number of Islamic prayer houses in Russia increased from about 160 to more than seven 
thousands by 1997. See Filatov 2005 
95 Allah is the name of God in the Islamic faith. 
96 For a brief introduction to the topic of the post-Soviet disintegration of Russia’s Muslim community, see 
Silantyev, Roman. “Etnicheskii aspect raskola islamskogo soobschestva Rossii,” Institut Etnologii I 
Antropologii Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk (Russian Academy of Sciences), N149, Moscow, 2002 
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ideology and welcomed the return of religious freedom, far from all hurried to unite 
under the leadership of the established clergy. Instead, many, relying on new state 
regulations, sought to challenge the Soviet-era religious authorities and struggled to set 
up autonomous religious institutions. As a result, in less than a decade a total number of 
Muslim Spiritual Boards in Russia exceeded forty (Malashenko 1998, Silantyev 2008). 
Several explanations have been offered for this phenomenon. Some experts 
interpreted the proliferation of Islamic institutions as a natural outcome of elimination of 
the state control mechanisms. A number of other analysts pointed to the internal struggle 
for power and resources within the Muslim clergy. Still few observers prioritized either 
generational differences between the young and older cohorts of Muslim believers, the 
impact of the burgeoning nationalisms that burst out during the Gorbachev era, or 
deepening ideological disagreements within the Muslim community as the causes of the 
split (Silantyev 2007).97 Interestingly, however, very few commentators at the time paid 
close attention to the state’s response to these dynamics. To this date, no systematic study 
has been conducted to investigate why, despite recurring instances of dramatic intra-faith 
clashes and looming security concerns, the state did not directly intervene in Muslim 
religious affairs during the first half of the 1990s.  
This chapter will explore in detail the reasons of state neutrality toward 
dissolution of the Soviet era Islamic hierarchy and the general accommodation by the 
state of all religious groups in Russia. It will argue that the state’s holding back from 
                                                        
97 For a comprehensive discussion of various reasons of a split within Russia’s Muslim community in the 
post-Soviet era, see part 2 in Silantyev, Roman. Noveishaia Istoriia Islama v Rossii, Moscow: Algoritm, 
2007. Also, see Filatov, S. Atlas Sovremennoi Religionzoi Zhizni Rossii, Moscow, 2005; Malashenko, A. V. 
Islamskoe Vozrozhdenie v Sovremennoi Rossii, Moscow, 1998; and Malashenko, A.V. Islamskie Orientiry 
Severnogo Kavkaza, Moscow, 2001. 
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involvement in religious affairs was dictated by the establishment of a multiethnic 
passive secular regime in the country. This type of ethno-confessional regime developed 
in the late Soviet era, when many secular authorities were convinced that religious 
identities of the Soviet people were subordinated to ethno-national cultures. Inspired by 
democratic reforms and liberal ideals, late Soviet-era reformers envisioned Russia’s 
future as a multiethnic federation open to the public visibility of all religious beliefs and 
practices. The conviction that religious identities had been successfully subordinated to 
national cultures and could not become a mobilizing factor for Russia’s ethnic Muslims 
led secular decision-makers to assume that the Soviet ethnicity regime would be 
sufficient to organize Russia’s diverse population.98 
In what follows I will attempt to demonstrate that the dominance of a particular 
ethno-confessional regime largely describes Russia’s state neutrality toward Islam 
between 1990 and 1997. Part I will discuss some of the specificities of the Islamic 
practice in Russia during the late Soviet era and provide the framework for the analysis. It 
will refer to the past in order to explain the development of a cultural definition of Islam, 
which guided the thinking of policymakers during the transition period. Part II will begin 
to examine the dynamics of Russia’s post-Soviet ethno-confessional regime. It will 
discuss the emergence and development of passive secularism in Russia in the 1990s in 
the historical context of state-religion regimes in Russia. Part III will continue to examine 
                                                        
98 According to Akturk, many academics, policymakers, and ordinary people in the Soviet Union were 
accustomed to thinking of ethnicity as a primordial fact. This, in his opinion partly explains the continuity 
of the Leninist/Soviet approach toward ethnicity in post-Soviet Russia. Slezkine has also argued that the 
state actively promoted a primordialist understanding of ethnicity in the Soviet Union for generations, 
leaving behind not only an institutional, political, and ideological legacy but also a socio-psychological and 
mental legacy premised on primordial ethnic identities. For details see, Aktürk, Şener. Regimes of ethnicity 
and nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey. Cambridge University Press, 2012; Slezkine, Yuri. "The 
USSR as a communal apartment, or how a socialist state promoted ethnic particularism." Slavic 
Review (1994): 414-452. 
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the characteristics of Russia’s ethno-confessional regime. It will discuss some of the 
reasons of persistence of the multiethnic regime of ethnicity in the country.99 Having 
explored the basic features of Russia’s post-Soviet ethno-confessional regime and its 
reflections on state policies toward Islam in the country, the conclusion will summarize 
the findings and reassess the perception of Islam as an element of local indigenous 
cultures during the attempts to construct Russia’s post-Soviet identity in the early 1990s. 
It will provide a different perspective on how the early post-Soviet Russian leadership, 
confused by a fundamental ambiguity about Russian national identity and the state’s 
legitimacy, sought to rebuild a vast country with its troubled political history. 
 
Part I:  Dealing with the Soviet Legacy: Russia’s Muslims, Islam, and Culture in the 
1990s. 
The Soviet legacy had a great impact on the dynamics of Islamic revival in Russia 
during the first two decades after the collapse of the communist regime. The brutal Soviet 
state propaganda of atheism has had a transformative effect not only on Islamic 
institutions and the infrastructure of religious communities but also directly on the 
Muslim religious practice. During several decades of ruthless anti-religious campaign, 
thousands of mosques were destroyed or given over to “more socially productive” uses 
such as youth clubs, museums of atheism, or warehouses; Islamic endowments were 
confiscated; religious schools closed; and the cadre of religious clerics was dramatically 
reduced (Khalid 2004).100 Moreover, connections between Soviet Muslims and the 
Islamic world were cut, religious knowledge was vastly circumscribed and the site of its 
                                                        
99 In using the term ‘ethnicity regime’ or ‘regime of ethnicity’ I rely on the work of Sener Akturk Regimes 
of ethnicity and nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey. Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
100 Khalid, Adeeb. “Islam” in James Millar, Encyclopedia of Russian History. Thomson Gale, 2004 
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preservation and transmission was pushed into private or covert realms. As a result, by 
the 1980s, for many indigenous Muslims, Islam became synonymous with local 
“tradition” and “culture” (Khalid 2007).101 This chapter argues that such perception of 
Islam was one of the key factors in formation of state attitudes toward the religion in the 
1990s.  
 
1. The Soviet transformative impact on the Islamic practice 
Under Soviet rule, communist ideologists sought not only to eliminate religion 
from the public sphere, but also to remove it from the private life of the Soviet people. 
Guided by the Marxian view of religion as an “opium of the people” and Lenin’s vision 
that religion was “merely a product and reflection of the economic yoke within society,” 
Bolsheviks wanted to build a community based on strictly non-spiritual beliefs. As they 
vigorously discouraged religious practice, one of the main goals of the regime was to 
bring into being the Soviet man, who would not only be loyal to the state, but would also 
abandon his/her faith in the supernatural.102 
Throughout the Soviet era, ideologists of atheism used various tactics and 
methods to fight the “spiritual loyalties” of the masses.103 Initially, they separated religion 
                                                        
101 In fact, the roots of cultural definitions of Islam rest deeper in the history. Much of the practice of Islam 
in the region still is a fusion of pre-Islamic and Islamic practices that, during the preceding five hundred 
years, local jurisprudence had come to justify as acceptable. The Soviet era, however, has made the most 
profound impact on the religious component of these practices, eroding its spiritual purpose and content. 
102 This was one of the distinctions of the Soviet Russia from Imperial Russia. Under the Tsarist rule, 
Muslims could maintain their religious lives and remain good citizens through the service to the state. 
103 See Smolkin-Rothrock, Victoria. “A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: Soviet Atheism, 1954-1971." Ph.D. 
Dissertation. University of California, Berkeley (2010). 
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from state institutions and secular education.104 The state’s secular bureaucracy took over 
from religious clergy the critical function of keeping the record of the population and 
registering changes civil status (such as births, marriages and deaths).105 Furthermore, the 
1918 decree stipulated that activities of the government and social organizations were no 
longer to be accompanied by public religious rituals or ceremonies. Subsequent laws and 
regulations went beyond separation of Church and state and directly interfered with 
religious affairs.106 The 1929 Law on Religious Organizations put numerous limitations 
on religious institutions. All charitable work and various forms of social action were 
prohibited. Organizations that were not registered with the state were deemed illegal. 
Soon thousands of places of worship were destroyed and their property was 
confiscated.107 In addition, the state prohibited religious proselytism and launched 
massive anti-religious propaganda.  
The geopolitical context of WWII and a gradual adaptation of the surviving 
religious bodies to the Soviet regime opened a limited space for religious practice under a 
close supervision of state authorities. Communists realized that they needed support of 
the religious clergy to turn the tide of battle in the war. They came to a certain 
compromise with religious authorities, assigning both to the Church and Muslim 
                                                        
104 Decree “On the separation of church from state and school from church” January 23, 1918. (Dekret 
Soveta Narodnyh Komissarov ob otdelenii Tserkvi ot gosudarstva i shkoly ot Tserkvi ot 23 janvarja 1918 
g.) 
105 Smolkin-Rothrock, Victoria, “A Sacred Space Is Never Empty”: How Soviet Atheism Was Born, Lived, 
and Died. (Princetin, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming)    
106 The resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Government of the Russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic "On religious associations," with additional instructions from People's 
Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) in the regions. April 8, 1929. (Postanovlenie Vserossijskogo 
Tsentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta (VTsIK) i Soveta Narodnyh Komissarov Rossijskoj Sovetskoj 
Federativnoj Socialisticheskoj Respubliki (SNK RSFSR) "O religioznyh ob'edineniiah"). 
107 This was done under the pretext of fighting the Russian famine of 1921. 
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Muftiyates a strictly circumscribed role within the Soviet system.108 Throughout the rest 
of the Soviet era, the Orthodox Church as well as Muslim spiritual assemblies had to 
tread a thin line between satisfying the requirements of the state and ensuring a space in 
which religious institutions could legally exist.109  
In 1983, the Institute of Scientific Atheism of the Academy of Social Sciences of 
the CPSU Central Committee published a special report on the state of Islamic affairs in 
the Soviet Union and the process of secularization in the Soviet Muslim majority 
republics.110 The report reflected the evolving Soviet view about the daily lives of 
indigenous Muslims. According to the official account, many Soviet Muslims had 
become largely secularized. Islam for the indigenous population of the country’s Muslim 
majority areas had come to serve as a set of rituals rather than a spiritual guidance in this 
life and hereafter. Islamic religious rites and holidays had become largely associated with 
national customs and traditions (Filimonov 1983:5).  
The impact of the Soviet experience on indigenous Muslims was indeed 
transformative in many ways. For example, by 1980, female participation in labor force 
among traditionally Muslim groups had reached an unprecedented level of 40%.111 
Almost every third registered marriage was either an interfaith or an interethnic marriage 
between representatives of various ethnic and religious groups.112 One Soviet expert drew 
                                                        
108 In part, to serve this purpose, the Patriarchate was reestablished in 1943. In addition to the Muftiyat in 
Ufa, Muslim spiritual assemblies were opened in Makhachkala, Tashkent, and Baku. 
109 For a more detailed analysis of Islam under Soviet rule, see Ro’i, Yaacov, Islam in the Soviet Union: 
from the Second World War to Gorbachev, London: Hurst, 2000. 
110 Filiminov, E.G. et. al. Islam v SSSR: Osobennosti protsessa sekulyarizatsii v respublikah Sovetskogo 
Vostoka. Moskva: Mysl’, 1983. Also see the 31st issue of Voprosy Nauchnogo Ateizma “Sovremenniy Islam 
i problemy areisticheskogo vospitaniya” (1983). 
111 The country’s average at the time was 51% (Filimonov 1983:33, 64). 
112 Mixed marriages varied 24 and 35% depending on the region. 
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attention to the fact that traditionally non-Muslim names such as Albert, Robert, Alfred, 
Artur, Emil, Ernest, and Rudolf (for boys) and Elvira, Elmira, Elina, Albina, Klara, 
Violetta, Lyucia, and Eleonora (for girls) became widely spread among the children born 
to families, in which at least one of the parents was an ethnic Muslim (Nikonov 1974).113 
With the state support, the Soviet holidays such as anniversaries of the October 
revolution, Labor Day, International Women’s Day, etc. became more and more popular 
among the Soviet indigenous Muslims.114 In addition, the Russian language, in practice, 
became the dominant language of the state, culture, and education for all the peoples of 
the USSR.115 All these were interpreted as symbols of declining Muslim religious 
convictions and abandoning of traditional Muslim lifestyles. As the late Soviet era 
experts accurately pointed out, in the context of a developing Soviet society, Islam was 
rapidly loosing its old functions as a reference point in the daily lives of indigenous 
Muslim communities (Filimonov 1983:39).116 As the Soviet model of development, 
including its education system, professional life, as well as its scheme of upward mobility 
                                                        
113 Nikonov, V.A. Imya i obschestvo. Moskva 1974 
114 For the discussion of integration of Soviet holidays in the life of Muslim societies see the 1983 report of 
the Institute of Scientific Atheism of the Academy of Social Sciences on Islam in the USSR. For details, 
see Filiminov, E.G. et. al. Islam v SSSR: Osobennosti protsessa sekulyarizatsii v respublikah Sovetskogo 
Vostoka. Moskva: Mysl’, 1983. Also see the 31st issue of Voprosy Nauchnogo Ateizma “Sovremenniy Islam 
i problemy areisticheskogo vospitaniya” (1983). 
115 From the late 1930s until the late 1980s, Soviet language policy increasingly promoted Russification. 
National languages remained equal in declarations, but in practice Russian became the dominant language 
of the state. It was only at the end of the 1980s, when a measure of political and cultural self– 
determination was restored, that the various Soviet nations and their languages acquired a higher status. 
(Reznik in Millar 2004) 
116 In fact, this process was under way since the Tsarist era, when secular norms had gradually started to 
penetrate into daily lives of the Empire’s Muslims. For an excellent review of some of these processes in 
Tsarist Russia, see Crews, Robert D. For prophet and tsar: Islam and empire in Russia and Central Asia. 
Harvard University Press, 2009. For the review of the Soviet era, see Tasar, Eren Murat. Soviet and 
Muslim: the institutionalization of Islam in Central Asia, 1943-1991. Ph.D. Dissertation. Harvard 
University, 2010. 
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matured, religion was pushed further into a private sphere until its total melting away as a 
phenomenon.117  
The late Soviet era policymakers, nevertheless, acknowledged that some elements 
of Islamic religious practice remained deeply entrenched in traditional Muslim 
societies.118 As one Soviet editorial put it, although the overwhelming majority of the 
population “has broken away from religion,” Islam continued to “exert its pernicious 
influence on some of the population.”119 Thus, while the degree of observance of daily 
prayers and fasting were noted to be very modest, customary practices of Muslim male 
circumcision, wedding and burial ceremonies, reportedly, were highly observed 
(Filimonov 1983: 71). As of the early 1980s, male circumcision was almost universal 
among Muslim boys, regardless the level of religiosity of their parents.120 A similarly 
high level of observance was noted in Muslim wedding rituals, burial ceremonies, and 
festivities commemorating the 3rd, 7th, and 40th days of a person’s passing away.121 Still 
about 15% of urban adults in Tadjikistan, for example, were estimated to be fasting 
during Ramadan.  
Persisting religious practices have always been a target of the Soviet ideologists. 
In the early stages of the Soviet development they were seen as a direct threat to the 
communist ideology. As the Soviet state strengthened, these religious rites and rituals 
                                                        
117 See chapter four for a more detailed analysis of some other structural factors. 
118 Despite the declining trend, the level of religiosity among the university and secondary school graduates 
was reported to be ten times higher among the Muslim than among the non-Muslim population of the 
country. See James Critchlow, 'Minarets and Marx', The Washington Quarterly, vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 1980, 
pp. 47-57, quoting T. S. Saidbaev, Islam i obshchestvo: opyt istoriko-sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya. 
Moscow, 1978, p. 181  
119 Editorial, Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 27 December 1981.  
120 Up to 17% of adult Tajiks of various age groups between 16 and 40 considered circumcision a national 
ritual (Filimonov 1983: 74).  
121 In many cases religious rituals were performed even for self-proclaimed atheists upon their death as a 
final wish of their relatives (Filimonov 1983:76) 
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were increasingly regarded as remnants of medieval feudal patriarchal social order and a 
consequence of bypassing the internal Muslim bourgeois revolution in the pre-Soviet era. 
The fact that oftentimes certain rituals were practiced in families of self-proclaimed 
atheists, among the intelligentsia, and even by members of the party strengthened the 
belief of Soviet authorities that religious and national-cultural traditions were 
interconnected in the consciousness of the Muslim peoples (Ro’i 1984:40). As Yaacov 
Roi pointed out, in Central Asia, “the many centuries of Islam's domination meant that 
many rites had become customary, fixed in people's consciousness and interwoven with 
customs.” As a result, they had become part of people's lifestyle and were “observed not 
only by believers but also by many non-believers” (Ro’i 1984:31).122  
Communist policymakers were convinced that the social progress was largely in 
control of the socialist regime. Available data on rising urbanization rates, growing 
literacy, and relatively low levels of religiosity contributed to the strengthening of this 
belief among the Soviet leadership. Islam, for them, did not and could not function as a 
regulator of socio-political activity among Soviet Muslims. Religious practices were 
expected to wither away through the socialist mode of development, Soviet socio-
economic policies, cultural reforms, and popularization of the Soviet lifestyle 
(Ul’yanovski 1979: 72; Garadzha 1983: 15). A class struggle and a common effort to 
build socialism were seen as key elements that could and would unite Soviet people. 
Some of the ideological hardliners were critical even of the rare attempts of some Soviet 
Islamic authorities to adapt Islamic lifestyle to modern Soviet way of life.123 According to 
                                                        
122 Ro'i, Yaacov. "The task of creating the new Soviet man: ‘Atheistic propaganda’ in the Soviet Muslim 
areas." Europe‐Asia Studies 36.1 (1984): 26-44. 
123 Some Islamic preachers, for example, called for fasting pointing out its positive medical effects. 
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socialist thinkers, it was nothing more than an effort to climb on the bandwagon of the 
socialist progress (Madzhidov 1983: 225).  
 
2. Islam as a potential threat 
The belief in a transformative impact of the Soviet experience, a widely spread 
perception that Islam in the Soviet Union had acquired cultural definitions, and the 
conviction that religion would ultimately wither away didn’t mean that Islam had totally 
ceased to be an issue of concern for communist planners. The Soviet expert community 
observed with anxiety the role that the Islamic faith played in political developments in 
Iran and Afghanistan starting in the late 1970s.124 In addition, Soviet authorities grew 
increasingly suspicious of the “Western bourgeoisie’s” attempts to use “human rights 
rhetoric” among Soviet ethnic minorities to weaken the socialist regime from within 
(Filimonov 1983:152). They thought that the West was seeking out for religious fanatics 
and extremists among Soviet citizens who would question the legitimacy of the Soviet 
order and the regime.125  
The Iranian Revolution and mobilization of Islamic mujahideen in Afghanistan in 
the late 1970s taught Soviet policymakers that the Islamic factor could take multiple 
forms and play different roles in various conditions. Soviet authorities observed that in 
                                                        
124 See Iy.P.Zuev’s speech at the all-Russia conference at the Russian Academy of State Service (RAGS). 
http://www.rusoir.ru/2009.php?action=view&id=486 (accessed on December 10, 2014). Zuev presented a 
report on the activities of the Institute of Scientific Atheism between 1964 and 1991. 
125 This was also reflected in several academic studies in the West. In the final two decades of the Soviet 
Union, a number of western Sovietologists argued that Islam represented a powerful counter-ideology to 
communism, which constituted with the increased demographic weight of Muslims in the Soviet Union a 
serious threat to the Soviet regime. See, for example: Alexandre Bennigson and Marie Broxup, The Islamic 
threat to the Soviet state (New York: St Martin’s, 1983); Alexandre Bennigson and Chantal Lemercier-
Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1967); Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, Decline of 
an empire: the Soviet Socialist Republics in revolt (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979); Muriel Atkin, The 
subtlest game: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1987); Nancy 
Lubin, Labour and nationality in Soviet Central Asia: an uneasy compromise (London: Macmillan, 1985). 
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the Iranian case religious clergy took the position against pro-American regime of the 
Shah. In Afghanistan, Islamic extremists rallied against the revolutionary Socialist 
government. Partly driven by the concern that Islamist ideologies might spread into 
Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Soviets realized the necessity to keep Islam 
under close watch. The issue of “Islamic threat” was brought up at the 26th Congress of 
the Communist Party.126 Later, a special issue was prepared by the Institute of Scientific 
Atheism of the Academy of Social Sciences, which presented some information that 
Soviet experts had to take into account while drafting counter-measures against Western 
efforts to “speculate on religious matters” in Soviet Central Asia and beyond. In part, it 
discussed the potential threat of Wahhabism – a conservative branch of Islam – and the 
Islamist anti-Soviet propaganda.127 
The above and preceding reports of the Soviet Institute of Scientific Atheism 
reveal that the Soviet leadership became increasingly wary of numerous “research 
institutes” around the globe that conducted research on Soviet Muslims and disseminated 
anti-communist propaganda.128 According to Ro’i, Soviet authorities were suspicious of 
'bourgeois clerical centers,' which allegedly directed hostile propaganda at the USSR and 
the Central Asian Republics in particular, seeking 'to propagate religious sentiments and 
mystical dogmas (Ro’i 1984:32).129 Reportedly, these research institutes published 
                                                        
126 The Congress was held on February 23, 1981. 
127 “O tak nazyvaemom Vahhabizme,” Information bulletin of the Institute of Scientific Atheism N20. 
Pp.26-29. 1988. Also see earlier publications of the Institute: 
Filiminov, E.G. et. al. Islam v SSSR: Osobennosti protsessa sekulyarizatsii v respublikah Sovetskogo 
Vostoka. Moskva: Mysl’, 1983; and the 31st issue of Voprosy Nauchnogo Ateizma “Sovremenniy Islam i 
problemy areisticheskogo vospitaniya” (1983). 
128 Reportedly, many of these centers were funded by Saudi and Western endowments and located in 
countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Indonesia, Turkey, and Germany. 
129 Ro'i, Yaacov. "The task of creating the new Soviet man: ‘Atheistic propaganda’ in the Soviet Muslim 
areas." Europe‐Asia Studies 36.1 (1984): 26-44. 
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articles, which discussed, among other things, the methods of fight against the Marxist 
ideology and Soviet colonialism; called for establishment of ties between Muslim 
brothers, who suffered under the despotic Soviet regime, and the Islamic world; and 
encouraged Soviet Muslims to demand political and economic rights and to raise the 
question of Turkestan in the United Nations.130 As one Soviet editorial put it, “bourgeois 
propaganda” tried to inspire Soviet people with views and ideas which contradicted the 
Marxist-Leninist world view, endeavoring in particular to transfer "the flame of the 
Islamic regeneration" into the Soviet Union in order to destabilize the position in the 
republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and the Caucasus, to inflame 
nationalistic prejudices in these regions and to arouse among believers dissatisfaction 
with the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state (Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 27 
December 1981).131 In part, as a result of these collective “foreign” efforts, in 1974 some 
of the international Islamic groups declared Communism an anti-Muslim ideology 
(Filimonov 1983:157). Occasionally, foreign reporters did not hesitate to accuse the 
Soviet Muslim clergy of betrayal of Islamic principles.  
 
3. The Soviet state’s response to a potential Islamic threat 
The reaction of the Soviet state to the potential threat of an Islamist ideology was 
prompt and thorough. The Soviet leadership actively engaged in preparation of adequate 
counter-measures to ensure that indigenous Muslims remained loyal to their state. 
                                                        
130 Perception that the main goal of foreign research on Soviet Muslims was to hinder Soviet plans in the 
Muslim world and weaken the ideological grip over indigenous Muslims in the country fed the Soviet 
skepticism even about academic studies on Islam in the Soviet Union.  
131 Editorial, Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 27 December 1981. For more details, see Ro'i, Yaacov. "The task of 
creating the new Soviet man: ‘Atheistic propaganda’ in the Soviet Muslim areas." Europe‐Asia 
Studies 36.1 (1984), p.33. 
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However, the beginning of a comprehensive perestroika initiative put a lid on the 
communist regime’s final anti-religious campaigns. Despite clear signs of the unfolding 
danger, the late Soviet leadership was committed to the liberalization of religious policy.  
The Communist leadership was vigilant against the Western efforts to revive 
nationalist fever among Soviet Muslims. As a counter-measure against foreign 
propaganda tools such as Radio Free Liberty, which allegedly called for religious 
uprising in Soviet Central Asia and portrayed the US and the UK as protectors of Islamic 
interests and Muslim people, communists launched a comprehensive counter-offensive 
campaign. Discursively, in response to accusations of massively abusing religious 
freedoms and pursuing anti-religious policies, they argued that the secularization of 
Soviet society was not a result of the Soviet administrative pressure. Rather, for them, it 
was a product of development, enlightenment, and socio-economic transformations under 
the socialist regime.132 They also pointed to the principles of secularism enshrined in the 
Soviet constitution and the distinctiveness of the socialist regime.133 The Soviet 
authorities rejected the criticism that the communist regime prosecuted people for 
religious beliefs. For them, the regime, at the most, could only penalize those who hid 
behind religious banners while pursuing anti-state activities. Socialist authorities also 
argued that the Soviet state did not discriminate against the clergy, who were free to 
benefit from political and civil rights granted to them by the civil law. Moreover, the 
regime proudly claimed that religious clergy in the Soviet Union supported the socialist 
                                                        
132 To a certain extent, this indeed reflects the evolution of the Soviet thinking about religion. From 1917 to 
1990, Soviet religious policies varied between militant atheism and scientific enlightenment projects. For 
more details, see Smolkin-Rothrock dissertation (2010). 
133 Soviet laws and the Constitutions never officially banned religion. This is the reason why technically the 
Soviet era regime may be considered close to an assertive secular model of state-religion relations. 
However, the use of state resources for anti-religious propaganda makes it distinct from secular regimes 
that observe clear separation of church and state and don’t interfere into religious affairs. 
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order, reflecting the popular will. According to them, if the clergy didn’t support the 
socialist regime, religious institutions would loose parishioners. Indeed, loyal Islamic 
clergy actively called for respect and love for the motherland, praised Soviet rule for 
strengthening the brotherhood among the peoples, preached about the compatibility of 
Islam with the Soviet lifestyle, and blamed Western imperialism and colonialism for 
setting some nations against others. Mufti of Central Asia Babakhanov, for example, 
publicly spoke in defense of Soviet regime preaching that the main goal of Soviet 
Muslims was to strengthen economic, scientific, and cultural potential of the Soviet 
Union and to contribute to the growth of its prestige. Some clerics went so far as to claim 
that Muslim values were in harmony with the moral code of the builder of 
communism.134  
To support the rhetoric, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) issued respective orders “About taking additional measures with 
regards to the activation of militant Islam in Asia and Africa”135 and “About 
strengthening of fight with Islamic influence.”136 As late as in May 1988, in his letter to 
the Central Committee, head of the Council for Religious Affairs Kharchev still called for 
the Party to take active measures in order to counter anti-Soviet foreign propaganda 
among Soviet Muslims, especially in the context of an ongoing crisis in Afghanistan and 
the situation in Iran.137 Among other things, the Council for Religious Affairs 
                                                        
134 See Sovet Sharki Musulmonnari 1976, N2, p.3 
135 CPSU Central Committee order from 21 October 1985. Postanovlenie TsK KPSS ot 21 oktjabrja 1985 
goda “O dopolnitel'nyh meroprijatijah v svjazi s aktivizaciej v stranah Azii i Afriki ‘voinstvujushhego 
islama’.” 
136 CPSU Central Committee order from 18 August 1986. Sekretnoe postanovlenie TsK KPSS ot 18 
avgusta 1986 g. “Ob usilenii bor'by s vlijaniem islama.”  
137 Kharchev’s letter to the CPSU Central Committee dated 16 May 1988. Pis’mo predsedatelya Soveta po 
delam religij pri SM SSSR K.M. Kharcheva, napravlennoe v TsK KPSS. 16 Maya 1988. 
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recommended increasing the number of students in state-approved Islamic schools in 
Bukhara and Tashkent, reducing the duration of receiving education for prospective 
Muslim clerics from 7 to 5 years, and increasing the funding of state-approved Muslim 
Spiritual Boards. 
 
4. Commitment to liberalism 
In the meantime, while the expert community watched the religious dynamics in 
the Soviet Muslim republics with a fair amount of anxiety and worry, Mikhail Gorbachev 
launched “the most ambitious, sweeping and, from the West's point of view, promising 
program of reform in the history of the Soviet Union” (Mandelbaum 1989).138 Neither 
warnings about a looming threat of Islamic resurgence, nor the early signs of ethnic strife 
during Gorbachev’s tenure could deflect the Soviet reformers from the liberalization path. 
In fact, for many of them, phenomena such as the clash between Armenians and Azeris 
over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, protests in the Baltic republics, and the 1986 street 
riots in Almaty came as a surprise.139 Gorbachev himself believed that the nationality 
question in the Soviet Union was “solved in principle”.140 For him, the virus of enmity 
was cultivated not by masses but by intellectuals, who were the bearers of nationalism.141 
Many in the political leadership were convinced that the overwhelming majority of the 
country’s population had acquired the feeling of belonging to a single family, the Soviet 
                                                        
138 Mandelbaum, Michael. "Ending the cold war." Foreign Affairs (1989): 16-36. 
139 In June 1987, a small demonstration was held in Riga to mark the anniversary of the deportation of 
thousands of Latvians to labor camps. In February 1988, a nationalist demonstration was held in Estonia. 
The 1986 riots in Almaty revealed sensitivity of Kazakhs towards the ethnicity of an appointed party 
leader. For more on Kazakh nationalism, see Sarsembayev, Azamat. "Imagined communities: Kazak 
nationalism and Kazakification in the 1990s." Central Asian Survey 18.3 (1999): 319-346.  
140 Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich. October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues. No. 276. Novosti 
Press, 1987. 
141 Walker, Edward W. Dissolution: Sovereignty and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2003. 
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people, and were totally loyal to the state.142 Ironically, this turned out to be nothing more 
than another example of a wishful thinking. The deepening of the ideological crisis gave 
liberal voices more and more opportunities to express alternative visions for religious 
policy making, suggest the new limits of religious pluralism, and discuss the possibility 
of opening up the public sphere for religious practice.143  
  The following sections will demonstrate that both religious and nationality 
policies are essential for understanding Russian state approach toward indigenous 
Muslims and Islam in the early post-Soviet era. They will show that in the context of 
political liberalization, thinking of religion in general and Islam in particular as a cultural 
phenomenon prompted the reform-era policymakers to adopt a particular kind of ethno-
confessional regime that was intended to continue administer Russia’s diverse society 
based on institutionalized multinationality (Brubaker 1996). The multiethnic passive 
secular regime emerged as a result of key decisions taken about 1) the criteria for 
membership and expression in a newly emerging post-Soviet society, and 2) the criteria 
for access of religious groups to the public sphere. As a result, norms of passive 
secularism and the multiethnic system of governance formed the basis of an ethno-
confessional regime that guided state policies toward Islam through 1997. The 
accommodative stance of secular authorities that prevailed between 1990 and 1997, as 
this study suggests, should be attributed to the rulings of the multiethnic passive secular 
                                                        
142 In fact, as some scholars of Soviet Central Asia pointed out, there was no necessary contradiction 
between being Muslim and a loyal Soviet citizen. Most Soviet Muslims, according to them, had no 
ambition to challenge, let alone overthrow, the Soviet state. See, for example: Muriel Atkin, The subtlest 
game: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1987); Nancy Lubin, 
Labour and nationality in Soviet Central Asia: an uneasy compromise (London: Macmillan, 1985); 
Dannreuther, Roland. "Islamic radicalization in Russia: an assessment."International Affairs 86.1 (2010): 
109-126. 
143 Garadzha, “Pereosmyslenie,” Nauka i Religiia 1989 
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regime and liberal reforms that led to its establishment. The table below summarizes the 
regime’s conceptual components. 
Table 9: Multiethnic Passive Secularism and Islam, 1990-1997 
State-religion regime Ethnicity regime 
Passive secularism Multiethnic ethnicity regime 
Unrestricted access of all 
religious groups to the 
pubic sphere 
Official support for 
institutionalization of ethnicities  
Non-involvement in religious affairs 
Cultural Islam (religion subordinated to ethnic identities) 
 
 
Part II: Islam under passive secularism 
By the mid-1980s it became clear that the decades-long efforts to eliminate 
religion from the private lives of the Soviet people had failed. Leading atheist ideologues 
of the Communist Party publicly admitted that neither militant atheism nor modernization 
and “scientific enlightenment” were able to root out the religion and replace it with the 
belief in the communist ideology.144 As Gorbachev launched his comprehensive 
perestroika initiative, the state sought to renegotiate its relations with religion. Rapid 
social changes and democratization of the Soviet society required development of a new 
legal approach toward religion. Wide range of proposals came from various segments of 
the population including the clergy, academics, the general public, and even former 
propagandists of atheism. Some of the key concerns had to do with granting legal status 
                                                        
144 Garadzha, V. “Pereosmyslenie,” Nauka i Religiya, N1, 1989, pp. 2-6. 
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to religious organizations and the return of religion to the public life.145 In academic 
terms, this implied a conceptual transition from an anti-religious regime toward another 
form of state-religion regime. 
According to the available typology of state-religion regimes, discussed in chapter 
one, Russia, in theory, could either become a religious state, a state with an established 
religion, or a truly secular country. The key criterion that would determine the direction 
in which the country would develop further was the level of visibility that religion would 
have in the public sphere and the role it would play. If Christian Orthodox dogmas were 
to become a basis for legislation and jurisdiction under the new regime, then Russia 
would become a religious state. If Russian Orthodoxy or any other religion were granted 
a special status that would give them access to exclusive privileges unavailable to other 
faiths, then the country would become more like a state with an established religion. If, 
on the other hand, the state maintained control over governmental institutions and 
restrained itself from interfering into religious affairs, it would become a secular state. 
Within the category of secular states it was also important to define whether religion 
would be confined to the private sphere or be allowed a public presence and visibility.146 
In theory, passive secularism describes regimes that maintain separation of church and 
state but allow public visibility of religion. In contrast to other types of state-religion 
regimes, it does not aim to confine religion to the private sphere, nor does it provide 
privileges to any particular confession (Kuru 2009).  
                                                        
145 This included meeting legal demands of religious communities with respect to returning religious 
buildings and property, construction of places of worship, publishing religious literature, receiving religious 
education, celebrating religious holidays, etc. 
146 For more detailed analysis of state-religion-regimes, see Kuru 2009, pp. 30-31 
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These questions became a subject of intense debates when the Soviet leader 
pledged in April 1988 that the state would start a broad dialogue with society, including 
religious actors.147 Transition into a religious model of government a la Iran has never 
really been an option for Russia. Possibility of turning the country into a state with an 
established religion was also very dim. Neither the state nor the Church seemed to be 
interested in such a model. Metropolitan Kirill, who at the time represented the interests 
of the Church at the meetings on the future of state-religion relations, pointed out that the 
Church did not seek a special status. He acknowledged that historically the Church was 
most comfortable when it did not depend on the state.148 Rather, Metropolitan pointed 
out, attaining a legal/juridical status for the Church was one of the main priorities for the 
Russian Orthodox clergy. Therefore, at the time, the most feasible option to reform state-
religion relations within the Soviet constitutional boundaries seemed to be through 
abandoning state-sponsored atheist propaganda and preserving the secular order.  
For the secular authorities this task of renegotiating multiple balances and 
redefining roles of the state and religion in a secularist framework was much more 
complicated and painful than it may initially seem. Coming to terms with the Soviet 
legacy required not only renouncing anti-religious propaganda, but also allowing 
                                                        
147 On the 29th of April 1988, Gorbachev met in the Kremlin with the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia 
Pimen and members of the Synod of Russian Orthodox Church. Gorbachev noted: "The mistakes that were 
made concerning the church and believers in the 30s and the following years are being corrected... 
extensive public dialogue became possible... The state’s relation to the church, to believers has to be 
defined by interests of strengthening the unity of all workers, all our people". (M. S. Gorbachev, volume 6, 
p. 201). See, Mikhail Gorbachev, “Sobranie Sochinenii,” Volume 6. Gorbachev-Fond. Moscow: Ves’ Mir, 
2008. Also see the interview with Patriarch Pimen in Izvestiia. “Tysiacheletie. Beseda s partiarkhom 
Moskovskim i vseia Rusi Pimenom,” Izvestiia, April 8, 1988. 
148 Metropolitan Kilrill could have referred to the lessons learned in 1917, when people did not protest 
against the state clamp on the Church.  
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religious proselytism, defining criteria for religion’s access to the public sphere, and 
ensuring equal treatment of all religious groups. 
In the late 1980s, leading state ideologists organized multiple roundtables to 
discuss state-religion relations in the context of socio-political transformations and 
democratizing reforms. One of such meetings took place at the headquarters of the 
“Communist” journal – the main ideological outlet of the Communist Party.149 The core 
team of communist thinkers, which included the director of the Institute of Scientific 
Atheism Viktor Garadzha, editor of the journal Science and Religion N.A. Koval’skii, 
leading expert of the Institute of Philosophy Mr. Solov’ev, Secretary of the Institute of 
State and Law Mr. Yakovlev, editor-in-chief of the journal Communist Mr. Bikkenin and 
a few others, was accompanied by two representatives of faith – Archbishop Kirill and 
Lithuanian Catholic priest Alyulis.150 Meeting proceedings reveal the breadth and depth 
of the ideological crisis the Soviet system was experiencing. In the spirit of an academic 
inquiry, objectivity, and professionalism, participants reflected on the past communist 
experience and the nature of the emerging ideological pluralism.151 Discussions, heavily 
laced with self-criticism, made frequent references to international norms, Russian 
history, and the history of western philosophical thought.152 The group identified some of 
the concerns and important principles that would need to be taken into account while 
drafting the new law on religion. Some of the most contested debates evolved around 
                                                        
149 “Svoboda sovesti i vozrozhdenie gumanizma,” Kommunist, N3 (1355) February 1990. 
150 Note that no representatives of Islam were present at the meeting. This was brought up as an issue 
during the meeting. Representatives of the Muslim clergy were invited, however, at later stages of 
negotiations.  
151 For details, see Kommunist, N3 (1355) February 1990 and Svobodnaya Mysl’, N2 (1609) 2010, pp.125-
145. 
152 For further analysis of self-criticism of Soviet atheist ideologists, see Garadzha’s “Pereosmyslenie” 
article in January 1989 issue of Nauka i Relegiia. The article and discussion that it provoked symbolize the 
change in Soviet thinking about religion. For publishing this article Garadzha lost his job at the journal. 
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questions regarding the legitimacy of state-led atheist propaganda, rights and 
responsibilities of believers and nonbelievers in the emerging order; opportunities for 
religious proselytism; and the legal status of religious organizations.153  
On many points the consensus was hard to achieve. Those who hoped to save the 
socialist order went back to Marx’s and Lenin’s statements on religion, inviting others to 
rethink whether socialism and religion were incompatible154. Many others criticized the 
Soviet approach and focused on the low effectiveness of methods that were used to fight 
religion since 1917. Still few others reiterated their faith in the power modernization that 
would ultimately wither the religion anyway. One point, however, that the majority could 
agree upon was that the emerging more liberal regime had to remain secular and ensure 
equal access of all religions to the public sphere.155 Realizing the burden of an earlier 
(mis)treatment of all religions, the main goal was reconciliation with the faith and 
ensuring neutrality of the state towards all religions and confessions. This liberal 
approach toward religion, which developed during the perestroika, had a lasting effect on 
religious revival in the post-Soviet era.  
 
1. The legal foundations of unrestricted public religious practice 
                                                        
153 Ultimately, when the new laws on religion were adopted in the USSR and the RSFSR, it became evident 
that the two took different approaches with respect to atheism. The RSFSR law deals explicitly with 
atheism, while the USSR law avoids this term (see, for instance, Articles 3, 4, 8 in the RSFSR law). In 
addition, the RSFSR law did not prohibit material assistance by state organs to religious associations. 
Article 16 of the RSFSR Law includes an explicit prohibition on the conducting of atheistic activities in 
places used by believers for worship. Such a prohibition does not exist in the USSR law. For more details 
on differences and similarities between the USSR and the RSFSR laws, see Lukasz Hirszowicz, “A note on 
the New RSFSR law on religion.” Soviet Jewish Affairs, Vol. 20, No 2-3, 1990, Pp. 39-43. 
154 See comments on Garadzha’s “Pereosmyslenie” article in subsequent issues of Nauka i Religiia and 
follow the debate that it caused. 
155 Svobodnaya Mysl’, 2 (1609) 2010, pp.125-145.  
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In many ways, the 1988 celebrations of the Millennium of the ‘Baptism of Rus’ 
became a symbol of a major change in Russian state attituides toward religion. In her 
pioneering work on Soviet atheismVictoria Smolkin Rothrock calls the commemoration 
of the anniversary “a litmus test for the sincerity of Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms.”156 
At least, these celebrations were perceived as such by many observers of religious life in 
the Soviet Union, including numerous indigenous Muslims.157 The Millennium became 
the first major religious event in decades publicly celebrated on a mass scale and widely 
covered in the Soviet press and television. Despite strong skepticism of some observers, 
the events have indeed marked the beginning of a new era in state-religion relations.158 
Celebrations were attended by high-ranking state officials and took place at the Bolshoi 
Theater and other state property with all the signs of state approval. By inviting the 
Orthodox Church to take part in perestroika and offering the religious clergy to play an 
active role in the moral revival of the society, Gorbachev, in fact, allowed the return of 
religion to Soviet public life. Retrospectively, according to Smolkin-Rothrock, this 
moment can be regarded as an end of state-sponsored atheism in the Soviet Union in the 
name of ideological pluralism.159 
                                                        
156 Smolkin-Rothrock, Victoria, “A Sacred Space Is Never Empty”: How Soviet Atheism Was Born, Lived, 
and Died. (Princetin, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming) 
157 See House, Francis. Millennium of Faith: Christianity in Russia, AD 988-1988. St. Vladimir's Seminary 
Press, 1988. Also see Victoria Smolkin-Rothrock, “A Sacred Space Is Never Empty”: How Soviet Atheism 
Was Born, Lived, and Died. (Princetin, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming). 
158 Keston College scholars and other well-informed agencies maintained concerns about imprisoned 
Christians and those sent to penal work-camps or internal exile. In April 1987 it was announced that 42 
prisoners of conscience had been released before completing their sentences. They included Alexander 
Ogorodnikov and Gleb Yakunin. 
159 Smolkin-Rothrock suggests that “The state's break with atheism in favor of "universal values" and 
"ideological pluralism," and the state-sanctioned return of religion to Soviet public life, signaled the end of 
the Communist Party's ideological monopoly, and therefore its moral and political legitimacy”. See 
Smolkin-Rothrock, Victoria, “A Sacred Space Is Never Empty”: How Soviet Atheism Was Born, Lived, and 
Died. (Princetin, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming)   
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The following year, in 1989, Soviet Muslims, though on a much smaller scale, 
organized similar celebrations. By fate or destiny, that year corresponded to a 1100th 
anniversary of adoption of Islam by the Volga Bulghars and the 200th anniversary of the 
establishment of the first Muslim Spiritual Assembly in Russia.160 Talgat Tadzhuddin, 
head of the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims in Ufa, a successor organization of the 
Assembly, led a sizable group of Muslims to the ruins of an ancient city of Bolgar in 
Tatarstan to commemorate Khan Almysh’s meeting with Ibn Fadlan’s delegation from 
the Abbasid Caliph and voluntary conversion of indigenous tribes to Islam. For the first 
time in several decades indigenous Muslims attained a chance to gather for a collective 
public prayer of a large scale and invite foreign Muslim guests to join and lead the 
religious service. In the same year Mufti Tadzhuddin, a public religious figure, was 
awarded a title of “Tatar of the Year.”161 
Preparations for public celebrations of the Orthodox Millennium and the 1100th 
anniversary of the adoption of Islam by Volga Bulghars took place in the context of 
heated discussions about the Party’s diminishing claims to spiritual authority. Adoption 
of laws on religion in October 1990, both for the USSR and RSFSR, finally declared 
Party’s renouncement from atheism and laid foundation of a new secular order, where 
religious marketplace would be competitive and no religion, including Russian 
Orthodoxy and atheism, would have a state support.162 Many commentators universally 
                                                        
160 Note that the 1100th anniversary was calculated according to the Islamic calendar. 
161 Mukhetdinov, D.V. and A.Yu. Khabutdinov. Islam v Rossii v XVIII – nachale XXI vv.: Modernizatsiia 
I traditsii. Nizhnii Novgorod: Izdatel’stvo NNGU im. N.I.Lobachevskogo, 2011. 
162 On October 1 and 25, 1990, respectively, the USSR Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations and the RSFSR Law on Freedom of Religion were adopted. Despite some differences 
between the two, both documents implied a dramatic shift in Soviet policy toward religion toward 
liberalization of religious life. For a detailed discussion of a difference between the USSR and RSFSR 
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agree that these laws have had a far-reaching impact on religious revival in post-Soviet 
Russia (Verkhovsky, Anderson 1994, Bourdeaux 1990). The laws marked a major 
transition from a regime guided by an anti-religious ideology to passive secularism, 
which implied that the state would no longer intervene in religious affairs and allow 
visibility of religion in the public sphere. More importantly, this meant that the state 
would recognize religious pluralism and provide equal access to the public sphere for all 
religious communities.163 For example, religious groups obtained permission to broadcast 
on radio and TV and use school infrastructure outside regular business hours for religious 
education of the population.164 No legal or administrative discrimination could be made 
with regard to the groups practicing various forms of the Islamic faith or depending on 
their affiliation with the established Muslim spiritual administrations. 
The language of the 1990 laws on religion, which gave much-needed breathing 
room to practice Islam in Russia, mainly followed stipulations of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as 
other European conventions (Shterin and Richardson, 2000).165 With respect to individual 
rights, the RSFSR law, among other things, prohibited the entering of any reference to a 
citizen’s attitude to religion in official documents (Article 6 of the RSFSR law).166 It 
guaranteed the secrecy of confession and forbade the questioning of a clergyman about 
                                                        
versions of the 1990 law, see Lukasz Hirszowicz, “A note on the New RSFSR law on religion.” Soviet 
Jewish Affairs, Vol. 20, No 2-3, 1990, pp. 39-43. 
Religious market is a physical and virtual space where religious ideas and goods are exchanged. Refer to 
the dissertation glossary for the definition and references. 
163 Refer to the deductive test in chapter one to assess the difference between anti-religious state-religion 
regime and passive secularism. 
164 See the RSFSR Law on Freedom of Religion.  
165 For details, see the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
166 Article 4 of the USSR law permits this at citizen’s request. 
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circumstances that became known to him (e.g. during the religious service).167 
Furthermore, the law allowed for private (non-state) religious education and permitted 
introduction of religion-related subjects into the public schools curriculum on condition 
that this is not accompanied by religious rituals and has an ‘informative’ character 
(Article 9 of the RSFSR Law). It authorized state organs to declare important religious 
festivals additional non-working days at the request of religious mass associations 
(Article 14 of the RSFSR law). Also, it allowed religious worship in military units, health 
establishments and all types of homes for the aged and infirm, prisons, etc. (Article 22 of 
the RSFSR law). In sum, the law was a major departure from the Soviet-era practice of 
regulation of religious affairs.168 It broke the ice and paved the way for a gradual filling 
of a “religious vacuum.”169 One of its most visible implications was the return of religion 
to the public sphere. 
The Russian Constitution, adopted after the collapse of the communist state, 
reaffirmed central provisions of the 1990 RSFSR law by providing guarantees of 
individual liberties. Several articles of the Constitution speak specifically to the issue of 
religion and conscience. Article 14, for example, establishes the Russian Federation as a 
secular state and states that “[n]o religion may be established as a State religion or 
obligatory.” In addition, the Article holds that “[r]eligious associations shall be separate 
from the State and equal before the law.” Article 15 proclaims that the Constitution will 
                                                        
167 Article 13 of the RSFSR law. Article 30 of the USSR law, which bears the same title, includes no such 
provisions. 
168 For more on religious policy of liberalization under Gorbachev see John Anderson’s Religion state and 
politics in the Soviet Union and successor states (1994: 137-81) and Michael Bourdeaux Gorbachev 
Glasnost and the Gospel (1990).  
169 For further discussion of the 1990 Law, see Shterin and Richardson (1998) “Local Laws Restricting 
Religion in Russia: Precursors of Russia’s New National Law.” Journal of Church and State, 40(2) pp. 
319-341. 
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“have the highest legal force” and that all other laws or legal actions “must not be 
contrary to the Constitution of the Russian Federation.” As Preston has put it, “one 
cannot read the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation and not feel that the 
document was truly intended to protect people’s rights to believe as their conscience 
dictated” (Preston 2001: 783). Together, the 1990 law on religion and the Russian 
Constitution guaranteed basic human rights and liberties, including the right to engage in 
public proselytism. Liberal principles outlined in these documents became a backbone of 
defenders of religious freedom in the coming decade.  
 
2. Islamic practice under passive secularism 
Adoption of the 1990 law on religion was of huge importance to Russia’s faithful 
Muslim community. For the established clergy, more than anything else, it implied 
liberation from the tight supervision of the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) and 
escaping from heavy financial dues to the Peace Foundation [Sovetskii Fond Mira]. 170 
For groups aspiring to challenge the Soviet-era Islamic establishment, liberal reforms and 
the spirit of perestroika served unprecedented opportunities in the Russian history to form 
autonomous religious organizations. For Russia’s Muslim laypeople, liberalization of 
religious policy, first and foremost, allowed to fulfill their dearest and deepest spiritual 
                                                        
170 For discussion of the structure and functions of the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) refer to John 
Anderson (1991), "The Council for Religious Affairs and the Shaping of Soviet Religious Policy" Soviet 
Studies 43 (4): 689–710. For a brief discussion of the Soviet Peace Foundation, see Mukhetdinov, D.V. and 
A.Yu. Khabutdinov. Islam v Rossii v XVIII – nachale XXI vv.: Modernizatsiia I traditsii. Nizhnii 
Novgorod: Izdatel’stvo NNGU im. N.I.Lobachevskogo, 2011. For many years one third of the revenues of 
the Muslim Spiritual Board in Ufa was transferred to the Soviet Peace Foundation [Sovetskii Fond Mira]. 
According to Mufti Tadzhuddin, annual payments exceeded 250,000 rubles. See interview with Mufti 
Tadzhuddin. “Obratimsia k nashemu mnogovekovomu opytu,” Nauka i religiia N1, 1991. 
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needs and desires, such as receiving Islamic education, traveling to Mecca for Hajj171, 
restoring Islamic heritage at home, and reconnecting with fellow Muslims abroad. 
Although many had their own vision for the future of Islam in Russia, what united most 
of Muslim believers was the desire to bring Islam back into the public sphere. 
In the first decade after the Soviet collapse, in many Russian regions, numbers of 
Muslim communities, mosques, and Islamic schools have substantially increased. 
Especially notable increase was recorded in historically Muslim populated areas of the 
country. Thus, with respect to Muslim communities, in Bashkortostan, for example, their 
number between 1987 and 1997 increased from 19 to 490 (a 25-fold increase). In 
Tatarstan, the growth between 1988 and mid-90s was from 18 to 700 (a 39-fold 
increase).172 In Dagestan, according to Bobrovnikov, over the same period, the number of 
Islamic congregations raised from 27 to 1,557 (a 57-fold increase)173. Most of these 
communities sought to open their own mosques. Overall across Russia, between 1990 
and 1997, the number of functioning mosques increased from 160 to over 7,000.174  
Muslim communities have also invested in restoring Islamic education and 
publishing, development of Halal food industry, and other aspects of Muslim lifestyle 
and culture. With respect to Islamic schooling, for example, as of 1988, no formal Islamic 
education institutions existed in Russia. The only two institutions on the territory of the 
Soviet Union that provided such education, namely the Islamic madrasa “Mir-Arab” in 
                                                        
171 The Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca that takes place in the last month of the year (according to the Islamic 
calendar), and that all Muslims are expected to make at least once during their lifetime. 
172 See Mukhametshin 2009: 76; Sagitova 2009: 129.  
173 Most of Islamic institutions in Dagestan, however, did not have state registration at the time 
(Bobrovnikov, 2006).  
174 Testimony of Paul Goble at the public hearing before The Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe: U.S. Helsinki Commission. December 17, 2009. 
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Bukhara (1945) and Islamic Institute in Tashkent (1971), became inconvenient and 
difficult to access after the Soviet collapse.175 In 1988, the first Islamic school – madrasa 
“Ismailiya” – opened in Moscow. Within a year, another two madrasas opened in Ufa 
and Kazan. By 1991 several similar schools emerged in Dagestan and Chechnya. By the 
end of 1995 up to 30 Islamic schools were registered with the Russian Ministry of 
Justice. Towards the end of the decade, such schools were present in almost every city in 
Dagestan and in many other places across Russia.176 The quality of these schools and 
their faculty, however, remained to be ascertained. 
Despite a visible effort to catch up with the growing demand for qualified 
religious personnel, the problem of cadres soon emerged as the most vital problem for 
Russia’s Muslim community. According to Silantyev, religious schools in Russia were 
unable to meet even 5% of the demand at the time.177 The evident lack of opportunities to 
receive quality Islamic education at home has led many young Muslim believers to 
explore readily available opportunities abroad. Reportedly, many Arab countries 
provided scholarships and stipends to students from the Former Soviet Union. It is these 
foreign educated students later became a focus of some of the most heated debates about 
politicization and radicalization of Islam in Russia. 
Islamic broadcasting, media, and other means of mass communication, which 
were practically nonexistent during the Soviet period, also experienced a revival. Before 
1989, the only regular Islamic periodical in the Soviet Union was Muslims of the Soviet 
                                                        
175 In exceptional cases, Soviet Muslims could receive such education abroad, in friendly to the Soviet 
Union Muslim states. One of such Muslim leaders was Talgat Tadzhuddin, a prospective head of the 
Central Spiritual Board of Muslims in Ufa. 
176 Silantyev, Roman. Islam v Sovremennoi Rossii: Entsiklopediia. Moscow: Algoritm, 2008, pp.97 
177 According to the report of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the European Part of Russia, one of major 
Islamic colleges in Russia awarded 34 diplomas in 6 years. For detailed discussion, see Silantyev 2008:98. 
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East (Sovet Sharki Musulmonlari), the content of which was regulated by strict 
censorship rules. Occasionally, relatively objective articles on the Islamic faith appeared 
in a secular journal Science and Religion (Nauka i Religiya). One of the earliest 
independent Islamic printed publications that emerged on the eve of the Soviet collapse 
was a newspaper Tawhid. It became known as an outlet of the newly emerging Party of 
the Islamic Revival. In 1990, the Muslim Spiritual Board in Ufa resumed publication of 
its old periodical Maglumat. The first Islamic publishing house in post-Soviet Russia, 
Iman, opened in Kazan in 1991. After the break up of the Soviet-era central Muslim 
spiritual boards in Ufa and Dagestan, their multiple successors founded their own presses. 
Thus, in 1992 and 1994 newspapers Islam and Society and Islam Minbare were launched 
in Bashkortostan and Moscow respectively. Within a few years, many newly established 
Muslim organizations founded their own newsletters and periodicals to publish religious 
articles and keep their communities up-to-date on the latest news about their 
organizations, accomplishments, and meetings. About 40% of these newspapers were 
published in national languages of respective minorities. A big portion of the printed 
material in Russian language was translated from Arabic.178 Although, the reach of these 
resources was relatively restrained – most issues ran on a monthly basis and were 
distributed in a limited number of copies – all these sources freely circulated across 
Russia’s regions, spreading Islamic religious messages.179 At the time, Islamic TV, radio 
broadcasting, and the Internet could not contribute to the process as much, largely due to 
financial, technical, and technological constraints.  
                                                        
178 See Silantyev 2008:116-122. For an excellent analysis of the linguistic aspect the post-Soviet Islamic 
revival in Russia, see Bustanov and Kemper 2013. 
179 See Silantyev 2008:107-116. 
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Development of the Islamic consumer industry is directly related to the Russian 
transition to market economy. Some of the first butcher shops in Russia emerged in 
Dagestan in 1990. They were specializing on producing Halal (religiously acceptable 
according to the Muslim law) meat and meat products. With the growing demand on such 
commodities, similar shops and cafes opened in other Russian regions. Over time, many 
grocery items became available with self-proclaimed Halal certification and consumer 
products such as alcohol-free perfumes and women’s dress arrived in stores.180 Some of 
the boutiques started to specialize exclusively on Halal products.181 Soon tourism and 
medical services with gender segregation became available.182 Possibility of Islamic 
banking in Russia has become a topic of serious discussions.183 While both supply and 
demand in the Halal market increased, no attempt was made to centralize or supervise 
this area in the early 90s. 
Visibility of Islam in the Russian public sphere also increased due to public 
celebrations of religious holidays. After 1992, two major Islamic holidays, Uraza Bayram 
(Eid ul-Fitr) and Kurban Bayram (Eid ul-Adha) were announced public holidays in most 
of Muslim-majority republics.184 Although these days were not regarded as national 
                                                        
180 Brands such as Zhineral and Albarakat, for instance, became very well known for their alcohol-free 
perfumes and women’s clothing.  
181 Apel’sin chain stores could be an example. 
182 Companies such as Idel-Hajj, for example, specialized in organization of the tours to Saudi Arabia for 
Hajj and Umrah. 
183 For discussion of the prospects of Islamic finance and banking in Russia, see Bekkin, Renat I. "Islamic 
insurance: National features and legal regulation."Arab Law Quarterly 21.1 (2007): 3-34; and Bekkin, R. 
"There’s the only Economy in the World with Totally Islamic Financial System,–Sudan. Islamic Economy 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Public speech, the Institute of Ethnology and Antropology of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences." (2010). 
184 Zakon Respubliki Bashkortostan ot 27 fevralja 1992 g. N VS-10/21 "O prazdnichnyh i pamjatnyh dnjah 
v Respublike Bashkortostan." 
Rasporjazhenie Pravitel'stva Respubliki Bashkortostan ot 2 nojabrja 2012 g. N 1400-r. 
Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Respubliki Bashkortostan ot 28 oktjabrja 2013 g. N 488 "O nerabochih 
prazdnichnyh dnjah v 2014 godu." 
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holidays on the federal level, Muslims living in traditionally Russian populated areas 
celebrated these days in their local communities. In daily routine life Islamic religious 
symbols became more and more visible. Scripts in Arabic and Islamic calligraphy not 
only decorated the interior of mosques, but also often adorned traditionally secular 
venues and art galleries.185 In addition, Islamic religious themes were increasingly 
illustrated in the movies and theaters.    
Moreover, some of the most active and ambitious members of Russia’s Muslim 
community, such as Geidar Dzhemal, Muhammed Salakheddin, Shamil Sultanov, 
Valiakhmet Sadur, and Mukaddas Bibarsov, went as far as to establish political 
movements and religious parties. Thus, with the introduction of political liberalization, 
Islamic political movements such as the Party of Islamic Revival, Union of Russia’s 
Muslims, Nur, Refakh, and several other movements emerged on the Russian political 
scene.186 Until the enactment of the Federal Law on Political Parties of the Russian 
Federation in 2001, technically, the creation of political parties on the grounds of ethnic 
or religious affiliation was allowed.187 
On the whole, much of what was legally done in the name of Islamic revival in 
the period between 1990 and 1997 was largely achieved due to liberal religious laws that 
                                                        
For a full list of Russia’s public holidays and relevant legal documentation, see 
http://base.garant.ru/4029129/ (Last access March 17, 2015). 
For a brief commentary on the topic, see “Kurban Bairam i Uraza Bairam v Bashkirii ostanutsya 
vyhodnymi dniami” Ria Novosti 21 December 2011 http://ria.ru/society/20111221/522411432.html (Last 
accessed on January 9, 2015). 
185 Read, for instance, about the life and work of Vladimir Popov. http://vladimir-popov.ru/index.html (Last 
accessed on March 17, 2015). 
186 Among these movements only Nur took part in the 1995 parliamentary elections independently, barely 
winning 0.5% of the votes. Others with a variety degree of success entered into coalition with other secular 
parties of Russia. For details, see Silantyev 2008:63-96.  
187 Federal Law on Political Parties of the Russian Federation. Enacted By the State Duma On June 21, 
2001. Approved By the Federation Council On June 29, 2001.  
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passed in 1990. Three aspects of the RSFSR Law on religion were particularly important. 
One was minimization of formal procedures that were required to establish a religious 
group.188 A second was abolishment of the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA), which 
interfered in the internal life of religious bodies. By 1990, religious dissidents, many 
public figures, and even some employees of the CRA itself argued for the abolition of the 
institution on the grounds that in a free society religion needs no regulation. The third 
aspect, most importantly, was the freedom to access the Russian public sphere for all 
religious communities. According to Anderson, the state has eventually come to 
recognize that even opium has its uses (Anderson 1991: 707). Throughout the 1990s the 
federal government remained committed to the norms of passive secularism spelled out in 
the 1990 law. Despite early warning signals about politicization and radicalization of 
Islam as well as emerging unintended consequences of religious liberalization, 
proponents of the 1990 law relied on provisions of the 1993 Constitution and stipulations 
of international agreements in order to protect individual rights and liberties of the 
people. 
 
3. Déjà vu or not? Passive secularism in Russian history 
In some ways, state-Islam relations in the early 1990s were unique. Never before 
has Russia’s indigenous Muslim community had such extensive opportunities to interact 
with various branches of the Islamic faith and practice them publicly across Russia under 
the legal protection of the state. Rules and regulations of the 1990 law on religion and the 
1993 Russian Constitution provided the necessary permissive conditions for religious 
                                                        
188 In fact, many Islamic communities in the country did not even seek state registration between 1991 and 
1997. 
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flourishing all over the country. Russia’s various Muslim communities have never been 
exposed to the range of theological views within Islam that they got to know after fall of 
the Iron Curtain and reconnection with the Muslim world. Establishment of an 
unprecedented level of religious freedom has not only set religion free from the state 
control but also tremendously diversified the religious marketplace in the country. This 
was especially visible in the context of a devastating impact that decades of Soviet 
atheistic propaganda have had on people. 
Nevertheless, in some ways, the reemergence of Islam in the Russian public 
sphere since the late 1980s resembles a brief earlier period in the Russian history. During 
the last decade of imperial rule there was a brief attempt to bring the norms of passive 
secularism to public life in Russia. In 1905, as part of the government’s response to 
mounting demands for civil rights by an increasingly urban and educated population, 
Tsar Nicholas II issued the Edict of Toleration, which gave legal status to religions that 
were not Russian Orthodox.189 This gave Russia’s Muslims new opportunities for 
religious expression. Dozens of new Muslim newspapers and journals were founded. 
Some of the most popular periodicals such as Tarakki, Tudjor, and Al-Ikhlas became 
major venues for public debates among Muslim intellectuals. A new vehicle for 
articulation of collective demands on behalf of Russia’s Muslims became the first Islamic 
political movement Ittifaq al-Muslimin. One of its aims was to represent the interests of 
the country’s Muslims in the Duma. Reforms were also carried out in Islamic education, 
where the Jadids, the late Tsarist era Islamic reformers, sought to introduce new 
education methodology. New Muslim publishing houses opened in Kazan, Astrakhan, 
                                                        
189 Pospielovsky, Dmitry (1984). The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime. Crestwood: St. Vladimir 
Seminary Press. p. 22 
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Ufa, and Orenburg.190 Later in the same year, the October Manifesto hinted at the 
possibility of granting total religious freedom to the population. The promise, however, 
was never legally ratified (Werth 2014).191 
Finally, it is important to note that the main focus of the religious policy debates 
in Russia has historically been the Russian Orthodox Church. Both because of its long 
history of the relationship with the Russian state and the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of the population has always identified with various forms of Orthodox 
Christianity, the Church was at the center of debates on state-religion relations. In that 
sense, the perestroika era was not a complete exception. Having demonstrated their 
allegiance and usefulness in international affairs in the decades following World War 
Two, key members of the established clergy came to be seen by the late Soviet leadership 
under Gorbachev as premier partners in planning the comprehensive “restructuring” of 
the Socialist order (Nichols 1990).192 The approaching Millennium of Orthodox 
Christianity in Russia in 1988 became an opportunity for the Soviet regime to engage 
with the Russian Orthodox Church and involve religion into the comprehensive social 
reform.193 Policies toward Islam in Russia largely shaped as a result of formulated 
                                                        
190 Khabutdinov, Aidar. “Obschestvennoe dvizhenie rossiiskikh musul’man v dooktiabr’skii period: idei i 
metody,” Forumy rossiiskikh musul’man na poroge novogo tysiacheletiia. Nizhnii Novgorod, 2003:41 
191 Werth, Paul W. The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial 
Russia. Oxford University Press, 2014. Until its last days, the imperial rule relied on religious institutions 
to perform certain functions of local governance. According to Werth, as the Church and Muftiyates 
continued to perform important administrative functions on behalf of the state bureaucracy, the capacity of 
the autocratic state rested on the “multi-confessional establishment” (Werth 2014). Not until the Bolshevik 
revolution and the establishment of the Soviet rule did the state give up the confessional system of 
governance. Among all, the Russian Orthodox Church remained the state’s most trusted and effective 
bridge to the people. 
192 Nichols, Robert L. “Dissent and conformity in the Russian Orthodox Church, 1943-1988,” in Leong, 
Albert, ed. The Millennium: Christianity and Russia, AD 988-1988. St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1990. 
193 The process of preparation for celebration of the millennium anniversary of Christianization of Rus’ 
turned out to be the beginning of a major change in state-religion relations that formalized in adoption of 
the 1990 law on religion.  
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church-state and state-religion regimes. Norms of passive secularism that came to 
dominate the 1990s were principally aimed at ensuring the equality of all faiths and to 
avoid domination of any particular faith group.194 Secular leadership’s commitment to 
liberalism, coupled with the belief in transformative impact of the Soviet era on religion 
and Islam and particular, which by then has largely attained cultural definitions, as well 
as the trust in loyalty of the people to the state exceeded the fear of a looming threat from 
growing Islamic activism. 
 
Part III: Muslims and Islam under post-Soviet multiethnic ethnicity regime 
Two decades after the Soviet collapse it is hard to disagree with Rogers Brubaker, 
who stated that by establishing a country based on institutionalized multinationality, the 
Soviet state “prepared the way for its own demise” (Brubaker 1996: 23).195 Back in 1988, 
for many, the emergence of nationalist movements in several Soviet republics came as a 
big surprise (Motyl 1990:174).196 Many in the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev had 
genuinely believed that the nationality problem had been more or less solved (Walker 
2003:58).197 Reportedly, Gorbachev himself shortly after becoming general secretary 
stated that “Into the consciousness and heart of every [Soviet citizen] there has deeply 
entered the feeling of belonging to a single family – the Soviet people.”198 To what extent 
he was right or wrong may still be open to debate. Be that as it may, in March 1991, 
when the communist leadership attempted to use a nationwide referendum to address a 
                                                        
194 Svobodnaya Mysl’, 2 (1609) 2010, pp.125-145.  
195 Brubaker, Rogers. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
196 Motyl Alexander J. 1990. Sovietology, rationality, nationality: Coming to grips with nationalism in the 
USSR. New York: Columbia University Press. 
197 Walker, E. 2003. Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union. Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield. 
198 Quoted in Walker 2003:58 
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critical question about the future of the USSR, the overwhelming majority of the Soviet 
population, indeed, supported the idea of preserving the Union. At the time, Muslim-
majority areas demonstrated some of the strongest bonds of loyalty to the state.  
In less than a decade after Gorbachev’s statement the Soviet Union collapsed and 
full-fledged nationalist uprisings unfolded across its former territory, including in 
Muslim-majority provinces.199 Centrifugal tendencies swept across the newly 
independent countries and autonomous republics, fundamentally transforming both 
secular and religious life and institutions. As it will be demonstrated below, in Russia, as 
a result of disintegration of the Soviet-era Muslim spiritual boards, within a few years, 
every ethnic Muslim republic established its own Muftiyat. According to Malashenko, by 
1998, Muslim Spiritual Boards had been founded in almost every subject of the Russian 
Federation with a sizable Muslim population.200 This section will explore whether and 
how religious and nationalities policies with respect to Muslim minorities in post-Soviet 
Russia were interrelated. 
 
1. Multiethnicity as a Soviet legacy 
Russia inherited from the Soviet state a culturally, ethnically, and religiously 
diverse population. According to the Soviet census of 1989, up to 20% of the RSFSR 
natives represented non-Russian minorities, many of which were ethnic Muslim 
groups.201 This demographic reality was at the heart of many complicated questions about 
                                                        
199 This is not to say that ethnic-Muslim nationalism led to the Soviet break up. In fact, the most serious 
challenge to the Soviet state came from Eastern European nationalist movements. See Dannreuther 2010: 
110. 
200 Malashenko, A. V. Islamskoe Vozrozhdenie v Sovremennoi Rossii, Moscow, 1998 
201 Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Growth and diversity of the population of the Soviet 
Union", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , Vol. 510, No. 1, 155-177, 
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post-Soviet nation-building and identity that Russian policymakers had to deal with. 
Should have Russia continued to attach political significance to ethnic identity? Was the 
category of natsional’nost’ (nationality) still necessary in the context of post-Soviet 
nation-building?202 What kind of political system had to be introduced? What policies the 
state had to adopt to address the questions of majority and minority? Was a post-Soviet 
Russia a nation-state and whether should it have been one?203 Dilemmas like these 
preoccupied the minds of Russian policymakers and constitutional theorists during the 
transition from communism. Ever since, the complexity of these issues has only increased 
and some still have not been resolved. 
Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, the Russian Federation has not only taken over 
the population, but also adopted the multiethnic ethnicity regime of the Soviet Union 
based on the official institutionalization of ethnic diversity. According to Akturk’s 
tripartite typology of ethnicity regimes, discussed in chapter one, “In institutional, legal, 
and symbolic terms, Russia preserved the Soviet legacy of multiethnic statehood” 
(Akturk 2012:230). Despite suggested proposals for promoting a non-ethnic, territorial, 
and civic nationalism, post-Soviet reformers decided to preserve the system of ethnic 
federalism in Russia. Yeltsin and his supporters deliberately opposed the arguments that 
ethnicity should be much less visible in post-Soviet Russia than it was in the USSR 
(Akturk 2012:231). 
                                                        
1990. Also, see Ralph S. Clem, Ed., Research Guide to Russian and Soviet Censuses, Ithaca: Cornell 
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The extant literature provides multiple reasons to explain the rationale of 
policymakers at the time for keeping the Soviet multiethnic structure intact. Some 
observers refer to systemic factors, arguing that the divided leadership in Moscow sought 
to win the support of ethnic autonomies, which could determine the fate of the struggle 
for presidency (Giuliano and Gorenburg 2012).204 Yeltsin, according to Akturk, in his 
struggle against Gorbachev and later in opposition to communists and rivals in the Duma, 
relied on the votes from ethnic republics, many of which wanted to maintain their 
privileged status. Others analysts suggest that it was the persistence of the Leninist/Soviet 
approach to ethnic diversity what defined the course of post-communist development in 
Russia. For them, Soviet era policymakers were accustomed to think of ethnicity as a 
primordial category. As Slezkine argued, the state actively promoted a primordialist 
understanding of ethnicity in the country for decades. This, according to him, left behind 
not only institutional, political, and ideological legacy but also a socio-psychological and 
mental legacy (Slezkine 1994).205  
Nevertheless, few studies attempted to look at the autonomous role that religion 
played in the political dynamics of the country. The following section will explore how 
Islam and the Muslim clergy affected the relationship between federal and local secular 
authorities. It will argue that the convergence of interests between secular elites and the 
religious clergy in Muslim majority republics in the early 1990s had a significant impact 
on the formation of the post-Soviet order in Russia. Ultimately it will demonstrate how 
                                                        
204 Giuliano, Elise, and Dmitry Gorenburg. "The Unexpectedly Underwhelming Role of Ethnicity in 
Russian Politics, 1991-2011." Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 20.2 (2012): 
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and why the adoption of the multiethnic ethnicity regime limited the involvement of state 
authorities in religious affairs during the 90s.  
 
2. Secular “ethnic Muslim” nationalisms 
The scholarship on religion and politics has rarely identified religion as a single 
most important cause of political behavior.206 On that account, two decades after the fall 
of communism, few can argue that the Islamic revivalism brought down the Soviet 
regime. According to Khalid, “the Soviet Union collapsed without its Muslims making a 
lot of trouble” (Khalid 2007:17). The initial period of Islamic revival after the Soviet 
collapse was also largely perceived as a non-political phenomenon. Local state authorities 
seemed to be in control of the evolving social and political change. The secular state 
bureaucracy gradually adapted to the conditions of political pluralism and market 
economy. Daily life of the majority of Russia’s ethnic Muslims, according to Khalid, 
remained largely de-Islamized and profoundly secular (Khalid 2007:121). For the first 
several years after the Soviet collapse, despite alarmist calls about politicization of Islam, 
especially in the Northern Caucasus, most religious groups showed little sign of disputing 
the established secular environment in the country.  
In the early 1990s, at least two factors contributed to the strengthening of the 
perception that “ethnic Muslim” nationalisms were secular in nature. One important 
                                                        
206 Unless one looks at the debates through the essentialist perspective, religion alone cannot explain the 
complexity of various social phenomena. On the contrary, many agree that political decisions may have a 
decisive impact on religious practices. See, for example, Williams, Rhys H. "Religion as political resource: 
Culture or ideology?" Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (1996): 368-378. Sherkat, Darren E., and 
Christopher G. Ellison. "Recent developments and current controversies in the sociology of 
religion." Annual Review of Sociology(1999): 363-394. Iannaccone, Laurence, Rodney Stark, and Roger 
Finke. "Rationality and the “religious mind”." Economic Inquiry 36.3 (1998): 373-389. Sharot, Stephen. 
"Beyond christianity: a critique of the rational choice theory of religion from a weberian and comparative 
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reason that added to the persistence of a secular order in Russia’s Muslim-majority areas, 
as this study suggests, has been the transformative impact of the Soviet era on the 
majority of indigenous Muslims. Acquired cultural definitions of religion and 
secularization allowed the majority of Soviet Muslims to feel about Islam as an integral 
part of their way of life while maintaining loyalty to the state and its secular order. Pride 
in Islam as a national heritage, according to Khalid, could coexist with limited or even 
complete lack of religious observance, let alone a desire to live in an Islamic state (Khalid 
2007:121). Therefore, revival of Islam as an element of national identity was not 
perceived as an issue of concern.  
Another reason that explains the dominance of a secular order in Russia’s 
Muslim-majority regions is a constructive dialogue that secular authorities and some 
religious groups managed to develop in the early post-Soviet period.207 For several years 
after the introduction of liberal reforms, both the secular nationalist and religious activists 
relied on each other and pursued a common goal of attaining more freedom and 
autonomy from the Soviet-era centralized administrations.208 In many of Russia’s various 
Muslim-majority republics, national minority leaders sought to extract benefits from the 
federal center and consolidate their own political power. In doing so they often took 
advantage of both the nationalist rhetoric and religious fervor of Islamic groups. Islamic 
activists, in their turn, strove to reorganize the Soviet-era religious administration and to 
instill religion into the public sphere. Many of them enjoyed the support of local state 
authorities and benefited from the administrative backing. 
                                                        
207 It is important to note, however, that regional state-religion dynamics in the Middle Volga and the North 
Caucasus evolved independently and often differently from each other. See sections below for a more 
detailed discussion. 
208 This aspect of the relationship between regional secular and religious elites has so far been largely 
neglected in the literature 
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3. The rise of “ethnic Muslim” nationalisms and decentralization of Islamic 
administration 
In the analysis of Russia’s first decade of post-Soviet independence scholars 
usually highlight several factors and impulses that could have triggered the rise of 
nationalist feelings among ethnic minorities.209 Many experts emphasize long-standing 
historical grievances and institutional legacies (Roeder 1991, Bunce 1999, Dunlop 1998, 
King 2001).210 Others call attention to the importance of economic factors and 
demographic trends (Toft 2003, Treisman 1997, Stoner-Weiss 1997, Hale 2000, Giuliano 
2011).211 In addition, some specialists draw attention to the interests of political 
entrepreneurs and their role in these processes.212 Rogers Brubaker, for example, suggests 
that even though interests of those who speak on behalf of communities often do not 
correspond with interests of all or even the majority of the population, they are being able 
to lead the masses in a particular direction.  
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What many of these studies agree upon is that Islam played one of the central 
roles in the rise of “ethnic Muslim” nationalisms in Russia during the late 1980s and 
throughout the 1990s. Since the late 1980s, Islam has indeed become salient in the life of 
Russia’s Muslims. According to Malashenko, it was a natural consequence of people’s 
return to the roots. As he puts it, “Their national consciousness is tied to their religious 
feeling.”213  Ro’i argues that ethnic minorities that were traditionally associated with 
Islam were turning to religion because they “saw in it an alternative to everything that the 
Soviet regime represented and stood for.”214 Goble points out that ethnic groups “have 
turned to Islam . . . as the only overarching identity that could give them the chance to 
define themselves and to achieve their goals.”215 In addition, several other experts suggest 
that some political groups, seizing an opportunity to turn faith into political returns, used 
Islam to promote nationalist struggles.216 They argue that many local secular elites used a 
comprehensive slogan of restoring national heritage in challenging respective central 
authorities. 
The epic statement that Yeltsin made in Kazan in August 1991, as a chairman of 
the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, “take as much sovereignty as you can swallow” is 
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widely regarded as one of the most consequential and controversial declarations in his 
political career. Ramifications of an extended process of political decentralization that it 
is believed this statement has triggered are still debated. Not only did it encourage secular 
elites to consolidate their power in the regions, it also gave a strong incentive to 
nationalist and religious groups to pursue more assertive tactics. Internal cracks that 
already existed within Muslim community rapidly developed along with the process of 
political decentralization. Disintegration of the Soviet era Muslim Spiritual Boards 
gained additional momentum with the support of nationalist groups and local political 
elites (Yemelianova 1999; Silantyev 2002). 
 At the forefront of both political and Islamic spiritual decentralization in Russia 
stood Muslim-majority republics of the North Caucasus and the Middle Volga regions. 
To a varying extent, the ruling elites in the republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, 
Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and a number of other regions relied on the support of 
religious and nationalist groups in building new terms of relationship with the federal 
center. Some demanded greater autonomy; some sought outright independence.217 As 
Giuliano puts it, “Islam served to shore up the claim to sovereign status” (Giuliano 2005: 
200). One component in these regional nation-(re)building processes was the 
establishment of local Muslim spiritual boards. Reportedly, many leaders of ethnic 
Muslim republics encouraged local Islamic clergy to set up independent Muftiyats in the 
republics. 
                                                        
217 It is often asserted, for example, that Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former Soviet commander who led the 
Chechen rebellion against Russia after the Soviet collapse, used religious rhetoric in order to mobilize 
Chechen strongmen for taking up arms. According to Giulinano, "Dudaev was attempting to link 
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Initially, it seemed that the internal split of Russia’s Muslim community indeed 
followed ethno-territorial principles.218 Thus, the first Muftiyat to fall apart in Russia 
largely along ethnic-territorial lines was the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the North 
Caucasus (DUMSK).219 The campaign aimed at removing the Soviet-era Mufti Gekkiev 
began before the Soviet collapse in March 1989. By the end of the year, independent 
Muftiyats were established in Chehcheno-Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Dagestan. 
Later, with the strong support of local secular authorities, a Muslim Spiritual Board was 
also established in Karachevo-Cherkessia and Stavropol. Tensions along ethnic lines 
continued further even within breakaway Muftiyates. In Dagestan, for example, different 
ethnic groups (mainly Dargins, Avars, and Kumyks) started to compete with each other 
to acquire control over the Muslim Spiritual Board in Makhachkala (Yemelianova 
1999:619; Giuliano 2005: 204; Silantyev 2008:292-298).220 According to Yemelianova, 
the conditions of extreme multiethnicity led to the emergence of four ethnic Islamic 
Spiritual Boards in Dagestan. They represented Dagestan’ s largest ethnic communities: 
Avars, Kumyks, Laks, and Dargins. From 1992 to 1994 the Lezgins also pressed for the 
formation of their own Spiritual Board. Yemelianova notes that in this early period of 
post-Soviet political and ideological confusion, “there was an alliance between these 
national/ethnic religious boards and the respective national/ethnic movements” 
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the leadership of the Spiritual Board in Uzbekistan. 
220 According to Yemelianova, the actual political and economic power has been monopolized by five or 
six ethnic mafia-nomenklatura groupings. Avars and Dargins have occupied the top and most lucrative jobs 
in the republic (Yemelianova 1999:613). 
For example, on the 8th of September 1994 deputy-prime minister Said Amirov called a meeting of Muslim 
spiritual authorities of the republic to hold elections for the leadership of DUMD. As a result, an ethnic 
Avar Muhammad Darbishev, activist of Islamic Democratic Party, was elected a Mufti. Registration of 
other boards in Dagestan except DUMD was refused. For details, see Silantyev, Roman. Islam v 
Sovremennoi Rossii: Entsiklopediia. Moscow: Algoritm, 2008. 
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(Yemelianova 1999: 619).221 Similar disputes also took place in Kabardino-Balkaria.222 
In Checheno-Ingushetia, where the most dramatic story unfolded, the initial split of the 
Muslim community also followed the ethnic line. Following the partition of the Chechen-
Ingush ASSR into two separate republics, an autonomous Muftiyat was established in 
Chechnya. Tragic efforts of local secular authorities led by Dzhokhar Dudayev to secure 
the loyalty of religious authorities and further exploit Islam to realize nationalistic 
ambitions largely defined the course of events in the republic and a wider region in the 
next several years. Overall, some observers of Islam in Russia describe these processes in 
the Northern Caucasus as a “sovereignization of the Islamic administration,” which 
acquired an ethnic dimension (Yemelianova 1999:619). According to Yemelianova, once 
disintegration had started, regional Islamic organization was no longer realistic in the 
North Caucasus.  
Soon, similar dynamics reached Russia’s another Muslim enclave in the Mid-
Volga basin. In 1992, Muslim activists of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, led by Gabdulla 
Galiullin and Nurmuhammad Nigmatullin respectively, declared their independence from 
the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims headed by Mufti Tadzhuddin (DUMES) and 
established local Muftiyates in Kazan and Ufa. The first President of Tatasrtan, Shaimiev, 
who regarded foundation of an independent Muftiyat in Tatarstan an important attribute 
of sovereignty, supported the initiative of the local Islamic clergy to secede from the 
umbrella organization (Yemelianova 1999: 611). Leaders of the Tatar national 
movement, after an unsuccessful attempt to move the headquarters of the Central 
                                                        
221 “Since 1994 there has been only one officially recognized Muftiyat in Dagestan – the Spiritual Board of 
the Muslims of Dagestan (SBMD), represented by the Avar Islamic elite and supported by the government. 
In reality, the SBMD has been accepted as a Dagestan Muftiyat only by Avars” (Yemelianova 1999: 619) 
222 However, the process there stopped short of complete fragmentation.  
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Spiritual Board of Muslims (DUMES) from Ufa to Kazan, also supported the decision.223 
On September 15, 1992, the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan 
(DUMRT) was founded. According to Yemelianova, Tatarstan’s authorities 
accommodated rapid construction of mosques, Islamic schools (madrasas), and other 
Islamic institutions in the republic. Furthermore, “an Islamic theme has been consistently 
introduced into Tatar national symbols, architecture, monuments, and design” 
(Yemelianova 1999: 611). Finally, Tatarstan’s secular leadership supported the claims of 
the Tatar Islamic officialdom to represent Tatars outside Tatarstan, i.e. within the 
mythological borders of the Idel-Ural.224 
Secular authorities in Bashkortostan have also supported the idea of reviving a 
“national” Spiritual Board of Muslims (DUMRB), which actually existed up until the 
1930s. The ethnic makeup of the Bashkir republic, however, complicated their task.225 
While the areas mainly populated by Bashkirs readily approved the idea of ‘sovereign’ 
Bashkir Muftiyat, settlements inhabited by Tatars tended to preserve their loyalty to the 
DUMES headed by an ethnic Tatar, Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin. As a result, when the 
Bashkir Muftiyat was established, the Republic of Bashkortostan became a host to two 
Muftiyates, what further aggravated the tension between Tatar and Bashkir nationalists.  
At the time, observers of Islam in Russia, such as Aislu Yunusova, interpreted 
these developments as an attempt of the local political leadership in ethnic Muslim 
republics to obtain their ‘pocket’ muftiates (Yunusova 1999b). Other observers of 
                                                        
223 The attempt has failed largely because the Board was initially designed as a supra-ethnic structure. 
224 Yemelianova, Galina M. "Islam and nation building in Tatarstan and Dagestan of the Russian 
Federation." Nationalities Papers 27.4 (1999): 605-629. 
225 According to the 1989 census, ethnic Tatars represented 28.4% of the total population of Bashkortostan. 
Ethnic Bashkirs made up 21.9% of the republic. 
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Russian politics perceived these developments merely as “a by-product of the ‘parade of 
sovereignties’ in Russian politics” (Matsuzato 2007:785).226 Breakaway Muftiyates soon 
spread across the country. Thus, by the end 1994, a number of regional Muftiyates 
opened outside ethnic Muslim homelands. Institutions of Islamic administration were 
established in Orenburg and Ulianovsk Obasts, Udmurtia, Perm, Samara, Saratov, 
Nizhniy Novgorod, Penza, Chuvashia227, Adygeya228, Rostov Oblast’229, Astrakhan230, 
and a few other places231. According to Malashenko, by 1998, several dozens Muftiyates 
were present in the country.232  
Overall, at the time when post-Soviet principles of state approach toward 
regulation of Russia’s diverse population were formulated, religious identities were 
perceived as subordinate to much stronger ethnic cultures. For many people, adherence to 
Islam meant a “return” to national tradition and (re)discovery of a cultural heritage. As 
Adeeb Khalid described it, the turn toward religion was an element of the recovery of 
national memories and national legacies (Khalid 2007: 117). Partly for that reason, both 
federal and local secular governments did not resist popular initiatives aimed at reviving 
Islamic faith in public life. Remaining within the framework of secularism, state 
authorities showed good faith effort in accommodating the needs of religious groups.233 
                                                        
226 See Kimitaka Matsuzato (2007)  
227 In some of the regions more than one Muftiyat were functioning. Thus, in Orenburg and Ulianovsk 
Oblasts three competing structures existed. In Mordovia and Penza - two. See Silantyev (2008) for more 
details. 
228 Muftiyat of the republic of Adygea and Krasnodar region was established in 1993. 
229 Don Muftiyat was founded in 1994 (under auspices of Muslim authorities in Ufa). 
230 Spiritual Board of Muslims of Astrakhan Oblast was established in 1994 (RDUM AO under auspices of 
Muslim authorities in Ufa). 
231 Spiritual Board of Muslims of Volgograd Oblast was established in 1995 (RDUM VO under auspices of 
Muslim authorities in Ufa). 
232 Malashenko, A. V. Islamskoe Vozrozhdenie v Sovremennoi Rossii, Moscow, 1998 
233 Also, see Yemelianova (1999) for a discussion of the position of intelligentsia on the issue. According to 
Yemelianova, the national/ethnic origins of the representatives of the intelligentsia have affected their 
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With a degree of variation across the republics, they all tended to return religious 
property, recognized some of the religious holidays, assisted with administrative 
questions related to organizing religious education, building mosques, traveling to Mecca 
for Muslim pilgrims, etc. Regional authorities seeking autonomy were especially glad to 
obtain local Muftiyats, instead of dealing with spiritual umbrella organizations. One 
could also observe active cooperation between ethno-nationalist groups and locally 
established Muftiyates as a confirmation of a thesis that Islam was a cultural phenomenon 
and did not pose a threat to the secular regime as a force that could unite Russia’s 
ethnically diverse Muslim population and mobilize them toward any political goal.234 
 
4. Challenges for the Multiethnicity regime in practice 
Post-Soviet political liberalization had many unintended consequences. Some of 
the ramifications of both spiritual and political decentralization became apparent already 
in the 1990s. In some parts of Russia, especially in the republics of the Northern 
Caucasus, the atmosphere of religious freedom encouraged some Muslim activists to 
challenge the norms of a secular order. These instances were recorded in the regions with 
highly religious population. In their attempt to face some of the emerging problems, 
secular leadership in the regions sought to develop their own approaches toward religion, 
which, in fact, were quite distinct from attitudes in Moscow. Several local governments 
sought to introduce regulatory measures on religious affairs on their territories. Thus, 
                                                        
views on the optimal degree of “Islamization” of the society and its specific forms. In Tatarstan, for 
example, the majority of Tatar-speaking Tatar intellectuals have stressed the importance of Islam in the 
national self-identification of Tatars. The intelligentsia of various Islamic peoples of Dagestan has had even 
greater expectations of Islam, which has often been perceived as a crucial factor in the moral salvation of a 
society that has been socially degraded and criminalized (Yemelianova 1999:622) 
234 See chapter three for a brief discussion of the attempts to establish Islamic political movements and their 
performance in national elections. 
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since 1994, multiple subjects of the federation, including both Muslim-majority and 
Muslim-minority districts, made several attempts to adopt restrictive measures against 
religious activism.235 Moscow, on the other hand, often limited itself to broad policy lines 
and did not intervene in regional dynamics. The following chapters will explain in more 
detail how and why federal and regional attitudes toward religion, and Islam in particular, 
were dissimilar in a number of ways.  
This section has demonstrated that neutral state attitudes toward Islam in the 
1990s were in part a result of a multiethnic ethnicity regime that the mew Russian state 
adopted as a basis for a new social contract with its diverse population. Adoption of 
multiethnic ethnicity regime reflected not only liberal views of the late Soviet era 
reformers, but also the prevalence of cultural definitions of Islam among the decision 
makers. In part, the multiethnic framework carried over from the Soviet era was 
maintained because it allowed preservation of a secular order and the room for ethnic 
revival. Thus, it served both central and local authorities as well as for pro-active 
religious actors, many of whom were united in their commitment to deconstruct the 
Soviet legacy of atheism and totalitarian control. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the principles that guided Russian state policies toward 
Islam from perestroika until the late 1990s. It shows that norms of passive secularism in 
state-religion relations and the multiethnic ethnicity regime determined the state approach 
                                                        
235 According to Shterin and Richardson (1998), local law proposals were often “diametrically opposed” to 
the federal regulations (Shterin and Richardson 1998). Also, see the report on the Freedom of Conscience 
Violations in the Russian Federation (1994-1996), presented at the OSCE Review Meeting in Vienna in 
November 1996. 
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toward the post-Soviet Islamic revival between 1990 and 1997. The multiethnic passive 
secularism allowed unrestricted access of religious groups to the public sphere and put 
the burden of regulating the diverse society and maintaining the balance between various 
identities on a multiethnic ethnicity regime. A strong belief among the policymakers in a 
deep transformative impact of the Soviet era on Muslims and the Islamic practice in the 
country led them to assume that religion had acquired cultural definitions and was 
subordinated to much stronger ethnic identities. 
The 1990 law on religion and the 1993 Russian Constitution provided a necessary 
legal base for a full-fledged religious revival. The number of religious communities and 
mosques grew, Islamic education was partly restored, religious literature as well as 
religious goods of public consumption became much more available than in the past. As a 
result, the overall visibility of Islam in the public areas significantly increased. Since no 
criteria were set out for the access of various Islamic groups to the Russian public sphere, 
shortly the Islamic religious market became increasingly diverse and no less divided. 
The initial split of the Muslim community that seemed to follow ethnic lines led 
to the formation of a loose system of “ethno-regional” muftiyates. Since, the process 
largely followed the pattern of political decentralization, in other realms, it was not 
perceived as an issue of big concern for secular policymakers and, in fact, confirmed their 
assumption that Islam had largely become an element of national cultures. As Russia’s 
“ethnic Muslim” republics strived for sovereignty, many Islamic groups aligned with 
secular nationalists to deconstruct the Soviet-era control mechanisms. 
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Soon, however, it became clear that the phenomenon of Islamic revival had many 
layers of complexity besides ethnic component. As intra-faith quarrels within Muslim 
communities took ideological, theological, and personal forms, it increasingly turned into 
a security concern and came to be perceived by secular authorities as a threat to a secular 
social order. The following chapter will explore how this secular perception of Islam as a 
cultural phenomenon has been altered over time. It will analyze the emergence and 
development of the notion of “traditional Islam” that carries a distinct meaning from the 
idea that Islam is a means of ethnic identification bearing something of a "folk" character 
(Yalykapov, Economist Sept 1, 2012). The introduction of regulatory measures toward 
religion, as I will suggest, was largely an outcome of debates about the kind of Islam that 






Chapter 3   
Russia’s Muslims and Islam under Non-ethnic Multiconfessionalism, 1997-2012 
  
Society is unity in diversity  
George Herbert Mead 
Khubb ul’-Watan min al’-Iman (“Love for the Fatherland is a testimony of the faith”) 
The Prophetic Tradition 
 
  
Abstract   
What explains Russian state’s interventionism in Islamic affairs since the late 
1990s? Research on the political dynamics in Russia in the first decade of the 2000s 
frequently refers to the return of authoritarian practices and reestablishment of the state-
centric approach in social policymaking. However, these frameworks rarely explain the 
mechanism of religious policy-making in the country or present a conceptual framework 
for interpreting the relationship between religion and the state. This chapter continues to 
develop the matrix of ethno-confessional regimes to explain Russian state policies toward 
indigenous Muslim population and Islam. I advance the hypothesis that state attitudes 
toward Islam in Russia between 1997 and 2012 reflected a transition to a non-ethnic 
multi-confessional regime. I argue that realization that religion, and particularly Islam, 
could serve as a tool for maintaining the patriotic consensus induced Russian 
policymakers to reject the ethnic model of development and embrace morality as the 
foundation of the Russian state. Within this framework, “traditional Islam” and the 
established Muslim clergy play an essential role in providing the Russian state with 
ideological legitimacy among the indigenous Muslims and the institutional means to 
govern a diverse society. Reconstruction of a Tsarist-era “multi-confessional 
establishment,” as this study suggests, is one of the reasons why the Russian state 
continues to actively regulate the access of religious groups to the Russian public sphere 









On November 4, every year since 2005, Russia has celebrated the National Unity 
Day, a symbolic date that marks the expulsion of Polish invaders in 1612 and the end of 
the ‘Time of Troubles’.236 The fact that the Russian President commemorates the event 
alongside the leaders of the country’s “traditional religions” does not escape the attention 
of careful observers of Russian politics.237 For many people, it primarily signals that 
religion has become essential to Russia’s political legitimacy and social cohesion. 
Secondly, the fact that it is usually Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church who opens 
the celebration with a prayer for the fatherland hints that Orthodoxy is particularly 
marked as the first among equals because of its central role in Russian historical 
development. Indeed, today, as Burgess put it, “the Russian Orthodox Church is 
reclaiming its place as an integral part of Russian society” and enjoys social and political 
privileges (Burgess 2009:5).238 As is spelled out in the preamble of the country’s 1997 
law on religion, Orthodoxy made a special contribution to the history of Russia and to the 
establishment and development of the country’s spirituality and culture. 
Nonetheless, in symbolically charged events like these, which represent the 
efforts to come up with a compelling national idea to fill the ideological vacuum that 
opened up after the Soviet collapse, a significant role is also reserved for Russia’s 
                                                        
236 The Time of Troubles (Russian: Smutnoe Vremia) was a period of Russian history comprising the years 
of interregnum between the death of the last Russian Tsar of the Rurik Dynasty, Feodor Ivanovich, in 1598, 
and the establishment of the Romanov Dynasty in 1613. In 1601–03, Russia suffered a famine that killed 
one-third of the population, about two million. At the time, Russia was occupied by the Polish–Lithuanian 
Commonwealth in the Dimitriads, and suffered from civil uprisings, usurpers and impostors. 
237 Victoria Smolkin-Rothrock, “What are Russians celebrating when they celebrate National Unity Day?” 
www.opendemocracy.net (Last accessed on 5 November 2014). 
238 Burgess, John P. "Orthodox resurgence: Civil religion in Russia." Religion in Eastern Europe 29.2 
(2009): 1-14. 
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Muftis.239 The significance of the day for indigenous Muslims is that it also highlights 
their own role in ‘liberating’ the country from foreign aggressors and emphasizes that 
native followers of Islam should therefore be considered co-constructors of Russian 
statehood.240 Leaders of the established Islamic institutions, who represent the majority of 
Russia’s Muslims, readily participate in such meetings and make sure to make careful 
public statements on the occasion. Thus, they contribute to the construction of Russia's 
shared historical narrative, in search of which architects of the country’s new ideology 
reach as far as to the 17th century.241   
Whether or not major representatives of Russia’s Islamic community think that 
the new ideological configuration of the state is being built on a confessional-religious 
model, they all realize the growing influence of the Orthodox Church on Russian politics 
and society, while still being unable to overcome the internal disputes that led to the 
fragmentation of Russia’s Muslim community in the 1990s. Under the deep influence of 
historical memories about forced Christianization, Muftis not only rely on the state as a 
guardian of secularism but also compete with each other for the right to speak on behalf 
of all Russia’s Muslims. The state in its turn, which also has come to increasingly rely on 
the established religious institutions as important tools of governance and moral 
                                                        
239 Earlier attempts to come up with a compelling national idea produced little but cynicism and mockery, 
as most Russians didn't understand what, or who, they were expected to reconcile with. For details, see 
chapter four. Also, for more on the 1996 contest for the ‘Russian idea’ and the Day of Accord and 
Reconciliation, see Linda Delaine, “Day of Accord and Reconciliation,” Russian Life. November 7, 2000. 
http://www.russianlife.com/blog/day-of-accord-and-reconciliation/ (Last Accessed on March 15, 2015). 
240 Dannreuther, Roland. "Islamic radicalization in Russia: an assessment."International Affairs 86.1 
(2010): 109-126. Also see Vitaly Naumkin, ‘Evroislam kak naslednik dzhadidizma’, in D. V. 
Mukhetdinova, ed., Forumy Rossiskykh musul’man na poroge novogo tysyacheletiya (Nizhnii Novgorod: 
Medina, 2006). 
241 For sample statements of the leaders of the three major Muslim Spiritual Boards of Russia, Sheikh-ul-
Islam Talgat Tadzhuddin, Mufti Ravil Gainutdin, and Ismail Haji Berdiev, see: 
http://www.muslim.ru/articles/115/6137/ (last access on January 19, 2015) 
http://cdum.ru/news/44/5413/ (last access on January 19, 2015) 
http://www.vrns.ru/society/3375/#.VIDPbmTF_WU (last access on January 19, 2015) 
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discipline, sees the vital importance of maintaining confessional peace among “traditional 
religions” and “protect” the established clergy from internal dissent and foreign 
influence.242  
These delicate issues were largely absent from the calculus of religious and 
secular authorities in the early 1990s, when religion was treated merely as an element of 
culture and the Russian public sphere was unrestrictedly open to all religious groups and 
communities. What changed in the relationship between the Church, state, and Russia’s 
Muslims during the first decade after the Soviet collapse? More importantly, how did 
developments within country’s Muslim community affect the state’s attitude toward 
Islam? This chapter will explore further evolution of Russia’s post-Soviet ethno-
confessional regime since the late 1990s and examine its impact on state-Islam relations. 
The first part of the chapter will demonstrate the evolution of secular thinking 
about the Islamic faith and describe some of the transformations in Muslim religious 
practice in Russia over the 1990s. It will explain why Islam, which was largely perceived 
by Russian policymakers as a subordinate element of largely secularized and westernized 
cultures of indigenous Muslims in the late Soviet era and the early 1990s, came to be 
seen as a powerful ideology that could guide human behavior both in positive and 
negative ways. The second part will start to examine the state’s response to these 
perceived challenges. It will focus on the emergence and development of a “Confessional 
collaboration model” in Russia’s state-religion relations.243 I will explain the formation of 
                                                        
242 Vladimir Putin’s speech at a meeting with muftis from Russia’s Muslim spiritual administrations on 
October 22, 2013. http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6157 (Last access February 23, 2015). 
243 Confessional collaboration refers to the relationship between the state and traditional religious 
organizations (most notably between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Kremlin) which manifests itself 
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a concept of “traditional Islam” and the development of a patriotic definition of religion, 
which guided the thinking of policymakers about Islam in the post-1997 era. This section 
will also demonstrate that the adopted model is largely based on the historical precedent 
known as the “multi-confessional establishment,” which was developed in the 18th 
century (Werth 2014). The third part will analyze the origins and development of a non-
ethnic ‘ethnicity regime’ in post-Soviet Russia. The conclusion will summarize the 
findings and reassess the rise of the concept of “traditional Islam” as a new phenomenon 
in the construction of Russia’s post-Soviet identity. Overall, the chapter should clarify 
how the post-Soviet Russian leadership, attempting to overcome the confusing ambiguity 
about Russian national identity and the state’s legitimacy, seeks to rebuild a vast country 
with its troubled political history. 
 
Part I:  Learning to deal with the Islamic Diversity: From Cultural Islam to Islamic 
Patriotism  
In October 2013, President Putin delivered a speech in Ufa at the event 
commemorating the 225th anniversary of the foundation of the Muslim Spiritual 
Assembly – the first state-recognized Islamic institution in Russia.244 Alas, he had to 
begin his address calling for a minute of silence to pay respect to the victims of a deadly 
terrorist attack in Volgograd that happened the day before.245 The tragic attack, which 
                                                        
in cooperation taking place in selected areas of the public sphere, in education and social care. See 
discussion below. Also refer to the dissertation glossary for the definition of the term and references. 
244 Vlabimir Putin, Speech at a celebratory event marking the 225th anniversary of the founding 
of the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Russia. October 22, 2013. 
http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/19473 (Last accessed on February 3, 2015) 
245 The attack took life of 7 civilians and left 37 more wounded. “V rezul'tate terakta v Volgograde raneny 
37 chelovek - utochnennye dannye MChS,” ITAR-TASS. 21 October 2013. http://itar-
tass.com/proisshestviya/693737 (Last accessed on January 20, 2015); “V Mahachkale ubit organizator 
terakta v Volgograde,” RIA-Novosti, 20 November, 2013. http://ria.ru/incidents/20131120/978323651.html 
(Last accessed on January 20, 2015) 
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was reportedly carried out by Islamist radicals, reminded many of a series of similar 
assaults throughout the 90s and the 2000s that left behind a heavy toll of dead and 
wounded civilians. The event in Volgograd turned the public’s eyes to the President’s 
remarks, which were expected to give an official perspective not only on issues of 
concern to Russia’s indigenous Muslim community, but also provide a broader 
perspective on the role of Islam in the country and some of the challenges that the larger 
society was facing with respect to Islamic extremism. The President’s talk at the 
ceremony and his comments at a subsequent meeting with the heads of Russia’s major 
Muftis did indeed reveal the position of the state with respect to key policy matters and, 
more importantly, vividly demonstrated the transformation of the official rhetoric toward 
Islam since the early 1990s.246 
The bulk of President Putin’s address stressed the importance of cultivating the 
sense of patriotism among the indigenous Muslim population and especially the youth. In 
his speech, Putin quoted indigenous Islamic scholars to remind Muslims that “the love of 
Homeland,” according to the prophetic tradition, was “part of Muslim faith.”247 Putin 
underlined the important role of the established clergy in educating the population about 
the common values. “Our common goal,” he said, “is to raise the youth in the spirit of 
mutual respect, which is founded on the feelings of common citizenship, patriotism, and 
shared national identity.”248 At a separate meeting with the country’s leading Islamic 
                                                        
246 Vladimir Putin’s Speech at a celebratory event marking the 225th anniversary of the founding of the 
Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Russia. http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6155 (Last access 
February 3, 2015) 
247 President Putin quoted Mufti Rasulev, who preached that love for the motherland was part of Muslim’s 
faith. 
248 Vladimir Putin’s speech at a celebratory event marking the 225th anniversary of the founding of the 
Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Russia. http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6155 (Last access 
February 3, 2015). 
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authorities, the President reiterated his vision of the future of Islam in Russia. He pointed 
out the historical role of Muslim Spiritual Boards in educating Muslims as true patriots of 
Russia and called on the Muftis to unite the efforts to strengthen traditional Islam. He 
also emphasized the importance of cooperation between Muftiyats and the Church, 
especially in questions pertaining to protection of the country from unfavorable foreign 
influence. For Putin, spiritual authority had to remain in hands of the established clergy. 
In this context, Mr. President underlined the importance of establishing a homegrown 
Islamic school of thought that would guarantee the “sovereignty” of Russia’s spiritual 
space. He admitted that secular efforts to do this had often been unproductive.249 Finally, 
he emphasized that the Russian public sphere remained open to the established clergy and 
invited them to make use of available resources to socialize indigenous Muslims and 
achieve other stated goals.250  
This section will examine the evolution of secular thinking about Islam in Russia 
from the idea that it was merely an element subordinated to ethnic cultures to the idea 
that it was a leading social force that disciplined the society in collaboration with the 
state. First, I will discuss some of the reasons for fragmentation of the Muslim 
community beyond ethnic lines. Then I will describe important transformations in 
Muslim religious practice in the country and explain re-emergence of debates about Islam 
in the context of a security discourse. Finally, I will discuss the formation and 
development of a concept of “traditional Islam” in Russia. I will suggest that the belief of 
secular authorities in 1) the ability of the established Muslim clergy to build patriotic 
                                                        
249 He mentioned the controversies about banning of the Islamic literature. 
250 Vladimir Putin’s Speech at a meeting with muftis from Russia’s Muslim spiritual administrations. 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6157 (Last accessed on March 18, 2015). 
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consensus among indigenous Muslims and 2) a potential threat stemming from non-
traditional Islamic communities has come to dominate policymakers’ thinking about the 
religion in the post-1997 era.251  
Table 10: Non-ethnic Multi-confessionalism and Islam, 1997-2012 
State-religion regime Ethnicity regime 
Confessional collaboration Non-ethnic  
Access to the pubic sphere 
is reserved for “traditional” 
religious organization 
Civic nationalism; 
Declining support for 
institutionalization of ethnicities  
Regulation of religious affairs 
Patriotic Islam (religious organizations as junior partners of 
secular state institutions) 
 
1. Islamic diversity beyond ethnic politics 
By the mid-1990s it became clear that many policymakers underestimated the role 
that Islam could play in the Russian society under the liberal regime. In his study on the 
post-Soviet fragmentation of the Russian Muslim community, Roman Silantyev argues 
that over time the explanatory power of the “ethnic factor” was rapidly fading away.252 
As intra-faith disputes within Russia’s Muslim community deepened, theological and 
political motives became important in the analysis of Muslim behavior (Silantyev 2002). 
Silantyev’s study reveals that ethnic diversity was indeed only one of many 
                                                        
251 For one of the best discussions about different interpretations of Islam in the contemporary world, see 
Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the roots of terror. Three 
Leaves, 2005. 
252 Simantyev, Roman. Etnicheskii aspect raskola islamskogo soobschestva Rossii. Moscow: Institut 
etnologii i antropologii RAN, 2002. 
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disagreements among the country’s Muslim clergy and various Islamic groups.253 The 
division of indigenous Muslims into multiple competing factions was also due to 
generational differences, ideological and theological disagreements, as well as divergence 
in financial and political interests. Many disputes seemed to be further complicated with 
personal idiosyncrasies.  
The first observation that began to challenge the perception that religious 
identities were totally subordinated to local cultures was a generational dispute between 
younger and older cohorts of indigenous Muslim clergy. So-called “young Imams” 
challenged older Islamic authorities, at times accusing them of incompetence in religious 
matters, excessive loyalty to the secular authorities, and even corruption.254 Indeed, in a 
religion that does not have a church-like hierarchy, seniority counts far less than religious 
knowledge in defining the authority. Therefore, some of the young Muslims, who took 
the opportunity to obtain Islamic education abroad, could easily challenge the authority 
of often religiously poorly educated Soviet-era elderly imams. The exact number of 
students who left Russia to receive Islamic education is unknown. According to various 
estimates, over 20,000 people returned to the country with such an education.255 This, 
according to Goble, has split Islamic communities in many Russian regions. Observers of 
Islam in Russia note that to a certain extent a strong sense of a usurpation of religious 
authority by an older generation of Soviet-trained elite, which is rarely justified by their 
                                                        
253 It is important to note that Silantyev’s hypotheses are highly contested both in the academic community 
as well as among the members of Russia’s Muslim clergy.  
254 Silantyev 2008:172, Yemelianova 1999. According to Yemelianova, the low standards of 
professionalism of the official Islamic clergy – many of whom were former party and Komsomol chiefs – 
triggered popular Islamic protest, especially in the Northern Caucasus, where the indigenous Muslim 
population was much more religious than in the Volga-Urals area (Yemelianova 1999: 612). 
255 Testimony of Paul Goble at the public hearing before The Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe: U.S. Helsinki Commission. December 17, 2009 
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theological or religious knowledge, exists among the younger generation of Muslims 
(Dannreuther 2010).  
Often generational conflicts overlapped with other disagreements within Russia’s 
Muslim community. Some observers interpreted these divergences as splits along various 
theological doctrines. According to Almazova, religious activists could be categorized as 
adherents of the reformist, conservative-traditional, secular-nationalist, and radical 
interpretations of Islam (Almazova 2015).256 Thus, for example, the established clergy 
continued to preach that Islam was rooted in local ethno-cultural traditions and for the 
most part was based on Sufism or on the Hanafi or Shafi schools of Sunni Islam.257 A 
younger generation of Muslims became exposed to other interpretations of the religion. 
Some of them found Wahhabism and Salafism to be more appealing. In terms of Islamic 
theology, Wahhabism and Salafism represent the “pure” Islam observed during the times 
of Prophet Muhammad and the four Righteous Caliphs. The Wahhabis advocate strict 
monotheism (tawhid) and regard innovations in religion and tariqatism (a form of 
Sufism) as deviations from “true” Islam. In particular, they insist on the mandatory 
observance of all five pillars of Islam and reject customary religious rituals such as 
sermons commemorating the 3rd, 7th, and 40th days after a brliever away. In doing so, 
Wahhabis often come into conflict with local established Islamic authorities.  
Moreover, the post-Soviet Islamic resurgence revived some other local 
theological debates that were silenced during the Soviet era. One of such debates 
emerged in the Volga-Urals area between qadimists – an Islamic camp concerned with 
                                                        
256 Almazova, Leyla. "The Positions of Muslim scholars in the Volga-Ural Region in the Context of Islamic 
Ideologies of the 20th and 21st Centuries." Islam and Citizenship Education. Springer Fachmedien 
Wiesbaden, 2015. 259-272. 
257 Also muridism, depending on the region. 
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the preservation of the old system and resisting religious innovation, and jadidists – 
Islamic reformers.258 Historically, according to Kanlidere, jadidists saw qadimists as 
traitors and considered themselves as the real preservers of the line of tradition. 
Ironically, however, qadimists accused their counterparts of the same faults (Kanlidere 
1997).259 The old rivalry between the two schools of Islamic thought that dates back to 
the 19th century revived soon after the Soviet collapse. The established Muslim clergy 
aimed primarily to defend Islam against supposedly "foreign cultural currents" and 
struggled against any kind of deviation from their accustomed Islamic practice. Some of 
the newly emerging Islamic groups played into the local theological debate and claimed 
their own authority. In addition, the leading Tatar official theoretician, Rafael Khakimov, 
came up with a concept EuroIslam as a viable basis for restoration of Tatar reformist 
Islam and the Tatar national idea (Yemelianova 1999: 612).260 Public debates over these 
issues contributed to the strengthening of the idea that Islam was not merely an element 
of ethnic identities. 
The idea that Islam was subordinated to ethnic and local cultures continued to 
suffer serious blows as disputes within Russia’s Muslim community deepened. In 
addition to generational, theological, and ideological differences that contributed to the 
crystallization of “traditional” and “non-traditional” Islamic groups, critical differences 
soon emerged among representatives of Russia’s established Islamic clergy 
                                                        
258 Abdullin, Yahya G. "Islam in the history of the Volga-Kama Bulghars and Tatars." Central Asian 
Survey 9.2 (1990): 1-11. 
259 Kanlidere, Ahmet. "Reform Within Islam." The Tajid and Jadid Movement among the Kazan Tatars 
(1809–1917). Conciliation or Conflict (1997). Also see Mukhametshin, Rafik “ Musul’manskoe 
obrazovanie u Tatar v dorevolyucionnoi Rossii: Sostoyanie, problemy i perspektivy.” Minbar, 2009:79. 
260 Rafael Khakimov is the author of the concept of EuroIslam, which is described as a synthesis of Tatar 
jadidism and postmodernism. See Khakimov, R. 2003. Where Is Our Mecca? Manifest of Euroislam, 
Kazan: Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan  
  125 
(representatives of “traditional Islam”). Key disagreements on the status of Islam in 
Russia, representation of the religion on the federal level, and the relationship with the 
Orthodox Church led to the grouping of Islamic communities around several major state-
approved Muftiyats. Differences in opinion as to whether Islam is a regional phenomenon 
or has a national perspective, whether it should be considered an equal or a junior partner 
to the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as the rights of Muslims in Muslim-minority 
regions became subjects of contention between the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims in 
Ufa, the Council of Russia’s Muftis in Moscow and several strong Muftiyats in the 
Muslim-majority republics (Curanovic 2014). 
In the meantime, Islamic pluralism in Russia grew fast and strong. In addition to 
the points mentioned above, several factors facilitated gradual development of 
independent religiously motivated communities in the country. In part, diversification of 
the religious marketplace happened due to the growing public demand for religious 
services and unpreparedness of the established clergy to meet the needs of the society.261 
Secondly, a growing number of people receiving Islamic education abroad and a massive 
influx of foreign Islamic missionaries facilitated the spread of new religious ideas. In 
addition, the proliferation of Islamic literature and the financial independence of new 
Islamic groups contributed to the process that has finally broken the perception that Islam 
was subordinated to the indigenous cultures.  
 
2. Transformations of Muslim religious behavior and Islamic practices 
                                                        
261 Religious market(place) is a physical and virtual space where religious ideas and goods are exchanged. 
See the dissertation glossary for the definition and references. 
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The expanding religious marketplace over the course of the 1990s was reflected in 
a great variation in Muslim religious behavior. For many Muslim believers this process 
presented an opportunity for private spiritual growth and building a closer relationship 
with the Divine.262 For some others, however, this was a chance to assert the public 
visibility and practice of Islam and even a reason to challenge the secular regime. Trends 
in Muslim religious behavior and Islamic practices became a topic of heated 
parliamentary discussions at the regional level. Public debates in Muslim-majority 
republics covered themes ranging from religious holidays to religiously motivated clashes 
between various Islamic groups. In this respect, developments in the republics of 
Dagestan and Tatarstan are exemplary. 
In Dagestan, for example, various Islamic groups sought new ways to become 
involved in public life, including active political participation. In March 1990, the first 
Islamic party of the republic ‘Dzhamaatul Muslimin’ was registered. It was aimed at 
representing the interests of the fundamentalist wing of Dagestani Muslims. Soon, on the 
20th of October, Islamic Democratic Party of Dagestan was founded and sided with the 
state-backed Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan (DUMD).263 In a relatively short 
period of time numerous other movements that also underlined their ties with Islamic 
values emerged in the republic. Among them were ‘National Front’, Avar People’s 
Society “Dzhamaat”, Avar National Council, Kumyk ‘Tenglik’, ‘Vatan’, Milli Medzhlis, 
National Front of Chechens-Akkins, ‘Birlik’, and others (Silant’ev 2006:230). 
                                                        
262 Available data suggests that in 1990 34% of urban Tatars identified themselves as believers. This 
number increased to 66% in 1994 and reached the level of 81% in 1997. The study suggests that these 
numbers varied according to different age groups. Levels of religious observance, nevertheless, were much 
lower. See Musina, R. “Islam i problemy identichnosti Tatar v postsovetskii period,” in ed. Iskhakov, D. 
Konfessional’nyi factor v razvitii Tatar. Kazan: Mardzhani, 2009. 
263 The party has later changed its name to the Islamic Party and joined the All-Russia Public Muslim 
Movement Nur. 
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In May 1991 ‘Dzhamaatul Muslimin’ organized the first public protest campaign 
against the regional Spiritual Board and secular authorities. The rally that occupied the 
central square of the capital Makhachkala lasted 12 days. The original disputed issue was 
a 6-fold increase on the price for a Hajj (a Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca).264 Over time, 
demands developed into a criticism of the local Spiritual Board and calls for resignation 
of the republic’s secular leadership. High-ranking officials failed to pacify the protesters 
and on the 13th of June demonstrators attempted to besiege the building of the Supreme 
Council of Dagestan. In the history of modern Dagestan this day is recorded as a “Black 
Thursday”. One person died as a result of a violent clash between protesters and security 
forces (Silantyev 2008).  
The organizer of the demonstration, ethnic Dargin Khasbulat Khasbulatov, was 
soon arrested in Moscow. However, before long he was released upon the appeals of 
arriving pilgrims. According to Roman Silantyev, releasing Khasbulatov was a critical 
event that had far-reaching consequences. He suggests that some Islamic groups in 
Dagestan perceived this gesture as a weakness of the secular state and realized that 
Islamic movements could effectively put pressure on secular authorities (Silant’ev 
206:231). By May 1998 representatives of the Islamic opposition, including extremists, 
became so powerful that a crowd of Islamists installed the green banner of Islam over the 
Dagestani Parliament in Mahachkala. In July 1998, several villages in Buynakskii district 
proclaimed themselves Islamic territory, based on Sharia (Islamic law).265 
                                                        
264 The price for Hajj was 5 thousand rubles per person in 1990. 345 people from Dagestan performed it. In 
1991, 900 people planned to perform Hajj, but the price for Hajj increased to 30 thousand rubles 
(Moskovskie Novosti, 11 August 1991).  
265 Yemelianova, 1999. 
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 Not only religious movements and groups demonstrated political activism. 
Encouraged by the public support of religious revival, Dagestan’s Muftiyat has also 
gradually developed a rather conservative approach. Demands of the clergy ranged from 
an increase in Islamic broadcasting on television and radio to making Friday an official 
holiday, establishing an Islamic educational system, and to the introduction of at least 
some elements of Sharia into the legal system (Sackman Eaton 2005, Yemelianova 
1999).  
Similar, albeit not identical, dynamics also evolved in Tatarstan. Encouraged by 
the growing popularity, the Mufti of a newly established Spiritual Board of Muslims of 
Tatarstan (DUMRT), Gabdulla Galiullin, pressured secular authorities for financial 
benefits such as significant cuts in utility fees for mosques and Islamic religious schools, 
as well as assistance in establishment of the new system of Islamic education in the 
republic.266 Unhappy with delays in meeting his demands, Galiullin began criticizing 
regional secular authorities and President of the Republic of Tatarstan Mintimer 
Shaimiev. The conflict reached its apogee in the “Muhammadiya” affair. The dispute 
developed over property rights on building of the Islamic school “Muhammadiya” in 
Kazan in 1995. In September, Mufti Galiullin demanded the return of the premises to the 
school. As city administration responded ambiguously, students seized the facility. The 
scandal took on a federal dimension when Galiullin’s move found support of the 
Orthodox Church. Despite all his efforts, Galiullin was unable to secure the property for 
too long. The secular leadership ordered security forces to empty the building and the 
command was immediately executed. Subsequent attempts of Galiullin and several other 
                                                        
266 See materials of the second meeting of DUM RT held on 22 January, 1995.  
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Islamic groups beyond control of DUM RT to challenge the secular leadership were in 
vain.267 
In the secular domain, arguably, the strongest campaigner for the thorough re-
Islamization of the local indigenous population has been the Republic of Tatarstan’s 
parliamentary deputy Fanavil Shaymardanov. He was the initiator of local parliamentary 
discussions on issues such as creation of Islamic schools, hospitals, maternity wards, food 
stores, and cafes, as well as special places for prayer in various places of work and 
recreation; the formation of Muslim units in the Russian army; the introduction of a ban 
on alcohol sales during the Islamic holidays, and a ban on the use of Islamic symbols in 
the labeling of alcohol and travel tickets, etc. These initiatives, however, received little 
support and had practically no effect on government policies (Yemelianova 1999). 
A number of similar initiatives have been tried in other Muslim majority republics 
and across the country. However, without a collectively accepted religious authority, the 
Russian Muslim community was neither able to present a coherent view on policy 
matters nor offer a vision for the future of Islam in Russia. On the contrary, 
disagreements within Russia’s Islamic communities turned increasingly intense and even 
violent.  
 
3. Politicization and Securitization of Islam  
The outbreak of violence in the Northern Caucasus, two bloody wars in 
Chechnya, and deadly terrorist attacks across the country throughout the 1990s and the 
                                                        
267 See Yemelianova 1999 and Silantyev 2008 for discussion of Galiullin’s attempts to establish an Islamic 
party based on a movement “Musul’mane Tatarstana” and similar efforts of several other Islamic groups 
beyond control of DUM RT (e.g. Saf Islam and Tabligh). 
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following decade have become a focus of public attention and intensive scholarly 
research. The purpose of this study is not to offer an alternative explanation of the vicious 
conflicts and heartless assaults on civilians that took many lives. Nor does this work aim 
to engage in a debate about the causes of Islamic radicalization and politicization of 
religion in general. Rather, one of its important goals is to show what has changed in how 
secular authorities perceived Islam in the early 1990s and the 2000s and what principles 
guided state policies toward the religion in the two periods. It will suggest that Islam, 
which was largely perceived by Russian policymakers as a subordinate element of highly 
secularized and westernized cultures of indigenous Muslims in the late Soviet era and the 
early 1990s, came to be seen as a powerful ideology that could guide human behavior 
both in positive and negative ways. The transformation of a peaceful fragmentation of the 
Muslim community into an armed conflict between various Islamic groups; the 
increasing involvement of religiously motivated combatants in a secular nationalist 
conflict in the Northern Caucasus; and the growing pressure of Islamic activists on 
secular authorities in the Muslim-majority regions contributed to the shift in decision-
makers’ thinking about what Islam could be and what it could do.268  
Roland Dannreuther suggests that the situation in the early 1990s “gave little 
indication that Islamic radicalism would become a major internal threat to the nascent 
post-Soviet Russian state” (Dannreuther 2010:111). The new Yeltsin administration did 
not view the indigenous Muslim population within Russia prone to Islamic extremism. 
Their assumption was that the problem of Islamist fundamentalism was left in backward 
                                                        
268 For discussion of the perceptions about Islam in the West in the 1990s and the 2000s and particularly 
about the origins of the concept of securitization of Islam, see Cesari, Jocelyne. The securitization of Islam 
in Europe. Vol. 15. CEPS, 2009. 
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Afghanistan and did not pose a serious threat to Russia’s own largely westernized and 
secularized Muslims, who constituted a much smaller portion of the country’s total 
population than before the separation of Central Asian republics. Russia’s Muslims were 
treated as recognized minorities and were welcome to benefit from the religious freedoms 
and civil liberties that the new regime offered (Dannreuther 2010). A peaceful process of 
disintegration of Muslim Spiritual boards initially along ethnic and territorial 
administrative borders was not an issue of major concern. In fact it could be seen as a 
“logical and even healthy development”, given that loosening of the Soviet straightjacket 
allowed the flourishing of egalitarian theological principles of Islam (Dannrether 
2010:113). This was also consistent with the overall goal to develop Russia into a 
“normal power” with liberalizing and westernizing agenda.269 
The outbreak of violence between competing Islamic groups and the 
transformation of a secular nationalist conflict in Chechnya into a battlefield for 
religiously motivated combatants was arguably the most tragic aspect of the post-Soviet 
Islamic revival. In his book, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, James Hughes 
explores how the initial struggle for independence in Chechnya, which was set in motion 
by secular nationalist demands, turned into a religious fight.270 Hughes argues that toward 
the beginning of the second Chechen War in 1999, “leading protagonists on the two sides 
no longer conceptualized the conflict as a secular nationalist struggle, but rather saw it as 
a confrontation, where the ‘Islamic factor’ was predominant” (Hughes 2007:xiii). While 
the author mainly blames the brutality of Russia’s military response, he also draws 
                                                        
269 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 Aug. 1992. Also see Shleifer, Andrei. A normal country: Russia after 
communism. Harvard University Press, 2005; Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Treisman. A normal country. 
No. w10057. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003; and Dannreuther 2010:112. 
270 Hughes, James. Chechnya: from nationalism to jihad. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. 
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attention to the influence of foreign militant Wahhabi Islamists, “who attempted to 
transform the core issue from secession, a concept that was grounded in a territorialized 
idea of the nation-state, into one based on a concept of a theocratic solidarity of the 
Muslim community (ummah) across the wider North Caucasus region” (Hughes 
2007:xiii).  
Dannreuther agrees that during the first Chechen war, from 1994 to 1996, the 
religious element was marginal compared to the overarching nationalist-defined struggle 
(Dannreuther 2010). However, rather than solely holding the Russian aggression and 
foreign militant Islamists responsible for Islamization of the conflict in the region, he also 
draws attention to internal disputes among the local Muslims. He discusses some of the 
reasons why some Muslims find radical Islamist approaches theologically appealing. 
According Dannreuther, the attraction of Salafist Islamic thought “lies precisely in its 
purity and austerity, its emphasis on monotheism, its rejection of innovation (bid’a) and 
its rejection of any popular, ethnic or national accretions” (Dannreuther 2010:121). 
Initially, the radical Islam found supporters among the Chechens (Tishkov 2004: 164-
180).271 Nevertheless, since competition between various interpretations of Islam was not 
confined to a particular territory or communities, radical Islam rapidly spread across the 
country and integrated into the global transnational jihadist movement (Dannreuther 
2010:109). Soon religious violence spread beyond the North Caucasus (Silantyev 2008). 
Moscow and a number of other cities and regions in Russia suffered a series of deadly 
Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks, such as apartment explosions in Moscow, Buynaksk, 
and Volgodonsk in 1999, the theatre hostage crisis in 2002 and the Beslan siege in 2004. 
                                                        
271 Tishkov, Valeriĭ Aleksandrovich. Chechnya: Life in a war-torn society. Vol. 6. Univ of California Press, 
2004. 
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Not all the disputes on religious grounds turned violent. In some regions, the 
process played out in institutionalized and rather peaceful forms. Thus, for example, 
some newly organized Islamic groups sought to mobilize people around faith by 
establishing religious movements and political parties, used the public sphere to criticize 
the secular leadership and to put pressure on regional authorities about meeting religious 
demands (Silantyev 2008). In some cases, as in Tatarstan, for example, the process of 
religious revival developed rather peacefully. In other regions, as was seen in the case of 
Dagestan, Islamic resurgence led to significant popular riots (Dannreuther 2010, 
Yemelianova 1999). In all cases, however, developments suggested that Islam could no 
longer be perceived as an element of culture.   
 
4. Conclusion: Rediscovering Islam 
Significant transformations in the internal dynamics of Russia’s Muslim 
community over the first half of the 1990s, partly affected by the external influence from 
the Muslim world, compelled the country’s secular authorities to revise their approach 
toward Islam. On the one hand, the state could no longer ignore the role of Islam in the 
public sphere. The events demonstrated that religion could thrive not only in the private 
domain but could also motivate indigenous Muslims to organize independently and even 
provide ideological basis for questioning secular norms and the regime. Despite the 
transformative impact of the Soviet-era, Russia’s Muslims maintained strong spiritual 
attachments to Islam. On the other hand, as some scholars and representatives of the 
religious clergy pointed out, there was no necessary contradiction between being a 
  134 
Muslim and being a loyal Russian citizen (Dannreuther 2010, Gainutdin 2009).272 As 
Danneuther has put it, “there is no deterministic inevitability in Muslim disloyalty to the 
Russian state, nor any inevitable contradiction between being a Muslim and a loyal 
Russian citizen” (Dannreuther 2010:126). Therefore, the Russian state had to find a 
balanced strategy to embrace its Muslim population and to neutralize Islamic radicalism. 
More importantly it had to develop a new discourse that would reflect the way the state 
would deal with its diverse population. The following sections will attempt to 
conceptualize the state response to the transformations in the Islamic religious practice 
and belief. 
 
Part II: Islam under Multi-confessionalism or the Rules of the “Confessional 
collaboration” 
In 2012, the construction of a major Islamic center ‘Yardam’ in Kazan was 
drawing to an end. For his outstanding service to the public, the imam of the center was 
publicly praised and would soon be awarded the prestigious title “Tatar of the Year.”273 
Around the same time, state security services conducted a search in another mosque of 
Kazan, Al-Ikhlas. Upon capturing a few items from the list of banned literature and 
identifying the extremist content in the lectures delivered at the mosque, Al-Ikhlas was 
soon closed and its imam sentenced to prison.274 The story about the state pressure on Al-
                                                        
272 Dannreuther, Roland. "Islamic radicalization in Russia: an assessment."International Affairs 86.1 
(2010): 109-126. 
Nancy Lubin, Labour and nationality in Soviet Central Asia: an uneasy compromise (London: Macmillan, 
1985). 
273 “Pobeditelem konkursa ‘Tatarin Goda – 2012’ stal zammuftiia Ildar Khazrat Baiazitov” (9 July 2013) 
http://www.suleiman.ru/news/pobeditelem_konkursa_tatarin_goda_2012_stal_zammuftija_ildar_khazrat_b
ajazitov/2013-07-09-714 (Last accessed on March 19, 2015) 
274 Prikhod kazanskoi mecheti ‘Al-Ikhlas’ likvidirovan za ekstremizm (15 May 2013) 
http://www.newsru.com/religy/15may2013/verbot.html (Last accessed on March 19, 2015). See discussion 
below for the analysis of the debates about the ban on Islamic literature.  
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Ikhlas and support to the Yardam center clearly demonstrates a difference in state 
attitudes toward various Islamic communities. What explains the ability of some religious 
groups to continue religious service and enjoy full access to the public sphere and what 
prevents others from benefiting from the same rights?  
This section will discuss the emergence and development of a new model of 
relationship between the state and religious organizations, which manifests itself in 
cooperation taking place between secular and religious authorities in selected areas of 
public life, in education and social care. I call this relationship a “Confessional 
collaboration” model in Russia’s state-religion relations.275 The section will conceptually 
explain the transition from passive secularism to a new form of state-religion regime and 
put it into a historical perspective. I will argue that introduction of the notion of 
“traditional religions” into the Russian legal framework was key in responding to the 
religious revival in the country.276 By doing so, the state defined what groups would be 
allowed to be present in the public sphere and rely on the state support in pursuing their 
religious mission, and what groups would face administrative charges and become the 
target of repressive measures.277 More importantly, the new conceptualization formed a 
basis for development of a new regime that was in part based on Russia’s pre-
                                                        
275 Refer to the dissertation glossary for definition of the key term – “Confessional collaboration” model. 
The term refers to the relationship between the state and traditional religious organizations (most notably 
between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Kremlin) which manifests itself in cooperation taking place 
in selected areas of the public sphere, in education and social care. 
276 Refer to the dissertation glossary for definition of the key term – “traditional religions.” In this study the 
term refers to four religions – Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism. In the Russian legal 
context, the concept is not defined. It is widely accepted that the notion was inspired by the preamble of the 
Russian Federation 1997 “Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.”  
277 Refer to the dissertation glossary for definition of the key term – “public sphere.” In this study the term 
refers to a space to which all citizens have access and in which all issues of concern to citizens and all 
available opinions can be articulated and deliberated.277 According to Taylor, it is “a common space in 
which the members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and also 
face-to-face encounters to discuss matters of common interest and thus to able to form a common mind 
about these.” 
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revolutionary “multi-confessional establishment” model – a framework wherein the state 
relied on state-approved religious organizations to socialize the population and provide 
moral discipline (Werth 2014).278  
 
1. The legal foundation for a privileged access to the public sphere 
According to the classification of ‘State-Religion Regimes and Secularism’ 
presented in chapter one of this study, the visibility of religion in the public sphere and 
whether some religious groups have a privileged access to it determines what kind of 
state-religion regime dominates in a given non-religious system of governance. As the 
example above demonstrates, toward the late 1990s, secular authorities in Russia 
renounced the neutrality that allowed equal access to the public sphere for all religious 
communities. Certain groups began to enjoy privileges in accessing the public sphere, 
while others faced new administrative obstacles. This section will explain how the 
adoption of the 1997 law on religion at the federal level and a number of consecutive 
legal measures at the local level have affected the state-religion regime in Russia, which 
began to gradually shift from passive secularism to a model of Confessional collaboration 
between the state and “traditional” religious organizations.279 
                                                        
278 Refer to the dissertation glossary for definition of the key term – “multi-confessional establishment.” 
The term refers to a religious order that framed the exercise of faith and defined the scope of religious 
freedom in Russia from the reign of Catherine II (1762-96) through that of Nicholas I (1825-55) until the 
end of the Tsarist era. It implies recognition of religious institutions and production of legal statutes for the 
regulation of spiritual affairs. In other words, it is a framework wherein the state relies on state-approved 
religious organizations to socialize the population and provide moral discipline. 
279 Refer to the dissertation glossary for definition of the key term – “traditional religious organizations.” In 
this study, the term refers to state-registered religious organizations representing traditional religions in 
Russia. More broadly, these are religious organizations that have demonstrated that they had significantly 
influenced the formation and development of Russian statehood, played an important historical role in the 
development of national consciousness and that a significant proportion of Russian citizens belonged to or 
expressed a preference for it. 
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Over the course of the early 1990s observers of Islam in Russia witnessed how 
various Islamic communities divided along multiple lines despite shared ethnic and 
cultural roots. The outbreak of violence among these groups and the rejection of a secular 
order by some Islamic communities made the benevolent state approach that allowed 
equal access to all religious groups to the public sphere increasingly unsustainable. As the 
pressure on the federal government to intervene into religious affairs mounted from 
various segments of the society, including the Church, the experiment with “passive 
secularism” rapidly drew to an end. 
The main argument for adoption of a more regulatory approach toward religion 
was that if left unregulated by the state new religious groups might infringe on people’s 
constitutional rights. For many critics of Russia’s rapid liberalization, the reliance on the 
"invisible hand" of the market forces could lead to many “troublesome problems” 
(Shterin and Richardson, 1998). Their attacks focused on newly emerging religious 
movements, which were seen as bogus faiths. Reportedly, by the mid 1990s, some 6,000 
“totalitarian sects” with three to five million participants operated in Russia (Dvorkin, 
1998). These “sects” were accused of imposing a threat to the people’s psychological and 
physical health, social well-being, and the national security. Therefore, according to 
supporters of regulatory measures, assertive stance toward such groups on the part of the 
state was required.280  
                                                        
280 During the 1995 election campaign, the political movement "Our Home Russia" published a leaflet in 
which all religious organizations were divided into three categories: a) the Russian Orthodox Church, 
entitled to "full necessary support"; b) "all traditional confessions in Russia", “deserving” harmonic and 
peaceful co-existence; and c) "totalitarian sects and foreign missionaries." The third category was destined 
to restrictive measures because the movement [Our Home Russia] was "against their activities on Russian 
territory." 
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Secondly, critics of unregulated religious market raised a national-security 
argument against it. There were several meetings and conferences under the auspices of 
political parties, parliamentary and governmental organizations, which discussed possible 
changes to the law on religion. In a letter to President Yeltsin the Duma declared 
"religious security of Russia an important priority of national security, along with 
military, political, economic, ecological, and social security."281 
Another argument came from representatives and advocates of the Russian 
Orthodox Church. They argued that in an open competition with other religions, the 
Orthodox Church (ROC) inevitably found itself in a materially disadvantageous situation 
because of the oppression of the Church during the Soviet period and because of the fact 
that foreign religious organizations were much better off financially (Shterin 1998). It 
was clearly expressed by Patriarch Alexii II: "I am of the opinion that the Freedom of 
Conscience Committee of the Supreme Council must take legal measures to act as a 
barrier in the way of a network of various financially well supported foreign religious 
organizations."282  
Finally, advocates of introducing regulatory measures argued that Orthodox 
Christianity was “the embodiment of the Russian national tradition, the core of the 
Russian national identity, and the guardian of the psychological well-being of the nation” 
(Shterin 1998). Therefore, according to them, any kind of proselytizing activities of alien 
faiths might be interventionist and detrimental. Often this view was supported by 
                                                        
281 Voskhod, N3, August 1997. 
282 Patriarch’s letter to Vyacheslav Polosin, Chairman of the Freedom of Conscience Committee of the 
Supreme Council, 28 April 1993. Also, Patriarch Alexi II proposed that the Ministry of Justice “should 
establish a committee formed of government officials and representatives of religious organizations who 
have respect and authority in society, and are connected with the historic fate of Russia, and give such a 
committee the right to "veto" registration and activity of foreign religious organizations for 5 to 7 years.” 
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reference to those Western European countries where the traditional churches are given 
privileged status compared to other religions, and where various restrictions are allegedly 
put on the activities of nontraditional churches.283 
The established Muslim clergy has also expressed its support for the adoption of 
restrictive measures in the 1997 law on religion. Head of the Central Spiritual Board of 
Muslims in Ufa, Talgat Tadzhuddin has been a long-time advocate of introducing 
regulation to the religious sphere. As a Chair of the Council of Muftis of Russia, Ravil 
Gainutdin also described Russia's 1997 law on religion as a notable step towards support 
for “traditional religions”, which recognized Islam, along with Orthodox Christianity, 
Buddhism, and Judaism, the inalienable part of the heritage of the Russian people.284 
Before adoption of the new law on religion at the federal level, several attempts to 
move away from the liberal model of state-religion relations were made in the Russian 
provinces. Relying on the decentralized nature of the political system, several regions 
took legal measures to limit the access of certain religious groups to the public sphere, 
without necessarily seeking the consent of the federal center. Particularly, they wanted to 
protect the religion of the local titular ethnic group (Shterin and Richardson 1998).285 
Thus, local policymakers in Tver’ and Kaliningrad, for example, were among the first to 
raise concerns about proliferation of new religious groups on their territories. Their fear 
was that the primary intention of those who join new religious communities was in fact 
non-religious. Some groups, in their opinion, were likely to unite followers "not because 
                                                        
283 The UK, Greece, and Germany were frequently cited as examples of such regimes. 
284 Refer to the dissertation glossary for definition of the key term – “traditional religions.”  
285 In their survey of regional legislation between 1990 and 1997, Shterin and Richardson, among other 
things, observe that local laws “protected religion of the local title ethnic group.” In the regions populated 
predominantly by Russians, protection seems to have been applied in relation to the Russian Orthodox 
Church (Shterin and Richardson 1998). 
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of common creed but because of affiliation with foreign organizations."286 In Tula 
proponents of non-mainstream beliefs were denounced for arousing ethnic, racial and 
religious discord among the public.287 In Kalmykia the activities of marginal religious 
communities were considered as "challenges to the national customs, traditions, and 
morals of society."288 Allegedly, religious freedom was being exploited by "emissaries 
from various sects and beliefs far from the humanitarian spirit of both Christianity and 
other principal religions" (Shterin and Richardson 1998:326). This would amount to 
"corruption of the spirit."289  
Restrictions on religious groups ranged from outright prohibition of religious 
practices "in all public places" (Perm region, the Republic of Udmurtia), to various 
mechanisms of controlled access to the meeting places (Sverdlovsk region). In addition, 
Shterin and Richardson note that many regional procedures were much more hostile 
toward foreigners than to Russian citizens. Certain laws required submission of 
documents, which were impossible to obtain (e.g. a certificate of registration of the 
foreign religious organization in the country of origin). In many cases, regional rulings 
required that the missionaries had to have an invitation from local authorities or a 
religious organization registered with the state. Occasionally, regulations went so far as to 
reserve the right for regional authorities to revoke the registrations of a religious 
                                                        
286 Tver' and Kaliningrad Duma Resolutions. Cited in Shterin, Marat S., and James T. Richardson. "Local 
Laws Restricting Religion in Russia: Prosecutors of Russia's New National Law." J. Church & St. 40 
(1998): 326. 
287 From a letter of the acting prosecutor of the Tula region, Report, 21. Cited in Shterin, Marat S., and 
James T. Richardson. "Local Laws Restricting Religion in Russia: Prosecutors of Russia's New National 
Law." J. Church & St. 40 (1998): 326. 
288 Republic of Kalmikia Law, Preamble. Cited in Shterin, Marat S., and James T. Richardson. "Local Laws 
Restricting Religion in Russia: Prosecutors of Russia's New National Law." J. Church & St. 40 (1998): 
326. 
289 Interview with the chairman of Tula Duma; Rossiyskaya Federatsia Journal, N22. Cited in Shterin, 
Marat S., and James T. Richardson. "Local Laws Restricting Religion in Russia: Prosecutors of Russia's 
New National Law." J. Church & St. 40 (1998): 327. 
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organization, which, according to the 1990 law on religion, could only be done by a 
decision of a court (Shterin and Richardson 1998).  
Arguably, one of the most consequential aspects of regional policymaking in 
1990s was introduction of a major distinction between traditional and nontraditional 
faiths to the Russian legal debates. Legislative drafts in Ryazan’, Arkhangelsk, 
Sverdlovsk, and Yaroslavl oblasts were among the first legal documents that contained 
these notions.290 Local authorities in these regions sought to regulate activities of ‘sects’, 
defined as being those other than unnamed ‘traditional religions’ (Fagan 2012: 61). 
Committed to the goal of “preserving social tranquility”, regional authorities barred those 
sects from using state premises.291 In Tver and Kaliningrad, local Dumas passed similar 
resolutions.292 In the Khaborovsk krai regulations limited the activity of religious 
organizations which were "canonically or in any other way under the jurisdiction of 
foreign religious organizations."293 Fagan suggests that similarities between the various 
laws and drafts might stem from regional-level coordination (Fagan 2012:61).  
                                                        
290 See Article 7 in Yaroslavl' draft and Article 14 in Sverdlovsk law. Cited in Shterin, Marat S., and James 
T. Richardson. "Local Laws Restricting Religion in Russia: Prosecutors of Russia's New National Law." J. 
Church & St. 40 (1998) 
291 See Shterin, Marat S., and James T. Richardson. "Local Laws Restricting Religion in Russia: 
Prosecutors of Russia's New National Law." J. Church & St. 40 (1998) 
292 "On religious organizations operating as structural divisions of foreign religious organizations beyond 
the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation." See Shterin, Marat S., and James T. Richardson. "Local Laws 
Restricting Religion in Russia: Prosecutors of Russia's New National Law." J. Church & St. 40 (1998). 
Also see Fagan, Geraldine. Believing in Russia: Religious Policy After Communism. Routledge, 2012. 
293 Article 5 of the “Law on Religious Organizations” in Khabarovski krai. See Shterin, Marat S., and 
James T. Richardson. "Local Laws Restricting Religion in Russia: Prosecutors of Russia's New National 
Law." J. Church & St. 40 (1998). Also see Fagan, Geraldine. Believing in Russia: Religious Policy After 
Communism. Routledge, 2012. 
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In many regions, various local councils were involved in preparation of the new 
regulatory measures.294 In Udmurtia, for example, new religious policy proposals were 
drafted at the ”Expert-Consultative Council for Cooperation with Religious 
Associations.” In Sverdlovsk Oblast’ it was a responsibility of an “Expert-Consultative 
Council on Questions of Freedom of Conscience and Creeds” to oversee religious 
activism in the region. In Yaroslavl Oblast’ a similar task was assigned to the “Expert-
Consultative Council for Religious Affairs”. Usually, these institutions were authorized 
to investigate and evaluate beliefs and practices of religious organizations, and give 
recommendations and/or decide about their registration. Overall, according to Uzzel, in 
the mid-1990s about quarter of regions adopted their own legislations regulating 
missionary activity (Uzzel 1996).295 However, they had a limited effect since the federal 
law still maintained a liberal attitude.  
Most of Muslim-majority republics, in part due to a strong link between national 
and religious revival in the early 1990s, had somewhat different state-Islam dynamics. 
During the first several years after the Soviet collapse, both religious and secular 
authorities were engaged in local nation-building processes. When religious and secular 
perspectives on the future of Islam in Muslim-majority republics began to diverge, state 
authorities in these regions also started to express similar concerns with their counterparts 
across Russia. On the pretext of being worried about the negative impact of the 
fragmentation of the Muslim community and the influence of foreign missionaries, in 
September 1994 deputy-prime minister of Dagestan Said Amirov called a meeting with 
                                                        
294 No regulatory institution existed on the federal level since abolishing the the Council for Religious 
Affairs in 1990. 
295 For details, see Lawrence Uzell, "Religious Freedom Loses Grounds in Russian Provinces," Keston 
News Service, Issue 96/9, October/November 1996. 
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Muslim spiritual authorities of the republic. As a result of the meeting, a united Spiritual 
Board of Muslims of Dagestan was established and its Mufti elected.296 Establishment of 
other Muslim Spiritual Boards in the republic was prohibited. Similarly in Tatarstan, 
roughly after signing off the Treaty with Moscow in 1994, the Shaimiev regime began to 
view independent religious activity as a danger to modernization and political stability 
(Filatov 1998).297 Public disputes between President Shaimiev and local Mufti Galiullin 
turned increasingly ominous as the religious leadership openly challenged secular elites 
on the political arena. Nevertheless, despite all the efforts to contain religious activism 
locally, the efforts of regional authorities had a limited effect largely because of the 
liberal attitude of the federal center. 
Due to the growing pressure from the regions and mainly the Orthodox Church, 
the discussions about the reform of religious affairs shifted to Moscow. The major move 
away from the liberal model of state-religion relations was the replacement of the 1990 
law on religion with the 1997 version, which introduced the notion of “traditional 
religions” into the Russian legal framework at the federal level.298 The preamble of the 
law has identified Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism as inseparable 
parts of the historical heritage of Russia’s peoples and in effect provided them with the 
                                                        
296 The Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan (DUMD) received official recognition as a public 
organization under resolution number 161 of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Dagestan. For 
details, see Abkhaliev. Istoriia Dukhovnogo Upravleniia Musul’man Dagestana. 
297 The Treaty on Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Authority between the 
State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan (February 15, 
1994). Some observers see 1994 as a year when conflict between mufti Galiulin and Shaimiev emerged. 
For details, see Filatov, 1998. 
298 In fact, the Russian Federation 1997 “Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” does 
not define the concept of “ traditional religions.” It is widely accepted that the notion was inspired by the 
preamble of the 1997 law, which acknowledges “the special role of Orthodox Christianity in the history of 
Russia, and in the establishment and development of its spirituality and culture, …respecting Christianity, 
Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions, that comprise the inalienable part of the heritage of the 
Russian people.” 
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status of “privileged” religions (Preston 2001:784).299 After the process of registration, 
religious organizations representing these religions were guaranteed the right to access 
the Russian public sphere. Those religious groups that did not belong to traditional 
religions or were not willing to be associated with the established clergy of recognized 
religions had to face administrative restrictions imposed by secular authorities and thus 
were denied the access to the public sphere. Their activities were portrayed as an 
ideological threat to Russian society and harmful for traditional values. Often they were 
accused of damaging the morality of the indigenous people, destroying families, causing 
psychological harm to the youth, nudging the people to suicide, and ultimately terrorism 
(Yunusova 1997). The efforts to contain or even forbid the activity of nontraditional 
religious groups became the main reason for the development of the new law, which 
became the founding element of the so-called “traditional religions” paradigm.300  
Adoption of a restrictive law at the federal level triggered a new wave of local 
initiatives. Thus, in Dagestan, since 1998, local policymakers adopted a series of local 
provisions that gave a state-backed Muslim Spiritual Board the authority to control 
Muslim public life in Dagestan. The republic's January 1998 Religion Law permitted 
                                                        
299 In addition, the document gave special recognition to the Orthodoxy, which “made a special 
contribution to the history of Russia and to the establishment and development of Russia’s spirituality and 
culture” (Preston 2001:784).  
300 Traditional religions paradigm is a pattern of thought based on the assumption that traditional religions 
deserve special privileges because of their size, geographical range, as well as the history of presence in 
Russia. For a detailed discussion of the 1997 law and its provisions, see Lekhel, Arina. "Leveling the 
Playing Field for Religious Liberty in Russia: A Critcal Analysis of the 1997 Law on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Associations." Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. 32 (1999): 167; 
Durham Jr, W. Cole, and Lauren B. Homer. "Russia's 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Associations: an analytical appraisal." Emory International Law Review. 12 (1998): 101.; Davis, Derek H. 
"Russia's new law on religion: Progress or regress?" Journal of church and state 39.4 (1997): 645-655.; 
Shterin, Marat S., and James T. Richardson. "Effects of the Western anti-cult movement on development of 
laws concerning religion in post-communist Russia." Journal of church and state. 42 (2000): 247.; Shterin, 
Marat S., and James T. Richardson. "Local Laws Restricting Religion in Russia: Prosecutors of Russia's 
New National Law." Journal of church and state. 40 (1998): 319. 
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only one Islamic umbrella organization in the republic (Article 10). Under the same law, 
both religious educational materials and study abroad programs were subject to approval 
by the Spiritual Board (Article 9). The law also required that all Islamic literature be 
endorsed by the republic’s muftiyat (Article 21). Moreover, in September 1999, 
Dagestani politicians adopted a law that banned Wahhabism altogether.301 According to 
the same law, all Islamic communities in the republic would need to obtain the 
endorsement of this umbrella organization in order to register (Article 4).302 Similarly, in 
1999, the Republic of Tatarstan updated its own law on religion, which granted 
monopoly privileges in the Islamic spiritual domain to the newly established state-
approved Muslim Spiritual Board.303 In May 2000 and June 2001, Karachay-Cherkessia 
and Kabardino-Balkaria adopted their own laws against “religious extremism.”304 
According to Fagan, the Kabardino-Balkaria law revealed that “the target of the whole 
                                                        
301 On 16 September 1999, the Dagestani Parliament adopted a law “On the ban of the Wahhabi and any 
other Extremist Activity on the Territory of the Republic of Dagestan.” For details, see Yemelianova, 
Galina M. "Islam and nation building in Tatarstan and Dagestan of the Russian Federation." Nationalities 
Papers 27.4 (1999): 605-629; Yemelianova, Galina M., ed. Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union. 
Routledge, 2009; Ware, Robert Bruce, et al. "Political Islam in Dagestan." Europe-Asia Studies55.2 (2003): 
287-302; Bobrovnikov, Vladimir. "‘Ordinary Wahhabism’versus ‘Ordinary Sufism’? Filming Islam for 
Postsoviet Muslim Young People." Religion, State and Society 39.2-3 (2011): 281-301; Ware, Robert 
Bruce. "Why Wahhabism went wrong in Dagestan." Central Asia Caucasus Monitor (2000). 
302 According to the head of the Oriental Manuscripts Department at the Institute of History, Archaeology 
and Ethnography of the Dagestan branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Shamil Shikhaliyev, as of 
2010 many in Dagestan believed that the 1999 Law was a mistake "because in practice it determined the 
state's priorities in the religious sphere". 
303 This was later struck down as unconstitutional. A 1999 provincial Law on Religion Law, permitting 
only one centralized religious organization per confession in Tatarstan, was annulled in October 2003 for 
being at odds with the federal Law. 
For a discussion about a standoff between Mufti Galiullin and President Shaimiev of Tatarstan, the 1998 
joint congress of Muslims of the Republic, and a subsequent subordination of the spiritual Board to secular 
authorities, see Yemelianova, Galina M. "Islam and nation building in Tatarstan and Dagestan of the 
Russian Federation." Nationalities Papers 27.4 (1999): 605-629; Yemelianova, Galina M. "Shaimiev's' 
Khanate'on the Volga and its Russian Subjects." Asian Ethnicity 1.1 (2000): 37-52; Ponarin, Eduard, and 
Irina Kouznetsova-Morenko. "Russia's Islamic Challenge." Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. 7 
(2006): 21. 
304 For more details on local drive against Wahhabism, see Fagan, Geraldine. Believing in Russia: Religious 
Policy After Communism. Vol. 41. Routledge, 2012. P. 161. Also see “Kabardino-Balkaria outlaws 
religious extremism,” Keston News Service. 31 May, 2001. 
http://www.keston.org.uk/kns/miscnew/KNS%20RUSSIA%20Kabardino-
Balkaria%20outlaws%20religious%20extremism.html (last accessed on March 24, 2015) 
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counterterrorism drive was not just violent activity, but ‘non-traditional’ belief (Fagan 
2012:161). 
 
2. Islam under the “Traditional religions” paradigm 
Departure from the norms of passive secularism had a dual impact on Islam in 
Russia. On the one hand, regulating access of religious groups to the public sphere helped 
to raise the profile of the state-recognized Islamic establishment. On the other hand, this 
put a limit on Islamic diversity by restricting religious practice of many other Islamic 
groups that were not affiliated with “traditional” religious organizations. As we shall see 
below, the rise of “traditional Islam” rhetoric facilitated strengthening of Muftiyats and 
legitimized the use of repressive measures against alternative sources of Islamic 
knowledge and authority. 
 
2.1 – What does “traditional Islam” mean? 
Regarded by many observers of religious life in Russia as a watershed event in 
post-Soviet religious affairs, the adoption of the 1997 law on religion opened a new era in 
state-religion relations in general and had a major impact on state-Islam relations in 
particular. The law not only introduced a distinction between traditional and non-
traditional religions in Russia, but also added an additional level of complexity to the 
intra-faith dispute within the indigenous Muslim community. The ability to comply with 
a contested definition of “traditional Islam” increasingly became a criterion for Islamic 
groups to benefit from privileges provided by the state. Those groups that did not meet 
the definition were marginalized, denied access to the public sphere, and even persecuted. 
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The concept of “traditional Islam” has been used at home and abroad in various 
contexts since Grand Mufti Talgat Tadjuddin reintroduced it to the public in the early 
1990s. According to several experts on Islam in Russia, Mufti Tadjuddin used it to 
underline the difference between Islam practiced in the post-Soviet area and other 
interpretations of religion promoted by foreign missionaries (Goble 2014, Batrov 2013, 
Safargaleev 2014).305 Not until the mid-1990s, however, did the concept become popular 
in public discourse or enter the official rhetoric. The establishment and strengthening of 
the “traditional religions” paradigm brought up the term to the public use. However, the 
irony is that despite its wide use, there is still no agreement on what exactly “traditional 
Islam” means. As Goble has put it, “a certain confusion has set in not only among 
Muslim leaders, civil officials, and the population but even among experts” (Goble 
2014). 
Analysis of the contemporary use of the concept suggests that “traditional Islam” 
has at least four distinct meanings in Russia (Batrov 2013, Safargaleev 2014). The first 
meaning, according to Rustam Batrov, the first deputy mufti of Tatarstan, is a synonym 
for “Russian [Rossiikii] Islam.” State officials, according to Batrov, often use the term in 
this sense. For them it is important that indigenous Muslims “lived in peace and concord 
with representatives of other confessions” and “respected the statehood and sovereignty 
of their homeland” (Batrov 2013). The second meaning of traditional Islam can be 
defined as “folk Islam.” As a rule, it refers to religious practices of ethnic Muslims who 
                                                        
305 Goble, Paul. “’Traditional Islam’ now has four distinct meanings in CIS countries, Moscow expert 
says,” The Interpreter, June 27, 2014.  http://www.interpretermag.com/traditional-islam-now-has-four-
distinct-meanings-in-cis-countries-moscow-expert-says/ (Last access February 2, 2015). 
Batrov, Rustam. “Traditsionnyi islam v Rossii – eto Akhliu sunna wal dzhamaa,” Golos Islama, October 
26, 2013. http://golosislama.ru/news.php?id=20054 (Last access February 2, 2015). 
Safargaleev, Ildar. “Konnotacii al’ternativ religioznomu ekstremizmu na postsovetskom prostranstve,” 
Materik, June 25, 2014. http://materik.ru/rubric/detail.php?ID=18042 (Last access February 2, 2015). 
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often learned about the religion from their practicing grandparents. This kind of Islam is a 
subject of the most lively interest of ethnographers and the object of angry attacks by 
proponents of “pure” Islam. The third connotation refers to Islam as a religion of a 
particular nation, such as the Tatars. Sometimes it is viewed simply as “part of the 
historical heritage” of a specific people, and sometimes as “the basis of its survival” 
(Goble 2014). The intellectual debates on jadidism (Islamic modernism) and qadimism 
(Islamic conservatism) often rely on this definition of traditional Islam. Finally, the fourth 
meaning of traditional Islam refers to orthodox Sunni Islam as it has existed for centuries 
in the entire Muslim world. In other words, it is Islam based on “canon law, dogmatic 
theology and spiritual ethics” (Goble 2014). Although some experts insist on using the 
concept of “traditional Islam” to describe Sunni Islam of the Khanafi and Shafii legal 
schools as well as Sufism, many contemporary observers of Islam in Russia reject this 
narrow definition on the grounds that excluding followers of other legal schools of Sunni 
Islam and downplaying multiple forms of Sufism weakens the utility of the concept of 
“traditional Islam.”306  
2.2 – State support for “Traditional Islam” 
While the Muslim clergy and the expert community continued to debate what 
“traditional Islam” means, policymakers both at the regional and federal levels put it to 
practical use. The concept became a direct reference in providing support for Russia’s 
Muslim communities, most notably through the federal Fund for Islamic Culture and 
Education and the Interreligious Council, a consultative body founded in January 1999 
                                                        
306 Malashenko A.V. Islam v Rossii: religiya i politika // Islamovedenie. 2010. No. 3. P. 67–85. 
Malashenko defines “traditional Islam” as 1) Sunni Islam represented by two religious and legal schools 
widely accepted among Muslims of Russia – a Khanafizm and a Shafiizm, 2) Sufism.  
Safargaleev, Ildar. “Konnotacii al’ternativ religioznomu ekstremizmu na postsovetskom prostranstve,” 
Materik, June 25, 2014. http://materik.ru/rubric/detail.php?ID=18042 (Last access February 2, 2015). 
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which embraces representatives of Russia's traditional confessions.307 The Fund was 
intended to assist the projects of traditional Muslim religious organizations of Russia 
aimed at the development of Islamic culture and education. In addition to obtaining a 
monopoly power in the Islamic religious marketplace, “traditional” Muslim religious 
organizations became partners of the state in promotion of religious tolerance, prevention 
of Islamophobia, development and strengthening of social harmony, spiritual and moral 
education of children and youth, and empowering families in the Russian society. In fact, 
according to Dannreuther, much of the funding was directed “towards supporting the 
official Islamic establishment and the promotion of a moderate Russian Islam” 
(Dannreuther 2010:120).308 
Efforts of the state to promote “traditional Islam” in the country have had a 
certain degree of success. The overall position of the established clergy, despite persisting 
internal disagreements, has significantly improved in comparison with their condition in 
the 1990s. Representatives of traditional Islamic organizations received both material and 
                                                        
307 Several state bodies attached to the presidential administration, government and parliament over the 
years proved to be of little relevance to formation of state policies toward Islam in Russia. For discussion of 
some of the activities of the Presidential Council for Cooperation with Religious Associations, the 
government’s Commission for the Affairs of Religious Associations, and the State Duma’s Committee on 
Social Associations and Religious Organizations, see Fagan, Geraldine. Believing in Russia: Religious 
Policy After Communism. New York: Routledge, 2012. According to Fagan, these structures were 
ineffective and for a number of reasons were unable to replicate the Soviet Council for Religious Affairs 
(Fagan 2012: 173). 
308 See chapter four for discussion of some of the policy areas that show a clear contrast between state 
treatment of “traditional” and “non-traditional” religious groups. For example, legal provisions in the 
Russian North Caucasus republic of Dagestan restricting religious education are a major element in the near 
monopoly on Muslim public life enjoyed by the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Dagestan. Some local 
Muslims maintain that the restrictions prevent qualified people from teaching. Referring to Shamil 
Shikhaliyev, head of the Oriental Manuscripts Department at the Institute of History, Archaeology and 
Ethnography of the Dagestan branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Forum 18 reports that a very 
well-educated imam returning from Syria or Egypt won't get a position at a mosque because it is the 
unwritten law of the Directorate that anyone who studied abroad is Wahhabi and can't become an imam. 
For details, see Fagan. G. “Dagestan’s controls on religious education,” Forum 18 News Service. 2 June 




oral support from the secular leadership. More importantly, from the perspective of this 
study, they maintained access to the Russian public sphere. These measures have not only 
significantly contributed to the growth of Muslim educational and scholarly activity but 
also made the radical opposition less attractive and more costly. As Dannreuther has put 
it, “the official Muslim establishment feels more secure than was the case during the 
Yeltsin period” and “its role as a recognized intermediary with the sate has been 
confirmed” (Dannreuther 2010:120). 
On February 1, 2013, President Putin reiterated the position of secular state 
authorities toward “traditional religions.” He pointed out that “The Russian Orthodox 
Church and our other traditional faiths must have all the possibilities for carrying out full 
and real service in important areas such as supporting families and mothers, raising and 
educating children, youth policy, resolving the many social problems we still face, and 
strengthening patriotic spirit in the Armed Forces. This is a response to people’s vital 
need for moral support and spiritual guidance.”309 According to Nabiev, the role of 
traditional religious institutions in contemporary Russia is no longer confined to spiritual 
matters, but is increasingly vital to areas such as organization of philanthropic activities, 
social work, and upbringing the youth (Nabiev 2014).310 Traditional religious 
organizations actively participate in state programs aimed at preservation and restoration 
of important historic sites and monuments. Moreover, the presence of the established 
                                                        
309 Vladimir Putin’s speech at the meeting with delegates to the Bishops’ Council. February 1, 2013. 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/4926 (Last accessed on March 15, 15). 
310 See, for instance, the official website of Russia’s Council of Muftis, "Osnovnye polozhenija social'noj 
programmy rossijskih musul'man," May 25, 2001. http://muslim.ru/articles/109/1087/ (Last accessed on 
March 15, 2015). Also see, Nabiev, Rinat. Vlast’ i religioznoe vozrozhdenie. Kazan: Kazan (Volga region) 
Federal University, 2014. In addition to the 1997 law on religion, activities of religious institutions in 
certain areas are regulated by the 1995 law "On Charitable Activities and Charitable Organizations," N135-
FZ from August 11, 1995; the law "On Non-Commercial Organizations," N7-FZ from January 12, 1996, 
and other relevant documents.  
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religious clergy has significantly increased in hospitals, homes for the aged and infirm, as 
well as military units. Many of these activities occurred in the context of various mutual 
social partnership agreements between state bodies and traditional religious organizations 
both at the federal and provincial levels.311  
This, in part, explains the positive attitude of the state-supported Muslim clergy to 
the establishment of “traditional religions” paradigm. “Traditional” Muslim organizations 
endorse provisions of the 1997 law and regard it as a success (Preston 2001:785). 
Reportedly, the Council of Russian Muftis participated in the preparation of the law, 
where its opinion and proposals were carefully considered (Preston 2001). Concerned by 
proliferation of newly established religious groups and the spread of alien interpretations 
of Islam in the country, Mufti of the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims in Ufa, Talgat 
Tadzhuddin, also supported the legislation. 
Nevertheless, the fact that secular authorities assisted the efforts of “traditional” 
Muslim organizations makes these religious institutions and their leaders vulnerable to 
the accusation that they have been co-opted and corrupted by the state. Bitter memories 
of the Soviet past, when the religious clergy was used by the communist regime, are still 
lingering in the minds of believers. Therefore, many often question the position of 
“traditional” Muslim organizations on matters of social and political importance. In the 
age of mobile communication and the internet, Dannreuther argues, the message about 
Islam “specific to Russian culture and traditions appears parochial and limited,” 
particularly for those who are engaged with the intellectual excitement of theological 
debates in the wider Muslim world. 
                                                        
311 For more details on this, see chapter four. 
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2.3 – State repression of “non-traditional Islam”  
In her study of the roots of radical Islam in Central Asia, Martha Olcott refers to a 
“potentially useful government approach” to decide whether any Muslim activist or cleric 
is a radical Muslim. According to that approach, any Muslim who rejects the leadership 
of the official religious establishment in the country could be deemed radical (Olcott 
2007).312 Rejecting the establishment’s leadership is to question the authority and the 
legitimacy of the state. Following this approach, Olcott traces the history of Islamic 
radicalism in Russia and the Soviet Union back to 1920. According to her, the modern 
history of “underground Islam” begins with the Bolsheviks’ elimination of public role for 
religion and their banning Sharia as a basis of jurisprudence among the local population. 
Despite the best efforts of Soviet antireligious propagandists, illegal Islamic schools 
(hujras) continued to survive for the whole Soviet period in Central Asia (particularly in 
Tashkent and the Ferghana Valley). According to Olcott, these schools, somehow 
managing to “stay below the Soviet radar screen,” continued to provide Islamic education 
of equivalent or even higher quality than the two schools run by the established clergy.313  
In the first few years after the Soviet collapse, the perception among Russia’s 
leadership was that radical Islamic elements remained abroad. When it became evident 
that these expectations were unfounded and radicalization of some indigenous Muslims 
posed a threat to public safety, the secular leadership developed a distinct approach 
toward “non-traditional Islamic groups,” which were labeled as radical Islamist 
                                                        
312 Olcott, Martha Brill. Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2007. 
313 The only two Islamic schools in Soviet Union were located in Bukhara and Tashkent 
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extremists and Muslim sects alike.314 So-called ‘securitization of Islam’ led not only to 
deprivation of these groups from accessing the Russian public sphere but also served as a 
reason taking repressive measures against them.   
In the European context, Joceline Cesari describes securitization of Islam as a 
process that involves actors who propose that Islam is an existential threat to political and 
secular norms and thereby justifies extraordinary measures against it. This 
characterization of Islam in the public debates, according to her, has prompted 
institutionalizing the notion of Islam as a security threat. The distinction between radical, 
‘bad’ Islam and law-abiding, ‘good’ Islam, Cesari maintains, has become a common 
political framing in many European countries. She argues that the fact that Muslims must 
be named as good or law-abiding means that there is an underlying assumption that Islam 
is a potential menace to society. 
In Russia, securitization of Islam has “justified” legal measures which have had 
multiple effects on Muslim religious practice in the country. State policies not only 
effectively restrained the civil liberties of practicing Muslims, including the right to use 
the Russian public sphere, but also led to increased surveillance and police activity, 
banning religious literature, persecution and banning of some religious groups. For 
example, according to Yemelianova, the secular leadership of Dagestan has opted for 
ruthless political and administrative suppression of Wahhabism and entered into an open 
confrontation with it.  Since the end of 1997 “state authorities have unleashed a 
comprehensive political, military, and propaganda campaign against Wahhabis” 
                                                        
314 Valiulla Yakupov. Neoficialnyi Islam v Tatarstane. Kazan: Iman, 2003; Valiulla Yakupov, 
Musulmanskie Sekty. Kazan: Iman, 2004. 
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(Yemelianova 1999:625). In September 1999, the people's assembly of the Republic of 
Dagestan adopted the law banning Wahhabism on the territory of the republic. 
Formulation of the title and the language of the law implied that Wahhabism and 
extremism were interconnected phenomena.315 Since activities of anti-state extremist 
organizations had to be regulated by the Criminal code, religious groups identified as 
extremist became a subject of criminal investigation.316  
On the federal level, a significant reversal of the laissez-faire policy of the early 
1990s has become primarily evident in enforcement of the rulings of the 1997 law on 
religion. Upon expiration of the deadline to register with the state, in January of 2001, the 
cases of thirty-seven Muslim communities were brought in court.317 According to a report 
of an institute that tracks Russia’s religions closely, these were the first known cases set 
to be the victims of mandatory liquidation.318 In the meantime, various Islamic charities 
with private or foreign state support that had been active in the 1990s, such as al-
Haramayn, al-Iqra’a, al-Igasa, Taiba, and Ibrahim al-Ibrahim Foundation, were closed 
down (Malashenko 2007, Silantyev 2008).319 
In January 2000, a new national security policy was adopted, which cited 
"cultural-religious expansion of neighboring states into Russian territory" among the 
threats to national interests and security. In particular, itcalled for "the counteraction of 
                                                        
315 On 16 September 1999, the Dagestani Parliament adopted a law “On the ban of the Wahhabi and any 
other Extremist Activity on the Territory of the Republic of Dagestan.” 
316 Reportedly, Russia’s Security Council “recommended that national legislation on the freedom of 
conscience and religious organizations be amended to outlaw Wahhabism” (Vladimir Radyuhin, Russia 
Plans Ban on Fundamentalist Group, HINDU, Aug. 6, 2000) Cited in Preston (2001) 
317 In total, following the 1997 Law's end of 2000 deadline, some 2,000 religious organisations were subject 
to liquidation for failing to re-register. 
318 Tatyana Titova, “Russia: Muslims First for Mandatory Liquidation,” Keston News Service. January 24, 
2001. http://www.keston.org/010124RU.htm (Last accessed on March 20, 2015). 
319 Malashenko, Islam dlya Rossii. 2007:143; Silant’ev, Islam v sovremennoi Rossii. 2008:141 
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the negative influence of foreign religious organizations and missionaries.” Nevertheless, 
it was not until the passage of the “Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity” in the 
summer of 2002 that the state began to penalize particular religious groups and 
individuals for extremist activities. Broadly known as an “anti-extremism law,” it 
provided for specific punishment guidelines applicable to all types of non-governmental 
(including religious) groups and mass media outlets found guilty of extremism. In 
combination with Articles 282 and 2822 of the Criminal Code and Article 20.29 of the 
Code of Administrative Offences, the “anti-extremism” law formed a legal basis for 
intolerance and persecution of activists representing “non-traditional” Islamic 
movements.320  
In February 2003, by the decision of the Supreme Court of Russia, 15 Islamic 
organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, were declared 
terrorist and prohibited on the territory of the country.321 Tablighi Jamaat, the world’s 
largest Muslim proselytizing organization, has reportedly been stigmatized. In addition, 
foreign-funded schools, including those known as Gulen schools, became a target of an 
increasing pressure.322 According to Verkhovsky, the 2006 and 2007 amendments to the 
law have expanded the definition of extremism and further restricted civil liberties in 
                                                        
320 Broadly stated, Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code criminalizes public statements aimed at 
inciting various kinds of enmity. Article 2822 criminalizes organization of an extremist group. Article 
20.29 of the Code of Administrative Offences punishes "Production or distribution of extremist materials." 
321 Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a pan-Islamic organization that seeks to create a transnational caliphate. It was banned 
in Russia by the Supreme Court on 14 February 2003. 
322 Following a religious extremism investigation, some 50 Turkish teachers in Russia were refused visa 
extensions in 2008 to work in secular Tatar-Turkish high schools with a high reputation among the local 
public and government elite of the Republic of Tatarstan. For details, see Fagan, G. “Raids continue as 
doubts grow over Nursi ban,” Forum 18 News Service. 16 July 2009. 
http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1328 (Last accessed on March 15, 2015). 
 Naumkin, V. “Russia, Turkey agree on Gulen,” Al-Monitor. June 1, 2014. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/russia-turkey-davutoglu-syria-crisis-ukraine-tatar.html (Last accessed 
on March 15, 2015).  
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Russia (Verkhovsky 2007, Dannreuther 2010: 117).323  According to Hahn, Putin-era 
amendments to the Russia’s Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity gave the 
Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Interior (MVD), Justice Ministry, 
and the General Prosecutor’s office broad leeway in holding suspects and determining 
what constitutes “extremist literature” (Hahn in Almanac 2011: 608).  
According to careful observers of religious life in Russia, the anti-extremist 
legislation was applied, first and foremost, to the Hizb ut-Tahrir party. According to 
Verkhovsky, about two-thirds of more than three dozen jailed Muslim activists were 
convicted on the charge that they were Hizb ut-Tahrir members.324 Several other Muslim 
activists who participated in another banned Muslim organization, Tablighi Jamaat, were 
given suspended sentences. Several Muslims who read Said Nursi's works faced charges 
under Criminal Code Article 282.2.325  
In 2004, the Russian Ministry of Justice started to compile a federal list of 
extremist literature.326 One of the first bans was issued in April 2004 by the Savelovskii 
                                                        
323 Alexander Verkhovsky, “Anti-extremist legislation and its enforcement”, Sova Center, 2007. 
http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2007/09/d11595/ (Last accessed on March 20, 
2015). Note that initially, the 2002 Law stipulated that "incitement of religious discord" had to be 
committed in connection with violence or the threat of violence. Prosecution of activities that had no 
association with violence became easier, however, when this stipulation was removed in July 2007. 
324 People, accused of participating in Hizb ut-Tahrir, are most often charged under the Criminal Code 
Article 2822 for membership in a banned organization. Referring to Elena Ryabinina of the Human Rights 
Institute, Verkhovsky argues that as of 2012 about 20 Muslim activists in Russia were jailed due to 
membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir. See Verkhovsky “Inappropriate enforcement of anti-extremist legislation in 
Russia in 2011,” Sova Center. April 27, 2012. http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-
analyses/2012/04/d24302/ (Last accessed on March 15, 2015) 
325 For discussion of the best known cases and a list of readers of Nursi’s works in Russia, who were 
convicted and received prison terms, suspended prison terms, and tried in the court but had their cases 
dropped, see Corley, Felix. “Prisoner of conscience freed but not exonerated,” Forum 18 News Service. 20 
January 2012. http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1658 (Last accessed on March 24, 2015). 
Also see other relevant posts on Russia on the Forum 18 News service website http://www.forum18.org/ 
(Last accessed on March 24, 2015).    
326 Based on Article 13 of the Federal law N 114-FZ "On combating extremist activity" from 25 July 2002, 
point 7 of the Provision on the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, approved by the Decree of the 
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Court of Moscow, which ruled Mohammed Abdul-Wahhab’s The Book of the Unity of 
God (Kitab at-Tawhid) illegal in Russia. In May 2007, the Koptevskiy Court of Moscow 
outlawed Russian translations of more than a dozen (14) Islamic religious texts authored 
by a Turkish theologian Said Nursi.327 The list was expanded by decisions of the 
Buguruslan Court in Orenburg in 2007, the Demskii Court in Ufa, and a several other 
regional and federal courts. In February 2009, the powers of the Expert Council for 
Conducting State Religious-Studies Expert Analysis for the Russian Ministry of Justice 
were considerably expanded. It was authorized to investigate the activity, doctrines, 
leadership decisions, literature and worship of any registered religious organization and 
recommend action to the Ministry.328 
Later, in June 2012, the Lenin district court of Orenburg ignited a controversy in 
several Muslim-majority regions of Russia with its decision regarding dozens of Islamic 
texts, allegedly for their extremist and radical content. The court’s provocative decision 
to ban the books, which included works by well-regarded Islamic scholars, quickly made 
headlines in the regional press and triggered a broad public debate. While secular 
conservative groups alarmed by the growth of radical Islam in the country supported the 
                                                        
President of the Russian Federation N. 1313 from 13 October 2004, the Ministry of Justice of the Russian 
Federation is responsible for maintaining and publication of the federal list of extremist materials. 
327 Fedosenko, Vladimir. “Interpreters of the Koran: The Legacy of a Theologian Is Held to Be 
Extremism,” Statutes and Decisions, vol. 43, no. 1, January–February 2008, pp. 63–65. 
In April 2008, Russia's Supreme Court banned a so-called “Nurdzhular” movement. According to Forum 
18, Russia's anti-Nursi campaign became apparent in 2005 and as of 2013 the state investigation has not 
been able to present a clear pattern of evidence that readers of Said Nursi’s works pose a threat to the 
Russian state. For details, see Fagan ,G. “What's the matter with Said Nursi?” Forum 18 News Service. 5 
March 2013. http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1811 (Last accessed on March 15, 2015) 
328 On 11 March 2009, Mufti Ravil Gainutdin, who chairs the Council of Muftis, raised the issue of 
outlawed Islamic literature at a high-profile meeting of the Council for Co-operation with Religious 
Organizations, a consultative body for religious communities attached to the presidential administration. 
President Dmitri Medvedev, who chaired the meeting, replied that "the quality of expertise in these sorts of 
problems should be the highest possible." He supported Gainutdin's suggestion for a federal expert council 
to deal with the situation and said he would order one to be created. 
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decision and advocated the toughening of security measures, human rights activists, a 
liberal wing of the official Muslim establishment, and wider public expressed their deep 
concern over increasing involvement of state authorities in religious affairs and published 
several open letters protesting the ban on literature and excessive reliance on anti-
extremist legislation.329 As of August 2014, there were 2,500 items on the list of banned 
extremist materials.330 Many of them are Islamic texts, which include works by globally 
recognized Islamic scholars, some Arabic language learning material, and translations of 
the Qur’an. 
According to Article 20.29 of the Code of Administrative Offences that was put 
into practice in July 2007, "Production or distribution of extremist materials" is punished 
with a fine of up to 3,000 Rubles or up to 15 days' detention for individuals and the 
confiscation of the materials. Organizations can be punished with a fine of between 
50,000 and 100,000 Rubles or a ban of up to 90 days, as well as confiscation of the 
materials.  
Finally, it is also important to note that while not targeted at religious 
communities directly, new visa rules introduced in October 2007 allowing foreigners 
with a business or humanitarian visa - which includes religious work - to spend only 90 
out of every 180 days in Russia have embittered many religious communities and 
organizations, particularly those which for one reason or another depend upon foreigners. 
                                                        
329 “Otkrytoe pis’mo musul’manskoi obschestvennosti prezidentu V.V. Putinu.” Izvestiya. N38. 5 March 
2007. 
“Musul’mane Dagestana prosyat Vladimira Putina otmenit’ zapret na knigi Nursi” 26 December, 2007. 
http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=59378 (Last accessed on March 20, 2015). 
“Musul’mane Sankt-Peterburga napravili otkrytoe pis’mo muftiyu Raviliu Gainutdinu” 16 January 2008. 
http://www.islamnews.ru/news-9142.html (Last accessed on March 20, 2015). 
330 “Federal’nyi spisok ekstremistskikh materialov,” Russian Ministry of Justice. 
http://minjust.ru/ru/extremist-materials?field_extremist_content_value=&page=12 (Last accessed on Nov 
24, 2014) 
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The legal obstacles, according to Fagan, are avoidable, “but the procedures for obtaining 
temporary residency or a work permit - which allow an unbroken stay in Russia - are 
lengthy and time consuming” (Fagan 2008).331 
Arguably, the limited effectiveness of these measures prompted some 
policymakers to propose further toughening the 1997 law. In October 2009, Justice 
ministry suggested forcing religious communities to issue licenses to anyone wishing to 
promote their beliefs away from places of worship. It proposed to make state registration 
compulsory for all religious communities, possibly rendering unregistered religious 
activity illegal.332 These attempts suggest that a fundamental ambiguity of the state 
officials on how to deal with “non-traditional” religious communities is still unresolved. 
According to long-time observers of religious affairs in the country, ambiguous 
state policies engendered resentment and misunderstandings among the indigenous 
Muslim population. Experts argue that the Russian government’s broad-brush approach 
toward religious groups was problematic, due to its arbitrary application of “vague anti-
extremism laws against religious adherents and others who pose no credible threat to 
security” (USCIRF 2011, Verkhovsky 2007). Aislu Yunusova, for example, compared 
the attempts to limit or even outlaw the activity of “non-traditional” religious groups with 
                                                        
331 For a brief discussion of the issue, see Fagan, G. “Religious freedom survey, October 2008,” Forum 18 
News Service, 1 October 2008. http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1196 (Last accessed on 
March 15, 2015). 
332 As of 2012, attempts to toughen the 1997 Law continued to reach the new Duma. Communist deputy 
Andrei Tychinin's May 2012 draft would raise the minimum membership of a religious organisation from 
10 to 50, and the minimum composition of a centralised religious organisation from three to 30 
communities. It would also subject religious worship in private homes to regional law, which opponents of 
religious freedom have found far easier than federal law to amend to their liking. According to Fagan, in 
Russia's new political climate of popular protest and government clampdown, the Kremlin has neither 
sufficient concern nor incentive to head off such proposals. For a brief discussion of this, see Fagan, G. 
“Religious freedom survey, July 2012” Forum 18 News Service. 19 July 2012. 
http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1722 (Last accessed on March 15, 2015). 
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the Soviet efforts to ban jazz, rock, and karate, which were also described as harmful to 
the youth and society (Yunusova 1997).333 
Experts also point out that the attempt to divide believers to adherents of suitable 
or unsuitable religions for Russian citizens contradicts the country’s Constitution and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which protects the right of individuals not only 
to practice any religion but also to change their beliefs (Yunusova 1997). The Declaration 
proclaims that the rights of people to receive and spread ideas cannot be bound by state 
borders.334 This expert criticism speaks to the attempt of Russian policymakers to limit 
the rights of foreign religious missionaries. Yunusova underlines the poly-confessional 
nature of the country, which she argues cannot be limited by a particular number of 
allowed religions. She warns that this could inevitably lead to the conflicts between 
adherents of various faiths, between the federal center and the regions, and between 
Russia and the outside world (Yunusova 1997). 
 
3. Moving forward towards the past? The road from the “multi-confessional 
establishment” to “traditional religions.” 
The emergence and strengthening of a so-called ‘traditional religions’ paradigm 
since the late 1990s resembles the pre-revolutionary “multi-confessional establishment” 
model. According to Paul Werth, this model was a framework that the Russian autocracy 
developed to regulate spiritual affairs in the empire during the reign of Catherine the 
                                                        
333 Yunusova refers to the 1981 decree banning sports clubs that taught “ideologically dangerous” karate. 
Aislu Yunusova. “Svoboda Sovesti I Svoboda Veroispovedanii,” NG-Religii, N9, 25 September 1997. 
334 Article 19 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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Great (1762-1796).335 The model granted a series of significant collective rights to 
recognized religious groups and accepted ‘foreign confessions’ as state religions entitled 
to certain forms of government patronage and protection. Non-Orthodox communities 
were thus “integrated into the broader imperial order through the establishment of 
confessional institutions as a crucial mediator between individual subjects and the state” 
(Werth 2014: 4).336 This section will examine some of the similarities and differences 
between the state approach toward Muslims and Islam in Russia during the early 19th 
century and the 2000s. 
As noted in chapter one, the concept of “multi-confessional establishment” was 
developed by Paul Werth to describe Russian state approach toward the Orthodox Church 
and religious minorities in Tsarist Russia since the late 18th century. Analysis of state-
religion regimes in post-Soviet Russia suggests that the concept still provides an excellent 
framework for the study of Russian state policies toward religion in the 2000s. First, it 
helps to place the debates about the role of religion in post-Soviet Russian national 
identity in historical context. According to Werth, one of Russia’s greatest identity 
challenges is rooted in its character as a multi-confessional state. Whether Russia is a 
truly poly-confessional state or a polity that embraces several religions while elevating 
only one of them as dominant has been at the center of many historical debates on the 
status of religious minorities in the country. Second, the approach developed by Werth is 
                                                        
335 The term ‘multi-confessional establishment’ in this study refers to a religious order that framed the 
exercise of faith and defined the scope of religious freedom in Russia from the reign of Catherine II (1762-
96) through that of Nicholas I (1825-55) until the end of the Tsarist era. It implies recognition of religious 
institutions and production of legal statutes for the regulation of spiritual affairs in the country. In other 
words, it describes a framework wherein the state relies on state-approved religious organizations to 
socialize the population and provide moral discipline. Refer to the dissertation glossary for details. 
336 This framework, according to Werth, was at best only partially compatible with the norms of “freedom 
of conscience.”  
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useful in emphasizing the importance of both religious and nationalities policies in the 
state’s management of its diverse population. Werth suggests that when religious modes 
of self-identification are central to many of the country’s subjects, the state’s approach to 
management of the diversity may rely substantially on confessional institutions and 
categories. According to Werth, until its last days the Tsarist regime was still heavily 
dependent on religious institutions despite the fact that “the national idea grew in 
significance over the course of the 19th century” (Werth 2014:7). 
The idea of Islam as a “building block of the empire” in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries and the contemporary idea of “traditional Islam” is highly comparable. Several 
historical studies have explored in detail the effort of the tsarist regime to instrumentalize 
religion. Robert Crews, for example, in his works discusses significant efforts of the state 
to build cooperative links with pious Muslims in the name of “true religion” in the Tsarist 
Russia (Crews 2003, 2009).337 He describes the country as a confessional state that 
created “a religion-centered framework for its subjects to engage with the autocracy” 
(Crews 2009). Observers of state-religions relations point to similar mechanisms of 
cooperation between the contemporary state and representatives of “traditional” religious 
organizations (Curanovic 2014, Dannreuther 2010). Similarly, present-day treatment of 
some “non-traditional” Islamic communities as extremists resembles efforts of the Tsarist 
regime in the 19th century to depict non-conformist Islamic communities as fanatics.338  
                                                        
337 Crews, Robert. "Empire and the confessional state: Islam and religious politics in nineteenth-century 
Russia." The American Historical Review 108.1 (2003): 50-83. 
Crews, Robert D. For prophet and tsar: Islam and empire in Russia and Central Asia. Harvard University 
Press, 2009. 
338 According to Khalid, for Konstantin Kaufman, the first governor-general of Russian Turkestan (in office 
1867–1881), Islam was irredeemably connected with fanaticism (Khalid 2004). 
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Ultimately, the historical model of “multi-confessional establishment” and the 
emerging “traditional religions” framework correspond to each other in the standardized 
typology of state-religion regimes presented in this study. In both cases, institutional 
control over the legislature and judiciary does not belong to a religious authority. 
Religion is generally allowed to be present in the public sphere, but not all religious 
groups may equally benefit from this right. In this regard, both “traditional religions” 
approach and “multi-confessional establishment” framework operate under a regime that 
subordinates religion to a secular authority.  
 
3.1 – “Traditional religions” from the historical perspective 
Religious and secular state institutions in Russia have historically had their own 
interests, which did not always overlap. While the Russian state depended on the 
Orthodox Church and saw it as an ally since Christianization of Kievan Rus, over time 
autocrats came to see in Patriarch a competitor that could either support or undermine the 
political authority of the ruler. Peter the Great, who grew up in he wake of the Old 
Believer Schism in the Orthodox Church, realized that competing centers of authority 
could inflict on the land and its people. The Emperor believed that consolidation of the 
state depended of the subordination and subjugation of the Church. Peter utterly rejected 
the idea of Moscow being the Third Rome. Instead, inspired by western examples, he 
initiated a comprehensive modernization project of Russia, which envisioned a different 
role for the Church. After Peter’s Church reforms in the early 18th century, the quasi-
medieval Muscovite Russia centered on the Church and headed by the Tsar and the 
Patriarch came to its end. 
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Peter’s modernization and secularization efforts were aimed at creating a rational 
state, where Church would function as a “department” of the state. For him, “the 
discipline was more important than any kind of religious values” (Zhivov 2009: 352).339 
Thus, the state’s involvement in religious affairs was more about discipline and order 
rather than piety and spirituality (Zhivov 2009, Shevzov 2004).340 In a broader sense, 
Peter laid the foundation of a new vision for an ideal Russian state or ideology, where 
religion was subordinate to the state. He reoriented the outlook and history of his country. 
His aim was to transform a backward medieval state and society into a power comparable 
to the kingdoms of Western Europe. As a Western-style rationalist, he regarded the 
Church as a major obstacle to modernization. In Francis House’s words, Peter “beheaded 
the Church”, first by refusing to allow the election of a patriarch, and then, after it had 
been leaderless for twenty years, abolishing patriarchate altogether and replacing it with a 
committee called ‘The Holy Synod.’ (House 1988:24).341 In effect, this made the Church 
subject to the authority of a state bureaucracy run by a layperson.  
The rise of the statist ideology and a gradual development of a new state-religion 
regime opened up new opportunities for minority peoples under the Tsarist regime. 
Service to the state, rather than Christianization, became the ultimate measure of loyalty 
and the source of privilege. Those Muslim subjects who survived the dispossession of the 
earlier periods obtained a chance to keep their land and were even able to own Orthodox 
                                                        
339 For a brief analysis of the historical role of the church and the state in disciplining the population in 
imperial Russia, see Viktor Zhivov, “Distsiplinarnaia revoliutsiia i bor’ba s sueveriem v Rossii XVIII veka: 
‘provaly’ i ikh posledstviia,” Antropologiia revoliutsii: Sbornik statei po materialam XVI Bannykh chtennii 
zhurnala “Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie,” eds. I. Prokhorova, A. Dmitriev, I. Kikulin, and M. Maiofis 
(Moscow: NLO, 2009), 327-361. 
340 Shevzov, Vera. Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004 
341 House, Francis. Millennium of Faith: Christianity in Russia, AD 988-1988. St. Vladimir's Seminary 
Press, 1988. 
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serfs. It was not until Catherine the Great, however, that the state recognized the utility of 
non-Orthodox religions as sources of order and stability (Werth 2014: 49).342 By making 
religious tolerance an official policy, legalizing and institutionalizing Islam, she created a 
basis for loyalty to the Russian state in the Muslim lands.343 The Orenburg Muslim 
Spiritual Assembly, at the time an organizational structure unique in the Muslim world, 
became an essential mediator between the state and its Muslim subjects.344 Moreover, in 
the spirit of Peter’s modernization reforms, Catherine further secularized the state 
bureaucracy and limited the influence of the Church on state affairs by reforming the 
property rights and allocating budget. In recognition of her role in changing the state’s 
relationship with its non-Orthodox subjects, Tatars to the present day still regard 
Catherine the Great as “Ebi-Patsha” (Grandmother-Queen). 
Having attained legitimacy as a tolerated religion under the “multi-confessional 
establishment” framework, Islam in Russia developed in a fashion unparalleled since 
before the conquest of Kazan. Some of the greatest indigenous Islamic thinkers lived and 
worked in Russia in the late 18th and 19th centuries. A spiritual and intellectual chain of 
these Muslim thinkers, which included Abdunnasir Al-Qursawi (1776-1812), Qayyum 
Nasiri (1835-1902), Alimjan Barudi (1857-1921), Rizaetdin Fakhretdin (1859-1936), 
                                                        
342 Werth, Paul W. The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial 
Russia. Oxford University Press, 2014. 
343 Hanafi-Maturidi theologians in Central Asia accepted the idea that Muslims could be ruled by someone 
who was either a ghayr-i din (nonbeliever) or a kafir (infidel) so long as the leader allowed mosques and 
madrassas to remain open, allowed Muslims to observe their rituals, and allowed Muslims to be judged by 
Sharia. As a result, the majority of the region’s Hanafi clerics, known as traditionalists or conservatives, 
accepted Russian rule as legitimate. 
344 According to Khalid, this was intertwined with the goal of bringing Central Asia under closer Russian 
control and outflanking Ottoman diplomacy there (Khalid in Milner 2004). The Spiritual Assembly, headed 
by a mufti appointed by the state, was responsible for appointing and licensing imams as teachers 
throughout the territory under its purview, and overseeing the operation of mosques. 
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Ismail Gaspirali (1851-1914), and Musa Jarullah Bigi (1875-1949) developed 
uninterrupted until the Soviet assault on religion.  
Introduction of a “multi-confessional framework” to govern the growing empire’s 
diverse population provided unprecedented opportunities for Russia’s indigenous 
Muslims to practice their own faith. Nevertheless, the new “institutional and statutory 
arrangement still upheld a clear distinction between a “ruling” Orthodoxy and 
subordinate foreign confessions” (Werth 2014:48). The autocracy’s political identity 
continued to be connected with Orthodoxy, which retained the status of an established 
religion. The Church maintained its privileged place at the top of the confessional 
hierarchy and continued its spiritual mission by aggressively promoting conversion to 
Orthodoxy on a mass scale (Werth 2014, Khalid 2004). Under Nicholas I, the state’s 
Orthodox identity was made more explicit after adoption of the official ideology 
“Orthodoxy, Authority, Nationality.” This vision of an ideal model for Russia’s future 
enshrined Orthodoxy as the autocracy’s legitimating ideology. 
As it has been discussed earlier, the last decade of imperial rule showed several 
signs of a possible transition to passive secularism in state-religion relations. In 1905, as 
part of the government’s response to mounting demands for civil rights by an 
increasingly urban and educated population, Tsar Nicholas II issued the Edict of 
Toleration, which gave legal status to religions not of the Russian Orthodox Church.345 
This seemed to break the monopoly of religious organizations. Various religious 
                                                        
345 Pospielovsky, Dmitry (1984). The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime. Crestwood: St. Vladimir 
Seminary Press. p. 22 
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movements emerged that sought different platforms for religious expression. One of 
group was the first Islamic political movement in Russia, Ittifaq.  
The promise of religious freedom that was made in the October Manifesto, 
however, was never fully delivered. Proposals of religious freedom never became a law. 
Until its last days, imperial state continued to rely on religious institutions to perform 
certain functions of local governance. Religion continued to do the work for the state 
rulers by performing certain administrative functions and legitimizing their authority. The 
bureaucratic capacity of the autocracy was too weak to do without what the historian Paul 
Werth calls the "multi-confessional establishment.”346 Among all, the Russian Orthodox 
Church remained the state’s most trusted and effective bridge to the people. 
 
 4. Challenges to the “Confessional collaboration” model   
The policies of the Russian state toward religion since 1997 resemble the 
country’s experience with the “multi-confessional establishment” framework. However, 
the ability of this model to overcome the legacy of the 20th and address the challenges of 
the 21st centuries is questionable. The first major question that the state would need to 
address with respect to managing the diverse population, including indigenous Muslims, 
is the status of Russian Orthodox Christianity vis-à-vis Islam and other religions. While 
the Russian government maintains a commitment to secularism and has sought to avoid a 
particular closeness between church and state, the Russian Orthodox Church has an 
                                                        
346 The notion of "multi-confessional establishment" developed by Paul Werth provides a valuable 
intellectual framework for the alaysis of the post-Soviet “traditional religions” paradigm and the 
“confessional collaboration” model presented in this study. To see how religious institutions became key 
mediators between the imperial Russian state and its diverse peoples in the late 19th century, see Paul 
Werth, The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia. 
Oxford University Press, 2014 
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undoubted politico-moral authority and considers itself primus inter pares among the 
‘traditional’ religions.347 Its own conceptualization of Russia, according to Dannreuther, 
is as an ‘Orthodox country’, with Muslims as a recognized minority.  
For some members of the traditional Muslim clergy, assuming a spiritually 
subordinate role is acceptable. In part, for this reason the church hierarchy privileges 
relations with Talgat Tadzhuddin, the head of the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims in 
Ufa.348 For many others, who argue for the equality of indigenous Muslims and Orthodox 
Christians, no special status of the Orthodox Church may be acceptable. This group of 
Muslims led by Ravil’ Gainutdin, the head of the rival Council of Muftis of Russia, has a 
more nuanced relations with the Church. On several occasions, in his public statements 
Mufti Gainutdin reflected the concerns about the government’s “preferential treatment” 
of the Russian Orthodox Church.349 Close to the surface of these inter-confessional 
tensions, according to Dannreuther, is an Orthodox fear of Islam as representing a threat 
to the Russian people, and Muslim fears that they are being progressively reduced to a 
second-order status in a state dominated by the Russian Orthodox Church. As Dannrether 
has put it, “there is here the potential for a spiral of radicalizing sentiments as perceptions 
of Russian Christians and Muslims become more mutually suspicious and distrustful” 
(Dannreuther 2010:124).  
                                                        
347 See, for example, Kovalskaya, Kristina. "The Traditional and the Non-Traditional in the Religious Life 
of the Russian Federation." Mundo Eslavo 12 (2013): 69-78.  
348 Aleksandr Verkovskii, ‘Publichniye otnosheniya pravoslavnykh i musul’manskikh organizatsii na 
federal’nom urovne’, in Aleksei Malashenko, ed., Islam v Rossii: vzgliad iz regionov (Moscow: Aspekt, 
2007). 
349 See, for example, the statement of Mufti Gainutdin on the position of the Council of Muftis of Russia on 
the federal law project “On Military Priests.” Moscow, 11 March 2006. Also see Mufti Gainutdin’s 
statement on the proposals to introduce courses on “Russian Orthodox Culture” at state schools in 
Gainutdin, Islam: Otvet na vyzovy vremeni (Moscow, 2011), 457-461. 
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The second question that the state would need to address with respect to 
organizing the diverse population, including indigenous ethnic Muslims, is the 
nationalities question. The attempt to fill the ideological void by basing the legitimacy of 
the state mainly on confessional grounds is unlikely to deliver the expected results as 
long as the new approach does not address the nationalities question. Despite the 
increasing prominence of religion, national identities remain salient and continue be 
sources of contention and one of the main challenges to political developments in Russia, 
as we shall see in the final part (Part III) of this chapter.  
 
5. Conclusion: Collaboration between the state and traditional Islamic 
organizations 
The era of passive secularism in Russia led to many unintended consequences on 
the religious front. On the one hand, recognizing constitutional rights of all believers and 
abandoning state-led anti-religious propaganda boosted political legitimacy of the secular 
reformers. The 1988 Millennium celebrations were of huge importance for the success of 
Gorbachev’s perestroika initiative. Maintaining the liberalization rhetoric was a key 
element in strengthening Yeltsin’s hold on power during the transition and early post-
Soviet periods. On the other hand, many of the assumptions that were made regarding the 
“transformative impact” of the Soviet era and the role of religion in society turned out to 
be inaccurate. One of such imperfect expectations was that religion was largely 
subordinate to ethnic cultures. The other misleading assumption was that Islam could not 
assume a leading role in social life, or in Dugin’s words, “become a logos” for Russia’s 
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own indigenous Muslims (Dugin 2010:146).350 In both cases, failure to realize that 
religion could take a life of its own, especially in the context of ideological crisis and 
fundamental ambiguity about Russia’s national identity, destined the country’s 
experiment with passive secularism to failure.  
The “traditional religions” framework that came to replace norms of passive 
secularism became a basis for construction of a new state-religion regime in the country. 
The state’s embrace of “traditional” confessions and reserving for them a privileged 
access to the public sphere symbolized a movement toward a confessional 
collaboration/established religions regime. This regime also resembles Russia’s pre-
revolutionary “multi-confessional establishment” model wherein, the state relied on 
religious organizations to perform some bureaucratic functions. Religious freedom, a core 
principle that guarantees equal access to the public sphere for all religious groups, was 
excluded by Russian model of confessional collaboration. In this collaboration, 
subordination of religious institutions to the state is a criterion for maintaining legal 
personality and public visibility. The concept of “traditional Islam” to a large degree 
developed into a calling card for Islamic groups that perform these functions on behalf of 
the Islamic faith. 
  The model based on collaboration with “traditional religions,” however, has 
major limitations in governing Russia’s diverse population, including indigenous 
Muslims. The first challenge is interfaith relations. How Russia’s indigenous Islamic 
community and representatives of other religions will react to the growing influence of 
                                                        
350 Dugin A.G. Logos i mifos. Sotsiologiya glubin [Logos and Mythos. The sociology of depths]. Moscow, 
2010.  
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the Orthodox Church as a first among the four equal traditional religions is difficult to 
predict. The second limitation is a question of nationalities. Given a strong sense of 
ethnic nationalism among Russia’s ethnic minorities and increasingly ethnic Russians, 
how viable it is to place the political legitimacy on confessional foundations is also not 
clear.351 The following section will discuss the state efforts in this direction.  
 
Part III: Muslims and Islam under the non-ethnic regime 
The same day that President Putin participated in the ceremony commemorating 
the 225th anniversary of the Spiritual Board of Muslims in Ufa, he also chaired a meeting 
of the Council for Interethnic Relations.352 If the focus of his address to the Muslim 
clergy was the importance of “traditional” religious organizations in maintaining the 
societal harmony in the country, the main theme of the meeting with representatives of 
secular state bureaucracy was implementation of the goals stated in the National Ethnic 
Policy Strategy through 2025. The strategy that the President was referring to reflected 
the vision of state authorities on the future of interethnic relations in the country.  
What unites these two seemingly distinct events in Ufa? This section will explain 
how the state’s ethnic policy fits into the ethno-confessional regime of the post-1997 era. 
It will show that the attempt to build a non-ethnic regime complements the state’s efforts 
to manage Russia’s diverse population based on the confessional model. State support for 
public visibility of the established Muslim clergy and curbing public assertion of ethnic 
nationalisms reflect the contours of the statist ideology and its approach toward Islam. 
                                                        
351 See, the conclusion chapter for further discussion of the limits of Russia’s contemporary ethno-
confessional regime. 
352 Meeting of Council for Interethnic Relations. October 22, 2013 http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6156 
(Last access February 5, 2015). 
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I will examine the recent efforts of Russian state authorities and ideologists to 
transform the country from a multiethnic federation into some sort of a “melting pot,” 
where along with legal uniformity the state is seeking to build a patriotic consensus based 
on supremacy of the state. Within this framework, both the construction of a non-ethnic 
regime and support for “traditional” Muslim organizations play an essential role in 
providing the Russian state with ideological legitimacy among the indigenous Muslims 
and the institutional means to govern a diverse society.  
 
1. Non-ethnic nationhood and civic nationalism 
In December 2012, President Putin signed a decree approving the National Ethnic 
Policy Strategy through 2025. In addition, the federal target program on “Strengthening 
the unity of the Russian nation and the ethnic and cultural development of the peoples of 
Russia (for 2014-2020)” was adopted.353 These two documents were the latest attempts to 
formalize the concept of the Russian nation as a non-ethnic community uniting its diverse 
population (Barkov, Serikov, Chernous 2013).354 Nevertheless, a consensus on the debate 
over nationality policy or ethnicity regimes – the discussion that lasted for over twenty 
years – has yet to be achieved.355 Most recently, the return of “Novorossiya” to the 
                                                        
353 “On endorsing the federal targeted program on Strengthening the unity of the Russian nation and ethnic 
and cultural development of the peoples of Russia in 2014-2020” Government decisions, 25 August 2013. 
http://government.ru/en/docs/4022/ (Last accessed on March 15, 2015). “Meeting of Council for Interethnic 
Relations” February 19, 2013. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17536 (Last accessed on March 
15, 2015). 
354 Barkov, Fedor Aleksandrovich, Anton Vladimirovich Serikov, and Victor Vladimirovich Chernous. 
"Competing of Civic and Ethnic Forms of Identity in Russia (Based on Regional Empirical 
Studies)." World Applied Sciences Journal 27.3 (2013): 324-328. 
355 Clunan, A.L., 2009. The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity and Security 
Interests. The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp: 22-53; Taras, R., 2013. The Power of Images and the 
Images of Power: Past and Present Identity in Russia’s International Relations. N.Y.: Routledge, pp: 1-10; 
Billington, H.J., 2004. Russia: In the Search of Itself. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, pp: 47-67; Tishkov, 
V.A., 2013. Russian Nation: History and Sense of National Self-Conscience. M: Nauka, pp: 300-322; 
Sanina, A.G., 2012. The Formation of Russian Identity: civic and state approach. Sotsiologicheskie 
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popular lexicon and the attempts to re-define what is meant by “Russkii Mir” in the 
context of a Ukrainian crisis in 2014 again revealed the fragile and contentious character 
of the social contract in present day Russia. Some continued to stress the importance of 
building a civic national identity based on common values and symbols (Tishkov 2013, 
Barkov et al. 2013).356 For some others, Tishkov’s idea of “Rossiyane” has never been 
fully embraced and finally collapsed with the rise of Russian nationalism (Akhmetov 
2014).357 
According to Akturk, ethnic criterion for acquisition of citizenship and legal-
institutional limits on expression of ethnic identities define the kind of ethnicity regime 
that dominates in a given political system.358 Accordingly, for most of the countries, the 
presence or absence of an institutional support for ethnic identification largely defines 
whether their political systems have adopted a civic or a multiethnic ethnicity regime. 
The analysis of the first two post-Soviet decades suggests that Russian legal-institutional 
norms on expression of ethnic identities have been changing. More interestingly, this 
change has been taking place roughly around the same timeframe as the shift in the 
state’s religious policy. According to Akturk, toward the end of the 1990s, Russia’s 
multiethnic regime was stigmatized and even perceived by many as a security threat. By 
                                                        
issledovaniia, pp: 12-57; Drobizheva, L.M., 2011. Russian Identity and Trends in Interethnic Attitudes for 
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the New States of Eurasia. N.Y.: Szporluk, pp: 78-100. 
356 Tishkov, V.A., 2013. Russian Nation: History and Sense of National Self Conscience. M: Nauka, pp: 
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Studies)." World Applied Sciences Journal 27.3 (2013): 324-328. 
357 Goble, Paul. “Putin’s ‘Russian World’ Death Knell for Civic Russian Identity, Tatarstan Editor Says,” 
The Interpreter. 29 September, 2014. http://www.interpretermag.com/putins-russian-world-death-knell-for-
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358 According to Akturk, whether membership in any particular society is limited to one ethnicity and 
whether institutionalization of ethnicities is encouraged determines whether any given polity could be 
categorized as mono-ethnic, multiethnic, or anti-ethnic (non-ethnic) (Akturk 2014:7-8) 
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1997 calls for a change in state policies toward ethnicity in Russia materialized into a 
major reform, which Akturk termed as “the passport reform” (Akturk 2014:230).  
Today, the question whether there should be a legal and institutional support for 
multiple ethnic categories is still a topic of heated debates. While some politicians and 
intellectuals continue to defend the principles that allowed flourishing of an ethnic 
federalism in the country during the 1990s, ideologists of non-ethnic national identity 
made significant advances in formalizing the idea of civic nationalism. The fact is that 
many symbols of ethnic distinctiveness no longer enjoy the level of institutional support 
that they had in the early 90s. This section will explain how a series of reforms, starting 
with a passport reform in 1997, has changed the ethnicity regime in Russia from a 
multiethnic toward a non-ethnic model, and how this shift has affected Islam in Russia. 
 
2. The road from ethnic federalism towards a non-ethnic statehood 
The Russian Federation inherited many elements of the Soviet multiethnic 
ethnicity regime. In addition to the ethnic federal structure, these were the indication of 
ethnicity in the internal passports and a number of programs for cultural development of 
national minorities. However, in less than a decade after the Soviet collapse some of 
these elements have been abandoned. One of the most illustrative examples of the change 
is the “passport reform” of 1997 (Akturk 2012). For the first several years after 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation continued the old practice of 
indicating a citizen’s ethnicity in the individual’s internal passport. The so-called “fifth 
line” in the document explicitly identified the ethnic background of all Russian/Soviet 
citizens. Some observers believe that a continuation of this practice reflected convictions 
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and habits centered on the Leninist/Soviet approach to ethnic diversity (Slezkine, 1994; 
Filatova, 1997). According to many others, the persistence of this tradition until 1997 was 
largely a result of strong lobbying from ethno-nationalist autocrats in Russia’s ethnically 
defined regions, Communists, and liberal advocates of minority rights (Akturk 2010, 
2012). Leaders of ethnic minority republics such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, who 
were most ardent defenders of retaining “line five,” regarded the attempts to remove the 
mark as a step toward destroying ethnic minority identities.359 For one reason or the 
other, the Russian Federation has largely preserved the Soviet legacy of multiethnic 
statehood in institutional, legal, and symbolic terms. 
Over time, however, the multiethnic structure of the state came to be seen as a 
threat to the stability of the country. The rise of ethnic separatism in some regions 
brought the country to the brink of collapse (Treisman 1997, Gorenburg 1999, Lapidus 
1999).360 Calls to change Soviet-era state policies on ethnicity in Russia gained 
momentum and acceptance among some politicians. This was reflected in the growing 
criticism of the parade of sovereignties and strengthening of the arguments in support of 
civic nationalism.361 In 1997, despite strong objections, indication of ethnicity was 
                                                        
359 Many of the 21 autonomous republics with their respective titular ethnic groups were against a reform in 
this direction (Petrov and Slider, 2007, p. 77). Petrov, Nikolai and Darrell Slider, “Putin and the Regions,” 
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Littlefield, 2007. 
360 Treisman, Daniel S. "Russia's “Ethnic Revival”: The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a 
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Gorenburg, Dmitry. "Regional separatism in Russia: ethnic mobilisation or power grab?." Europe-Asia 
Studies 51.2 (1999): 245-274. 
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removed from internal passports.362 This policy change from a mandatory recording of 
individual ethnicity to an uncompromising prohibition against recording individual 
ethnicity symbolized a dramatic shift in the country’s ethnicity regime (Akturk 
2010:324).363  
Throughout the post-Soviet era, one of the main intellectual proponents of the 
idea of creating a non-ethnic national identity in Russia was Valeriy Tishkov, the head of 
the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (IEA). Starting in 1992, when he served as 
Minister of Nationalities under the Yeltsin regime, Tishkov advocated a concept of 
territorial, as opposed to ethnic, nationhood (Tishkov, 1997b, pp. 246–271). For him, 
“territorial nationalism” based on a civic ‘Rossiyanin’ identity was crucial in order to 
transcend ethnic differences, build up patriotism that could claim the allegiance of 
Russia’s non-Russian citizens, and ultimately create a homogeneous society loyal to the 
state and its principles.364  Eventually, it would become a foundation of a nation-building 
                                                        
362 On March 13, 1997, Yel’tsin eliminated ethnicity in the internal passport with a presidential decree (No. 
232), “On the Basic Document Certifying the Identity of the Russian Federation Citizen on the Territory of 
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Valery Aleksandrovich, “Carte Blanche: Farewell to Line Five. The Absence of an Indication of 
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project.365 The passport reform seemed to be an important step in that direction (Akturk 
2010). 
Having broken with one of the key legacies of the Soviet ethnicity regime – the 
passport ethnicity, the Russian governments continued the work of “demolishing the 
multiethnic institutional architecture” of the country (Akturk 2012:252). Under Vladimir 
Putin’s presidency the Ministry of Nationalities was abolished, some ethnic autonomous 
okrugs were merged with Russian oblasts, seven “super regions” with appointed polpreds 
were established, and the system of popular elections of regional governors was replaced 
with political appointments from the federal center. In addition, a number of regional 
initiatives aimed at promoting national language and culture came to a halt as a result of 
the pressure from the federal center.  
For example, in 1991, the Ministry of Education of Tatarstan approved a “Plan for 
the Development of Tatar Education,” which was in part aimed at the expansion of the 
Tatar language in secondary and higher education.366 However, despite a very strong 
support for the plan among the Tatars, with the beginning of centralization efforts in 
2000, the Tatar-language schools started closing down and regional education curricula in 
general went through major revisions. According to Faller, 111 Tatar schools were shut 
                                                        
V. A. Tishkov in Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 22, 1997, p. 2, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 
49, 42:10, November 19, 1997c; Tishkov, Valeriy A., Etnologiya i politika (Ethnology and politics). 
Moscow: Nauka, 2001a; Tishkov, Valeriy A., “Chto yest’ samoopredeleniye (What is self-definition?)?,” in 
V. Tishkov, ed., Etnologiya i politika (Ethnology and politics). Moscow: Nauka, 2001b. 
365 For a discussion of distinction between mnogonarodnaya natsiya and mnogonatsional’nyy 
narod, see Akturk 2010:324. Akturk, Sener “Passport Identification and Nation-Building in Post-Soviet 
Russia,”Post-Soviet Affairs, 2010, 26, 4, pp. 314–341. 
366 Gorenburg, Dmitry. "Tatar language policies in comparative perspective: Why some revivals fail and 
some succeed." Ab Imperio 1 (2005): 257-284. 
Veinguer, Aurora Alvarez, and Howard H. Davis. "Building a Tatar elite Language and national schooling 
in Kazan." Ethnicities 7.2 (2007): 186-207. 
  178 
down between 2007 and 2009 (Faller 2009: 44-46).367 Moreover, in 1999, the State 
Council of the Republic of Tatarstan adopted an alphabet for the Tatar language based on 
Latin script.368 However, on February 22, 2002, the Russian State Duma’s Committee on 
Nationality Affairs recommended the approval of a draft bill, according to which ethnic 
minorities living in Russia could only make use of the Cyrillic script.369 In November 
2002, the Russian parliament passed a law requiring all official languages within the 
Russian Federation to use the Cyrillic alphabet.370 Later, the Federal law N309-FZ of 
December 1, 2007 amending the Federal Law ‘On Education’ stipulated a removal of “an 
ethnic component” (ethnic language and culture classes) from public schools’ curricula 
throughout Russia.371 This created a wave of protests in Tatarstan and was temporarily 
amended by the Republic’s government.372 In her study on Muslim Tatar women's piety 
stories Liliya Karimova points out that this kind of federal policies, which limit the rights 
of Russia’s ethnic minorities, inevitably affect the relationship of those people and 
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especially of women with the faith.373 With the 2009 introduction of a new form of high 
school graduation examinations (which are also entrance exams into universities) that can 
be taken only in Russian, schools with ethnic-language instruction might simply become 
irrelevant. Although many of these reforms did not target the ethnicity regime per se, 
political centralization in the 2000s, according to Akturk, “increased the capacity of the 
federal state to unilaterally impose ethnic regime changes in the future” (Akturk 
2012:253).   
All in all, since the late 1990s Russian state policy toward ethnicity has been 
moving away from the multiethnic regime, which was a distinctive feature of the Soviet 
model, toward a non-ethnic mode. One of the clearest manifestations of the rollback in 
institutional support for ethnic diversity was the ‘passport reform’ of 1997. A series of 
subsequent initiatives throughout the 2000s contributed to deemphasizing ethnic 
differences and discouraged indigenous ethnic minorities from manifestations of 
nationalism. What does this movement toward non-ethnic nationhood mean for Islam in 
Russia? The following section will discuss how the state’s simultaneous support for both 
civic nationalism and “traditional Islam” aims to facilitate the growth of ‘patriotic Islam’ 
in Russia. 
 
3. Non-ethnic nationalism and Islam 
One may think that non-ethnic regime is incompatible with the notion of 
“traditional Islam,” which for many carries the meaning of a “folk Islam” or a religion of 
a particular nation. Instead, the assimilationist nature of a non-ethnic regime seems to 
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better tally with the Salafi interpretation of Islam, which largely regards religion as a non-
ethnic category and denies ethnic differences.374 The problem with this superficial 
judgment is that it doesn’t account for political motives behind religious expressions. 
While “traditional” Muslim imams have historically helped the state to make indigenous 
Muslims "true patriots of Russia," Salafism and Wahhabism over the course of the 1990s 
have proved to be an ideology of protest (Knysh 2007).375  
“Love for the Fatherland is a testimony of the faith” (Khubb ul’-Watan min al’-
Iman). This instruction of the Prophet Muhammad has been a guiding principle of many 
imams in Russia since the beginning of WWII, when Gabderrakhman Rasulev, the head 
of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Ufa, publicly referred to the above-
mentioned hadith and proclaimed jihad of Soviet Muslims against Nazi Germany. At the 
time, Mufti’s declaration that patriotism is part of Islamic faith has been an important 
step in renewing a working relationship between the established clergy and the Soviet 
state. Today this principle continues to play a central role in the rhetoric of the 
established clergy representing “traditional Islam” in the country. 
For example, leaders of Russia’s Islamic officialdom Muftis Ravil Gainutdin, 
Talgat Tadzhuddin, and Ismail Berdyev in many of their written statements and oral 
sermons often refer to historical episodes such as victory against Nazi Germany in WWII 
in order to bolster a sense of patriotism among the indigenous Muslims. Mufti Gainutdin 
constantly calls the multi-million Russian Umma to pray to the Almighty for the peace in 
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Hadramawt)." Middle Eastern Studies 43.4 (2007): 503-530. 
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common Fatherland (Gainutdin 2011: 295-299).376 In its “Basic Principles of the Social 
Program of Russian Muslims” the Council of Muftis, which Gainutdin heads, stresses its 
willingness to cooperate with the government, the importance of Russian unity, and its 
condemnation of all kinds of disobedience to the law (Staalesen 2005:311).377  
Talgat Tadzhuddin, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Board in Ufa, not only calls 
for patriotism, but also disapproves the expression of ethnic minority nationalism 
(Staalesen 2005:311).378 During the debates on changing the Tatar alphabet to Latin 
script, for instance, he opposed the regional initiative. Despite popular support for the 
program among the Tatars, Tadzhuddin claimed that the introduction of the Latin script 
“could destroy the integrity of the Tatar nation and cause other nations in Russia to 
oppose Tatars.” Instead he declared that he was “proud of the fact that Cyril and 
Methodius, the founders of the Cyrillic script, were Bulghars, and [that Tatars] share 
historical roots with them” (Sebba 2006).379 Tadzhudin has even supported the idea of 
making the anniversary of the 14th-century battle of Kulikovo, where the Russians 
defeated the Mongolian Tatars, a public holiday. This proposal has met with fierce 
opposition from Tatar intellectuals. 
In their pioneering study on Islamic texts in post-Soviet Russia, Michael Kemper 
and Alfrid Bustanov explore the linguistic aspect of the Islamic revival in the country. 
                                                        
376 Also see Kemper, M. "Mufti Ravil'Gainutdin: The Translation of Islam into a Language of Patriotism 
and Humanism." (2012): 105-141, in Bustanov, Alfrid K., and Michael Kemper. The Russian orthodox and 
Islamic languages in the Russian federation. Amsterdam: Pegasus (2013). Ummah is a community of 
Muslims bound together by ties of religion. Refer to the dissertation glossary for a definition. 
377 Staalesen, Atle. "Orthodoxy and Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Opposing Confessional Cultures or 
Unifying Force?." Nation-Building and Common Values in Russia (2005): 301. 
378 Staalesen, Atle. "Orthodoxy and Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Opposing Confessional Cultures or 
Unifying Force?." Nation-Building and Common Values in Russia (2005): 301. 
379 Sebba, Mark. “Ideology and Alphabets in the former USSR.” Language Problems & Language 
Planning, Volume 30, Number 2, 2006, pp. 99-125(27). Sebba refers to RFE/RL Daily Review from 
Tatarstan, 23 July 2002 
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The study, among other things, reveals that Russia’s Islamic leadership is rapidly 
adapting to the new role of the Russian language as an emerging lingua franca of the all-
Russian Islamic discourse (Bustanov and Kemper 2012:7).380 Some of the apparent 
reasons for a growth in the use of the Russian language as a means of Islamic 
communication since the Soviet collapse are the status of the Russian as the best known 
common language among Russia’s various peoples (Pavlenko 2006), a rapid spread of 
Islam into new regions far beyond its “ethnic homelands” (Bustanov and Kemper 2012), 
and the influx of Central Asian immigrants and other foreigners, who usually don’t speak 
the language of Russia’s ethnic Muslim minorities (Laruelle 2007, Myhre 2014).381  
 
4. Challenges for the non-ethnic regime in practice 
Movement toward a non-ethnic nationhood raises many concerns among secular 
nationalists, some members of the religious clergy, and public intellectuals. On the one 
hand, over the first decade of the 2000s, legal-institutional limitations on the expression 
of ethnicities have significantly affected the development of ethnic minority languages 
and cultures. This, according to careful observers of Islam in Russia, may have major 
consequences for the development of “traditional Islam” in the country. Titular language 
and customs, according to them, are very important in transmitting the indigenous 
traditions of local Islamic culture, which have been developing in Russia for centuries. 
                                                        
380 Bustanov, A.K. and Kemper M. (eds.), 2012: Islamic Authority and the Russian Language: Studies on 
Texts from European Russia, the North Caucasus and West Siberia. Amsterdam: Pegasus, Pegasus Oost-
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381 Pavlenko, Aneta. "Russian as a lingua franca." Annual Review of Applied Linguistics 26 (2006): 78-99. 
Bustanov, Alfrid K., and Michael Kemper. The Russian orthodox and Islamic languages in the Russian 
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Laruelle, Marlène. "Central Asian Labor Migrants in Russia: The ‘Diasporization’of the Central Asian 
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They argue that cuts in ethno-cultural programs may facilitate the rise of religious 
radicalism. On the other hand, the ambiguity of the Russian leadership about the rise of 
Russian nationalism seems to pose even greater constraint on the prospects of non-ethnic 
nationhood in Russia. 
In June 2013 it was reported that religious leaders in the 14 mosques of the 
Moscow region intended to stop using Kazan Tatar, the language they have employed 
since the 1940s, and would soon begin using Russian for all parish activities, including 
sermons and other parts of religious services (Goble 2013).382 This picture is not unique 
to Moscow. In many mosques across Russia, including those in Muslim-majority 
republics, imams already deliver religious services at least partly in Russian. Apart from 
the reason that Russian is a lingua franca among Russia’s indigenous and migrant 
communities from near abroad, this transition can also be explained by the decrease in 
active bearers of a Tatar language. According to the census data, the number of Tatar 
language speakers has fallen by 20% between 2002 and 2010.383  
Although a causal link between Russian language and Islamic radicalism cannot 
be inferred, according to Goble, this shift in languages may directly or indirectly 
contribute to radicalization of Muslims near the Russian capital. On the one hand, there is 
a strong belief that one of the sources of radicalism is an influence of foreign 
missionaries and their followers, who are far more likely to use Russian than any other 
language of indigenous Muslims in Russia. On the other hand, there are many proponents 
                                                        
382 Goble, P. “Three Bellwethers of Russia’s Future,” Window on Eurasia. June 13, 2013. 
http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/06/window-on-eurasia-three-bellwethers-of.html (Last 
accessed on March 21, 2015) 




of the idea that values of traditional Islam can only be transmitted in the native language 
of indigenous Muslims. According to Valiulla Yakupov, one of the biggest threats to a 
moderate Muslim religious identity stems from the radical Islamist ideology (Yakupov 
2009:55). For Yakupov, preservation and support of local traditions, languages, and 
cultures is essential for continuation and development of the indigenous Islamic school of 
thought.  
Finally, according to Kazan-based historian Damir Iskhakov, the more ethnic 
identity is suppressed, the more religious identity is manifested (Iskhakov 2013).384 In 
other words, religion, as a readily available ideology, may attract many of those people 
who cannot find enough opportunities to express themselves in a secular nationalist 
domain. In many cases radical interpretations of Islam become the first choice of 
dissidents because Salafism/Wahhabism has proved to be more effective (and 
fashionable) as an ideology of protest (Knysh 2007). Given the goal of secular authorities 
to support traditional Islam and contain radicalism, pushing forward the idea of non-
ethnic regime for some people seems to be counter-productive. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that state attitudes toward Islam in Russia between 1997 
and 2012 took shape in the context of a transition of the Russian ethno-confessional 
regime from multiethnic passive secularism to a non-ethnic multi-confessional mode. 
Disaffection with the passive secular multiethnic model of governance that allegedly 
                                                        
384 Iskhakov, Damir. “Kontsept traditsionnogo Islama,” Zvezda Povolzhya. 25 February 2013. 
http://zvezdapovolzhya.ru/obshestvo/kontsept-traditsionnogo-islama-25-02-2013.html (Last accessed on 
March 21, 2015). 
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helped bring the country to the brink of collapse and an understanding that religion could 
be utilized to maintain a non-ethnic patriotic consensus prompted Russian policymakers 
to assume morality as the foundation of the new regime. Within this framework, 
“traditional Islam” came to play a key role in providing the state with ideological 
legitimacy among indigenous Muslims and the means to govern a diverse society. The 
effort to build a new ethno-confessional regime, similar to the Tsarist-era “multi-
confessional establishment” model, is one of the main reasons why the Russian state has 
been actively regulating the access of religious groups to the Russian public sphere and 
been cultivating the non-ethnic nationalism. 
The chapter has demonstrated the evolution of secular thinking about the Islamic 
faith and described some of the transformations in Muslim religious practice in Russia 
over the 1990s. It attempted to explain why Islam, which was largely perceived by 
Russian policymakers as a subordinate element of largely secularized and westernized 
cultures of indigenous Muslims in the late Soviet era and early 1990s, came to be seen as 
a powerful ideology that could guide human behavior both in positive and negative ways. 
Cooptation of the established Islamic clergy and marginalization of non-conformist 
religious groups were the main strategies of the secular leadership in responding to 
perceived challenges and regulating the Islamic affairs. In doing so the state was guided 
by historical memories and the principles of a statist ideology, which will be discussed in 
the next chapter.  
The chapter has also argued that in the 2000s the state’s efforts to manage 
Russia’s diverse population based on the confessional model were combined with 
attempts to build a non-ethnic regime. The state support for increasing the public 
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visibility of “traditional” religious groups and curbing the public assertion of ethnic 
nationalisms reflect the contours of a new ethno-confessional regime in the country. 
Accordingly, Russian state authorities and post-Soviet ideologists sought to transform the 
country from a multiethnic federation into some sort of a “melting pot,” where along with 
legal uniformity the state is seeking to achieve a patriotic consensus based on supremacy 
of the state. 
How does this all explain the involvement of state authorities into Islamic affairs 
in Russia since the late 1990s? I suggest that the decision of secular authorities to 
cultivate a patriotic version of Islam through Muslim Spiritual Boards was in part guided 
by historical memories and experiences. Subordination of the Church by Peter the Great 
and institutionalization of Islam by Catherine the Great served as an historical precedent 
for establishment of a confessional collaboration model between secular state institutions 
and religious organizations. The vision of a strong sovereign state with a multi-
confessional patriotic society replaced the early post-Soviet Western liberal model, where 
religion was considered merely as an element of culture.  
Nevertheless, while speaking of “traditional Islam” as an important element 
construction of Russia’s post-Soviet identity, it is important to keep in mind that 
“traditional” religious organizations and the established clergy are not just tools of the 
state. Rather, they are themselves powerful social actors and institutions. If religious 
organizations withheld or even withdrew their support from the regime, the Russian state 
might find itself without an essential social base, and its moral claims would lose much of 
their power, thereby undermining the current patriotic consensus. 
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Arguably, an even more important aspect of the confessional mode of governance 
is its dependence on inter-faith peace and dialogue. Whether representatives of traditional 
religions agree on their respective roles and duties in the society will determine if Islam 
will be treated as an equal partner of Russian Orthodoxy or remain a local phenomenon 
that is relevant only in Muslim-majority republics. According to the rector of Moscow 
Islamic University Marat Murtazin, “the majority of the Muslim subjects of the 
federation will not find it to their liking to live under the Christian Orthodox banner and 
according to Christian Orthodox laws” (Murtazin 2000). This, according to him, would 
lead to nothing but Russia’s disintegration.385 
In part, in order to achieve this delicate balance, the state demands total 
subordination of the religious clergy to the secular regime. Ironically, in the long history 
of Islam in Russia, the Muslim faith has been able to prosper only under the secular rule 
and state protectorate. Under the clerical regime, with unchecked power of the Church, it 
faced massive purges. Under the anti-religious communist rule it suffered a devastating 
damage that brought it to the brink of extinction. Under passive secularism with high 
levels of religious freedom it was internally split into multiple competing factions.  
A major concern regarding complete subordination of the established clergy to the 
secular regime and the state’s reliance on “traditional” religious organizations in 
disciplining its Muslim population is that Islamic authorities may find it difficult to 
satisfy the demands of the population in an ever-changing Islamic landscape. Trying to 
put a straightjacket on Islamic interpretation may backfire and lead to stigmatization of 
“traditional” Islamic institutions. Although Russia’s Muslim community generally 
                                                        
385 Murtazin, Marat. "Muslims and Russia: war or peace?." Central Asia and the Caucasus 1 (2000): 133. 
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follows the established clergy, other interpretations of Islam exist and are popular among 
certain groups of Russia’s Muslims. One of the consequences of sharply limiting 
established clergy’s room for maneuver may result in the (re)emergence of a distinctive 
phenomenon of dvoeverie or “double faith.”386  
Finally, it is important to note there are some demands that most of Islamic 
groups in Russia share. Regardless of their doctrinal preferences, they all value order and 
justice. As a representative voice of “traditional Islam” in Russia, rector of the Moscow 
Islamic University Marat Murtazin claims, “The Muslims of Russia want law and order 
in their country … they want a government that would give them a chance to work and 
earn, and to ensure freedom of conscience.”387 Political Islamism, on the other hand, 
while challenging the hegemony of secular political and cultural norms, also places the 
issues of social justice, legitimate power, and ethical life at the center of their discourse 
(Buck-Morss 2003).388 As history demonstrates, when systematic problems emerge and 
state institutions weaken, ideational struggles revamp and the existing order is called into 
question. Russian post-Soviet history verifies this claim. Criticism of multiethnic 
ethnicity regime and norms of passive secularism, which dominated in the early 90s, rose 
along with mounting security threats to the regime and the economic turmoil. The next 
chapter will discuss structural factors and guiding ideologies that led to the shift of ethno-
confessional regimes in Russia in the late 1990s. 
                                                        
386 Dvoeverie is a name for bifurcation of religion into officially sponsored mainstream and an unofficial 
underground culture censored and persecuted by the state. This happened in Russia in the past as described 
in Slovo o Polku Igoreve (Igor’s Tale) written in the 12th century (existence of Christian and pagan 
elements). Similarly, the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 drove the Russian Orthodox Church 
underground as Marxism and atheism were established as the official creed of the Soviet state. 
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Ideologies, Security, and the Economy: Ideational and Structural Constraints on the 
Stability of Ethno-confessional Regimes in Russia, 1990-2012   
Losing an illusion makes you wiser than finding a truth.  
Ludwig Borne, 1840389 
No doubt Russia will not cease to be a great power. But it will be a normal great power 
Andrei Kozyrev, 1992390 
For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly to fight against. Quite the contrary, it is 
the source and guarantor of order, the initiator and the main driving force of any change.  




What explains the continuity and change of ethno-confessional regimes in post-
Soviet Russia? In the period since the Soviet collapse, the academic literature has referred 
to various theories and approaches, ranging from modernization and transitology to 
decolonization, state collapse and state rebuilding, in order to characterize the trajectory 
of post-communist transformations. Despite many important contributions that these 
studies have made to the scholarly knowledge about the institutional stability and change 
in Russia, few hypotheses have been tested for their ability to explain the transformation 
of ethno-confessional regimes in the country or interpreting the relationship between 
religious minorities and the state. Building upon the analysis of state-religion and 
ethnicity regimes in Russia between 1991 and 2012, this chapter will show that the 
persistence and change of ethno-confessional regimes in Russia were a result of 
ideological struggles and structural constraints. I argue that the emergence of a major 
security threat and economic turmoil in the 1990s have undermined the dominance of 
liberal principles that guided Russian state policies toward indigenous Muslims and Islam 
in the early post-Soviet years. Reassertion of a popular patriotic consensus around the 
idea of a strong state facilitated the rise of an alternative ideology that is based on 
Russia’s historical autocratic traditions. Economic stability, reinstatement of order, and 
strengthening of the rule of law in the 2000s largely explain the recurrence of what I call 
the “statist approach” toward managing the ethno-confessional diversity. 
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Introduction  
“Our goal is to establish a genuine civil society,” declared in 1992 Andrei 
Kozyrev, Russia’s first post-Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, calling to support the 
government’s efforts in promoting democracy and human rights (Kozyrev 1992a:288, 
Clunan 2009).392 Less than a decade later Vladimir Putin, as a prime-minister under the 
Yeltsin regime, reformulated the country’s objective by proposing that the Russian 
society “desires the restoration of the guiding and regulating role of the state” (Putin 
1999, Hill and Gaddy 2013).393 What went right and wrong in Russia during the 1990s 
remains a matter of academic debates and public speculation (Gans-Morse 2004, Trenin 
2006, Shevtsova 2007).394 Many commentators still debate whether institutional factors 
(Hale 2005, Ross 2011, Akturk 2012) or agency of powerful individuals better explains 
the political evolution in post-Soviet Russia (Hill and Gaddy 2013, Shevtsova 2007, 
Politkovskaya 2005, Steen 2004).395 What many observers agree upon is that important 
continuities and discontinuities became visible in state policies that regulated various 
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aspects of Russian domestic and foreign affairs.  
This chapter aims to explore some of the reasons that led to the shift of ethno-
confessional regimes in Russia. It will demonstrate that state policies toward indigenous 
Muslims and Islam between 1990 and 2012 were guided by ideological principles, factors 
that have been largely neglected in the study of post-Soviet transformations (Hanson 
2010).396 In doing so, the first part of the chapter will define the two dominant Russian 
ideologies of the post-Soviet era, namely ‘western liberalism’ and ‘statism.’ I will briefly 
review the intellectual roots of both philosophical traditions, their rise to prominence in 
post-Soviet era, and their perspectives on the role of Islam and Muslims in the country. I 
will argue that western liberalism and statism represent two different and consistent sets 
of ideas that guided state policies in the 1990s and early 2000s respectively. The second 
part of the chapter will focus on some of the structural factors that triggered the shift of 
ideologies. Relying on the premise that institutions are stable as long as nobody in power 
has incentives to change them, I will demonstrate how the emergence of a security threat 
and economic turmoil prompted the transition from liberalism to statism toward the end 
of the 1990s. The conclusion will summarize theoretical findings and reassess ideological 
debates in Russia in the context of the post-Soviet identity crisis. 
   
Part I: Ideologies, Islam, and Russia’s Search for a National Identity 
The question of national identity has become one of the central themes in the 
analysis of post-communist Russian politics and society. Soon after the Soviet collapse, 
                                                        
396 Hanson, Stephen E. Post-imperial democracies: ideology and party formation in third republic France, 
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many Russian intellectuals and politicians as well as Western observers and scholars 
pointed out that Russia was facing an identity crisis (Tsygankov 2006a, 2007; Suny 2007; 
Evans 2008:899).397 Commentators presented multiple competing frameworks for the 
analysis of Russia’s domestic as well as its foreign policy choices (Tolz 1998, 2001; 
Hopf 2006, p. 700; Legvold 2007).398 Many intellectuals were relying on old concepts to 
describe the new polity. Whereas others attempted to develop new approaches (Tolz 
1998:994; Sakwa 2008; Kucas 2009).399 As a result, a wide spectrum of competing ideas 
claimed that Russia was guided by a set of principles ranging from “secular liberal 
Westernism” to “Christian conservatism”, “Orthodox Imperialism,” and “Eurasianism” 
(Agardjanian 2000).400 Andrei Tsygankov, a scholar of Russian politics and history, for 
example, referred to the pre-revolutionary philosophical debates between the late 19th 
early 20th century Russian thinkers such as Nikolai Danilevsky, Vasilii Klyuchevsky, 
Nikolai Berdyaev, Georgii Fedotov, Ivan Ilin, and Vladimir Solovyev, to explain post-
Soviet Russian decision-making (Tsygankov 2007).401 For Tsygankov, Westernizers and 
Eurasianists represent ‘polar opposites’ on the question of Russian identity (Tsygankov 
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2007: 381). On the other hand, Valerii Tishkov, director of the Institute of Ethnology and 
Anthropology as well as former Minister of Nationalities, proposed a relatively new 
framework to define the nation based on Western scholarship on ethnicity and 
nationalism led by Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, and Benedict Anderson. He 
suggested the concept of a civic nation, which for him was a community of all citizens of 
the Russian Federation regardless of their cultural, ethnic, or religious differences. 
Tishkov advocated for the use of the word Rossiyane rather than Russkie to emphasize 
the difference between civic and ethnic characteristics (Tishkov 1996, 2009a, 2009b, 
2009c).402 
How did indigenous Muslims and their religion fit into the range of proposed 
post-Soviet definitions for Russian national identity? The five major interpretations about 
the country and its people that were put forward in intellectual debates offer a clear 
perspective on the role of non-Russian minorities in the society (Tolz 1998). Thus, 
according to Vera Tolz, a Union identity implies portrayal of a nation as a multiethnic 
community with decades and sometimes centuries of shared history within the territorial 
borders of the Soviet Union. Based on the ideas of Danilevsky, Il’in, Fedotov, and 
Solovyev, this perspective suggests that indigenous Muslims are members of a new 
cosmopolitan Eurasian nation (Evraziiskaia natsiia), which emerged as a result of a long 
period of coexistence of the peoples of Slavonic, Tatar-Turkic, Finno-Ugric, and even 
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Mongolian origin.403  
A second interpretation of Russia as a nation of eastern Slavs, united by common 
origin and culture, focuses on ethno-cultural similarities as the main markers of national 
identity. Based on the 19th-century Russian historiography, this perspective entails that 
Ukrainians and Belarusians are included into the Russian nation (Klyuchevsky, 
Solzhenitsyn).404 Ethnic Muslims, on the other hand, are excluded because of the lack of 
ethno-linguistic similarities and different historical origins. Moreover, Muslims, 
according to this view, are partly responsible for dispersion of the historical Slavic union 
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of Vasily Klyuchevsky, see Boris Mironov, “Klyuchevsky, Vasily Osipovich” in Millar, James R. 
(Ed.) Encyclopedia of Russian history. Thomson Gale, 2004. 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn (1918-2008), a Nobel Laureate for Literature, one of the most prominent Soviet 
dissidents of the late 1960s and early 1970s. While most Soviet dissidents focused on the need for basic 
human rights, by the early 1970s Solzhenitsyn began to focus on the issue of morality. He believed that the 
Russian people could only be saved by a rejection of Bolshevik ideas and the resurrection of what he 
considered a unique set of moral values developed in Russia over centuries under the influence of Orthodox 
Christianity. He looked to pre-Revolutionary Russia for guidance, not to the West. For a brief introduction 
to the life and works of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, see Brian Kassof, “Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isayevich” in 
Millar, James R. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Russian history. Thomson Gale, 2004. 
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during the Tatar-Mongol yoke in the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries. 
Defining post-Soviet Russia as a community of Russian-language speakers points 
out the importance of a shared language. According to this view, the Russian language 
could unite different people, regardless of their ethnic origin, and make them an 
inseparable part of the Russian nation (Pushkin, Mendeleev). Therefore, not only some 
25 million ethnic Russians who were left outside the Russian Federation after the Soviet 
break up, but also those who considered Russian their mother tongue were proclaimed by 
some intellectuals to be part of the Russian nation (Galenko). Ethnic Muslims, according 
to this view, could well “qualify” for membership in such community. However, relying 
on the Slavophile school of thought, some advocates of this perspective sometimes assert 
Orthodox Christianity as a marker of national identity (Rogozin 1996).405 Therefore, in 
this kind of outlook, indigenous Muslims who speak Russian are viewed as marginal.406  
Some commentators have suggested a racial definition of Russian nationhood, 
according to which blood ties constitute the basis of common identity. Manifested in the 
theories of extreme right-wing anti-Semitic ideologists, this view defined the nation as a 
biological phenomenon (Gumilev, Borodai). According to this perspective, membership 
in the new polity was reserved solely for “biological” Russians, who suffered most 
throughout the Soviet era. Some were alarmed by the demographic trends and severe 
problems of alcoholism that undermined the majority status of Russians in the country. 
Others perceived non-Russians and particularly Muslims as a direct threat to the Russian 
population (Fetisov). Tolz suggests that the pictures by the dissident writer Aleksandr 
                                                        
405 Rogozin, D. Russkii Otvet (St. Petersburg 1996). 
406 For discussion of the role of Orthodoxy in post-Soviet Russian national identity, see Agardjanian 
2001and Wozniuk 1997.  
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Zinovyev, “depicting Moscow with minarets and Soviet leaders with distinct Central 
Asian appearance on Lenin’s Mausoleum during the parade to mark the October 
revolution, were the reflection of this fear” (Tolz 1998:1003). Several other public 
activists went as far as to call for banning of mixed marriages (Barkashov), introduction 
of proportional representation in elections and other restrictions against the Muslims, and 
even deportation of Muslims from Russia (Lysenko).407 
Finally, under the influence of Western experience and theories of nationalism, a 
conception of a civic nation has also been proposed. Accordingly, members of the 
political community would be united primarily by loyalty to newly emerging political 
institutions and to the constitution.408 This notion, which implies that citizenship is 
granted regardless of people’s ethnic or cultural background, entered Soviet/Russian 
discourse on nations and nationalism only in the late 1980s (Tishkov 1989, Tolz 
1998:1005).409 Thanks to the process of naturalization, according to this view, national 
identity could be a matter of personal choice. Valerii Tishkov, who was the main 
advocate of a civic definition of a nation, argued that a new Russian nation could be 
formed through the efforts of politicians and intellectuals. The word Rossiyanin would be 
applied equally to all citizens of the federation regardless of their cultural and religious 
                                                        
407 See Tolz 1998 for further details. 
408 See the dissertation glossary for definitions of key terms – “civic nationalism” and “ethnic nationalism.” 
Ethnic nationalism is a type of nationalism based on a belief in the ethnic purity of the nation or in unity of 
language, religion, or culture. Civic nationalism is a type of nationalism based on a belief in common 
citizenship in a state embracing a specified territory and common allegiance to the institutions governing 
that territory. For further discussion of differences between civic and ethnic nationalisms, see Brubaker, 
Rogers. "The Manichean myth: Rethinking the distinction between 'civic' and' ethnic' nationalism." In 
Kriesi et al (eds.) Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective. Zurich: Ruegger, 
1999. Pp. 55-71. Also see, Yack, Bernard. "The myth of the civic nation." Critical Review 10.2 (1996): 
193-211. For him, ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism are not dichotomous. Rather they are two 
extremes on a spectrum of nationalisms that mix ethnic values and opportunities for outsiders to become 
members in varying proportions. 
409 Tishkov, V. “O novykh podkhodakh v teorii I praktike mazhnatsional’nykh otnoshenii,” Sovetskaia 
Etnografiya, 1989, 5. 
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differences.  
With a varying degree of articulation and popularity, all of these views of Russian 
national identity (and several variations) became a subject of considerable debate 
throughout the first two post-Soviet decades. Advocates of these frameworks would 
repeatedly come up with arguments in favor of their own vision of the country’s future 
during the heated discussions about migration, wars in the Caucasus, interethnic tensions, 
and religious extremism. Two decades after the Soviet collapse, many questions related 
to Russia’s national identity still have not been resolved. However, predominant 
tendencies could be observed in how state officials approached questions related to ethnic 
and religious affairs in the 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, despite major disagreements 
between various opinion holders, the state maintained a largely laissez faire attitude 
toward ethnic and religious expression in the 1990s. In contrast, state policies became 
much more regulatory in the 2000s. 
This chapter argues that a commitment of ruling elites to liberal principles largely 
explains some of the policy choices that Russian state authorities made in the early 1990s 
to manage its diverse population. Movement toward a statist doctrine in the late 1990s, on 
the other hand, accounts for introduction of regulatory measures to govern the country’s 
heterogeneous society. The following section will explore liberalism and statism as two 
separate sets of consistent and to a certain degree emotionally charged ideas that provided 
a relatively coherent perspective on the future of the country and were articulated in the 
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official discourse at the federal level.410 
 
1. Western Liberalism 
Many observers of Russian politics as well as Russian politicians themselves 
often deny the existence of consistent ideologies in the post-Soviet era (Hanson 2010).411 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to ignore how relatively coherent and consistent sets of ideas 
expressed at the highest levels of government have had major effects on daily life 
activities of the Russian people. As Kathryn Sikkink has pointed out, this kind of denial 
resembles the paradox that scholars who spend their lives developing, disseminating, and 
defending their own theories insist that ideas have no systematic social impact (Sikkink 
1991).412 Having rejected Marxism-Leninism, the new ruling elite in Russia suggested 
that there was no viable systematic alternative to Western liberalism, thus in one way 
confirming the argument that history had eventually reached its final destination 
(Fukuyama 1989).413 Russia, for them, was on its way to “reintegrate into the mainstream 
of human development” and was following a logical path towards becoming a “normal 
country” (Kozyrev 1992a, 1992b, Shleifer and Treisman 2004, Shleifer 2005).414  
                                                        
410 According to Evans, the term ‘ideology’ pertains to a system or collection of ideas, which should 
include direct political content, motivate substantial numbers of people to action, and display some degree 
of coherence (Evans 2008:900). For my definition of the term, see chapter one and refer to the dissertation 
glossary. 
411 Hanson, Stephen E. Post-imperial democracies: ideology and party formation in third republic France, 
Weimar Germany, and post-Soviet Russia. Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
412 Sikkink, Kathryn. Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Argentina and Brazil. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press,1991. 
413 Fukuyama, Francis, and Allan Bloom. The end of history?. Vol. 16. National Affairs, Incorporated, 
1989. 
For a discussion of how Russian intellectuals perceived Fukuyama’s thesis, see Tsygankov, Andrei P. 
"Rediscovering National Interests after the “End of History”: Fukuyama, Russian Intellectuals, and a Post-
Cold War Order." International Politics 39.4 (2002): 423-446. According to Tsygankov, many intellectuals 
in Russia were in fact highly skeptical about the applicability of Fukuyama’s thesis to Russia. 
414 Kozyrev, Andrei V. "Russia and Human Rights." Slavic Review (1992a): 287-293. 
Kozyrev, Andrei. "Russia: a chance for survival." Foreign Affairs (1992b): 1-16 
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At nearly all stages of Russia’s modern history, the search to define the ‘us’ and 
the ‘other’ of the Russian state “has remained a priority for Russian political and 
intellectual elites” (Tolz 2004: 177).415 This statement has been especially relevant to 
Russia’s self-identification with respect to the West. Referring to Tsygankov, Evans 
argues that since Peter the Great Russia’s rulers have faced a dilemma in relation to the 
more modernized societies of Western Europe: “whether to emulate the example of the 
West in order to advance their country’s development or to preserve Russia’s separate 
values and customs at the risk of denying it the capacity to compete with Europe” (Evans 
2008:899).416 Disagreements about how to respond to that dilemma flared up in one 
period after another. As Angela Stent has described it, the feelings of the Russian 
intelligentsia towards the West have been guided by impulses of both attraction and 
aversion (Stent 2007).417 
In the early post-Soviet years many Russian decision-makers seemed to have 
taken a clear and steady hold on the issue of Westernization and democratization. In his 
early commentaries as Russia’s Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev identified the issue of 
human rights as a critical matter and emphasized that Russia made a “conscious and 
irrevocable choice,” which in his opinion was inevitable (Kozyrev 1992a:287).418 He 
described the policies of President Yeltsin and the Russian government as an effort to 
                                                        
Shleifer, Andrei. A normal country: Russia after communism. Harvard University Press, 2005. 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Treisman. "A Normal Country." Foreign Affairs (2004): 20-38. 
415 Tolz, Vera (2004) “The Search for a National Identity in the Russia of Yeltsin and Putin,” in Yitzhak 
Brudny , Stefani Hoffman and Jonathan Frankel (eds) Restructuring Post-Communist 
Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
416 For details, see Tsygankov, A. (2007) ‘Finding a Civilisational Idea: ‘‘West’’, ‘‘Eurasia’’, and ‘‘Euro-
East’’ in Russia’s Foreign Policy’, Geopolitics, 12, 3, July. 
Evans Jr, Alfred B. "Putin's legacy and Russia's identity." Europe-Asia Studies60.6 (2008): 899-912. 
417 Stent, A. (2007) ‘Reluctant Europeans: Three Centuries of Russian Ambivalence toward the West’, in 
Legvold, R. (ed.) (2007). 
418 Kozyrev, Andrei V. "Russia and Human Rights." Slavic Review (1992a): 287-293. 
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make the turn toward democracy irreversible and called to support a new generation of 
democratic rulers in the country (Kozyrev 1992b:6).419 More broadly, liberals contended 
that, during the Cold War, the USSR acted against Russia’s interests. The country now 
had to do everything to become an integral part of the West, because it proved to be the 
only viable and progressive civilization in the world. As Tsygankov has described it, the 
perception was that only by incorporating Western institutions and by joining the 
community of “Western civilized nations” would Russia be able to respond to threats and 
overcome its economic and political backwardness (Tsygankov 2002).420 
 
1.1 – Intellectual roots of Russian liberalism 
As it often happens in social sciences, it is difficult to decide on a starting point 
that will satisfy everyone. Depending on how one defines liberalism in the Russian 
context, its philosophical roots go back to the late 18th century.421 Alexander Radishchev 
(1749-1802), a well-educated and widely traveled Russian nobleman, is often referred to 
as an early figure in the history of Russian liberalism (Phillips 2004).422 His book A 
Journey from Petersburg to Moscow (1790) is regarded as the first work that revealed the 
dark side of Russian serfdom. For his writings Radishchev was deported to Siberia. 
However, the author’s uneasy fate served as an inspiration to liberals for decades to come 
(Phillips 2004).  
                                                        
419 Kozyrev, Andrei. "Russia: a chance for survival." Foreign Affairs (1992b): 1-16 
420 Tsygankov, Andrei P. "Rediscovering National Interests after the “End of History”: Fukuyama, Russian 
Intellectuals, and a Post-Cold War Order."International Politics 39.4 (2002): 423-446. 
421 Refer to the dissertation glossary for definition of liberalism. In the context of this study, liberalism 
refers to an ideology that focuses on the promotion of human rights, civil liberties, market economy, and 
democratic government broadly defined. While liberalism has indigenous intellectual history in Russia, it 
borrows heavily from the Western philosophical tradition and experience. 
422 Phillips, Hugh, “Liberalism” in James Millar, James Encyclopedia of Russian history. Thomson Gale, 
2004. 
  201 
Since the early 19th century, a group known as Westernizers contributed to the 
development of liberal ideas that later became the reference for post-Soviet reformers. 
Thus, in the mid-19th century Timofei Granovsky and Boris Chicherin were among the 
first Russian thinkers who systematically explored the theme of personal liberties and 
their protection by the law. During the reign of Alexander II (1855-1881), Ivan 
Petrunkevich brought up the topics of resisting a terror from above and guaranteeing 
basic civil rights. By the early 20th century such ideas had spread far enough that liberals 
established their own journal (Liberation), an organization (The Union of Liberation), 
and a political party (Constitutional Democrats) (Phillips 2004). Individual liberals like 
Pyotr Struve achieved national prominence in the years after 1905. Among other things, 
Struve called for widening of civil liberties and the establishment of a constitutional 
monarchy. Another public intellectual and historian, Pavel Milyukov, emphasized the 
need to abolish the autocracy and the right to basic civil liberties.  
Calls for human freedom under the Soviet regime were thoroughly suppressed. 
Nevertheless, largely due to individual efforts of people like Andrei Sakharov the rhetoric 
about human rights and civil liberties reached the perestroika generation and was crucial 
in shaping the post-Soviet order.423   
A great deal of overlap has historically existed between Russian liberals and 
Westernizers. In the best traditions of liberalism, Westernizers denounced serfdom and 
                                                        
423 For more on the history of liberalism in Russia, see Fischer, George. (1958). Russian Liberalism: From 
Gentry to Intelligentsia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Hamburg, Gary. (1992). Boris 
Chicherin and Early Russian Liberalism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; Roosevelt, Patricia. 
(1986). Apostle of Russian Liberalism: Timofei Granovsky. Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners; 
Stockdale, Melissa K. (1996). Paul Miliukov and the Quest for a Liberal Russia, 1880–1918. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press; Timberlake, Charles, ed. (1972). Essays on Russian Liberalism. Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press; Walicki, Andrzej. (1986). Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism. Oxford: 
Clarendon. 
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put forward plans for its abolition. They criticized censorship, the absence of legal rights, 
and persecutions on ethnic and religious grounds. Instead, Westernizers advocated civil 
rights, democracy, and representative government. In doing so, however, unlike liberal 
Slavophiles, Westernizers regarded the West as point of reference. In particular, they 
contrasted the Russian autocratic system with the constitutional orders of western 
European countries, especially those of England and France (Mironov 2004). In part, 
according to Mironov, they did so because philosophical views of Russian Westernizers 
were largely formed under the influence of Western enlightenment thinkers and 
philosophers such as Georg Hegel, Johann Herder, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schelling, 
Johann Fichte, and Auguste Comte. Classical Westernizers perceived the flow of history 
as a process of irreversible qualitative changes from worse to better and recognized the 
leading role of human intellect, which leads societies to the progress (Mironov 2004).424 
Arguably, this is a strongest link that unites the late Soviet-era reformers and post-
communist state-builders in Russia with their pre-revolutionary intellectual predecessors 
(Tolz 1998).425 
According to careful observers of Russian politics, during the last years of the 
Soviet state, Mikhail Gorbachev looked on Western Europe as providing the model for a 
new system (Stent 2007). Not only he attempted to Westernize Soviet political and 
                                                        
424 Mironov, Boris, “Westernizers” in James Millar, James Encyclopedia of Russian history. Thomson 
Gale, 2004. 
425 For more on the history of Westernism in Russia, see Edie, James M.; Scanlan, M. P.; and Zeldin, Mary-
Barbara, eds. (1965). Russian Philosophy, Vol 1: The Beginnings of Russian Philosophy: The Slavophiles; 
The Westernizers. Chicago: Quadrangle Books; Treadgold, Donald. W. (1973). The West in Russia and 
China: Religious and Secular Thought in Modern Times, Vol. 1: Russia, 1472–1917. New York: 
Cambridge University Press; Walicki, Andrzej. (1975). The Slavophile Controversy: History of a 
Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought, tr. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka. Oxford: 
Clarendon; Walicki, Andrzej. (1979). A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism, 
tr. Hilda Andrews Rusiecka. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
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economic institutions, Gorbachev also wanted the country to be accepted as part of the 
‘common European home’, where all shared a commitment to democracy and individual 
rights. The liberal elite that came to power after the Soviet collapse attempted to surpass 
Gorbachev in adopting the image of Westernizers. According to Evans, although in 
practice Yeltsin’s policies were deeply inconsistent, in theory his program of change 
“was justified as bringing features of Western democracy and capitalism to Russia” 
(Evans 2008:901) 
A highly favorable image of Western democratic patterns, including religious 
pluralism, inspired the late Soviet-era leadership to reform their policies toward 
religion.426 According to Agadjanian, it was actually the American model of religious 
freedom that encouraged Soviet reformers to adopt the 1990 law on freedom of 
conscience (Agadjanian 2001:480). At the same time, Soviet reformers wanted to make 
sure that the state preserved its secular nature. Because as a way of thinking, Russian 
Westernism was based on the recognition of the leading role of human intellect, some of 
the leading figures of this philosophy believed that religion could potentially hinder the 
humanity’s advancement toward higher levels of existence. As Agadjanian has described 
it, “Orthodoxy was at that time virtually ignored in the new ‘formula of identity’” 
(Agadjanian 2000:108). For him, this trend formed part of the legacy of the 
Constitutional Democratic Party dating from the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Secularizing influence of the 1960s intelligentsia, shaped by Soviet atheism and 
                                                        
426 For discussion of why foreign observers – journalists and human rights activists as well as political and 
religious leaders – watched the celebration of the millennium of the Christianization of Kievan Rus’ as a 
litmus test for the sincerity of Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms, see Smolkin-Rothrock, V. A Sacred Space 
Is Never Empty: The Spiritual Life of Soviet Atheism (forthcoming). 
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generated by the thaw of the Khrushchev era, contributed to this line of thinking. 
According to Smolkin-Rothrock, Gorbachev’s motives might have indeed been political. 
She suggests that Gorbachev could have met with Patriarch Pimen on the eve of 
celebrations of the Millennium in 1988 in order to “harness the moral capital of 
Orthodoxy to recapture popular support for his failing reform program.”427 The following 
section will discuss how these attitudes toward religion were reflected in state policies 
toward Islam and Muslims in post-Soviet Russia. 
 
1.2 – Liberalism and Islam in Post-Soviet Russia 
The decision to rely on the norms of both passive secularism and multiethnic 
ethnicity regime to manage the country’s diverse population, which included a sizable 
portion of Muslims, reflects some of the key principles of Westernist liberal philosophy 
that permeated the thinking of the late Soviet era reformers and architects of post-
communist Russia. Debates during the drafting of the 1990 law on religion, holding back 
from interfering into the process of decentralization of Muslim Spiritual Boards, and 
tolerating the emergence of Islamic political movements and parties best describes the 
attitude of state authorities toward Islamic affairs until the late 1990s.428 In order to 
address the emerging identity questions institutionally, state authorities resorted to the 
                                                        
427 Smolkin-Rothrock, V. A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: The Spiritual Life of Soviet Atheism 
(forthcoming). Also, see Agadjanian, Alexander, “Religious Pluralism and National Identity in Russia” 
International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS) Vol. 2, No. 2, 2000. Pp.97-125 and Agadjanian, 
Alexander. "Revising Pandora's gifts: religious and national identity in the post-Soviet societal 
fabric." Europe-Asia Studies 53.3 (2001): 473-488. According to Agadjanian the mention of religion at the 
time was in order to affirm the “universal values of democracy.”  
428 For the detailed analysis of the process of disintegration of Muslim Spiritual Boards in post-Soviet 
Russia, see Silantyev, R. The contemporary history of Islam in Russia. Moscow: Algoritm. 2007. 
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asymmetric model of federalism.429  
Arguments and principles of Western liberalism were at the center of debates 
during the drafting of the 1990 law on religion and the 1993 constitution of the Russian 
Federation. Analysis of those debates reveals that secular state authorities deliberately 
precluded religion from taking part in the new “formula of identity” (Agardjanian 
2000:110). The negligence of state authorities to involve Islam in the construction of a 
new national identity in Russia can clearly be seen from the fact that neither of major 
Islamic leaders at the time was systematically involved in the process of drafting the 1990 
law. In fact, it was a representative of the Orthodox Church who called for more 
inclusionary format of the meetings that discussed a new religious legislation.430  
Secondly, despite the growing popular concern over mounting intra-faith disputes 
within Russia’s indigenous Muslim community, secular state authorities at the federal 
level did not involve in the Islamic affairs. Instead, they resorted to the self-regulating 
principle of the religious marketplace.431 Thus, for example, when Makhmud Gekkiev, 
the Soviet-era Mufti of the Muslim Spiritual Board in the Northern Caucasus, appealed to 
the secular authorities to support him during the popular uprising against the Muftiyat, 
the state did not back him (Silantyrv 2008:290). This was an early indication that the state 
would provide equal access for all Islamic communities to the Russian public sphere. 
                                                        
429 Some regional authorities have indeed skillfully used ethnic and religious identity arguments in 
constructing the post-Soviet relations between the federal center and the regions. For discussion of the 
asymmetric nature of Russian federalism, see Lapidus, Gail W. "Asymmetrical federalism and state 
breakdown in Russia."Post-Soviet Affairs 15.1 (1999): 74-82. Also see Ross, Cameron. "Federalism and 
democratization in Russia." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 33.4 (2000): 403-420. 
430 For details and the transcripts of the meeting at Kommunist, see Kommunist, N3 (1355) February 1990 
and Svobodnaya Mysl’, N2 (1609) 2010, pp.125-145. 
431 For the detailed analysis of the process of disintegration of Muslim Spiritual Boards in post-Soviet 
Russia, see Silantyev, R. The contemporary history of Islam in Russia. Moscow: Algoritm. 2007. 
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Indeed, the 1990 law on religion did not require religious communities to have 
institutional affiliation with central Muslim Spiritual Boards in order to perform religious 
services, did not specify limitations related to the citizenship or the background of 
Islamic preachers, and allowed construction of mosques for all who could afford it. Later, 
when radical Islamic groups gained a foothold in some of the Russian regions, the 
established clergy demanded that the secular authorities legally ban some interpretations 
of Islam in the country (Silantyev 2008). At the federal level, these calls went 
unanswered. State authorities in Moscow remained committed to the legal pluralistic 
framework and the 'spiritual/religious marketplace' that was established by the 1990 law 
on religion.  
Moreover, inspired by high standards of liberalism, architects of post-Soviet 
Russia created a system that tolerated religious movements and parties. Thus, over the 
first several years of political pluralism a few Islamic parties emerged on the Russian 
political scene. Some of the most prominent examples were the Russian Party of Islamic 
Revival, Union of Russia’s Muslims, “Nur,” “Refakh,” and “Madzhlis.”432 Until 2001, 
the law did not prevent activists from establishing parties based on ethnicity or religious 
affiliation.433   
In letting the religious marketplace thrive, the state authorities, nevertheless, 
possessed a mechanism that was intended to manage diversity. This mechanism was 
                                                        
432 Among these movements only “Nur” took part in the 1995 parliamentary elections independently, 
barely winning 0.5% of the votes. Others with a variety degree of success entered into coalition with other 
secular parties of Russia. For details, see Silantyev 2008. 
433 The intent, of course, was not to allow the emergence of anti-pluralist parties. Rather, such parties would 
ideally be committed to pluralism but embrace religious values as guiding principles. An example for such 
political entities in the West could be the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU). While CDU 
openly emphasizes the Christian understanding of humans and their responsibility toward God, its 
membership consists of people adhering to a variety of religions as well as non-religious individuals.  
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asymmetric federalism. Authorities did so because the overwhelming perception at the 
time was that the resurgence of religious identity was part of a broader revival of ethnic 
identity. 
Overall, according to Agardjanian, from the start of perestroika, and in particular 
following the official celebrations of the Christian Millennium in Russia (1988), religion 
“figured in liberal, anti-communist rhetoric as a symbolic alternative opening the way to 
a rediscovery of universal values” (Agardjanian 2000:105). Up to then quite irrespective 
of creed or affiliation, in this context, religion, including Islam, contributed to 
construction of a certain democratic myth, which, in the Westernist thinking, presupposed 
a secular social model and absolute religious pluralism.  
 
2. Statism  
In 1996, Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin declared the urgent need for creation of 
a new national idea. This was the formal acknowledgement that emulating the Western 
experience and the attempt to build a state according to liberal principles had ultimately 
failed. The committee that the President established for drafting a new Russian Idea did 
not succeed in producing an all-embracing notion of a nation. At its best, it could come 
up with a report entitled “Russia in Search of an Idea,” which elaborated on challenges of 
such a task. The debate carried on as policymakers, intellectuals, and the general public 
pondered upon the issue and discussed it in detail.434 The question whether Russia has 
finally arrived at a consensus about its unifying national idea may still be a subject of a 
                                                        
434 Particularly notable are the ideas put forward by Igor Chubais in his Ot Russkoi idei k idee novoi Rossii 
(From the Russian idea to the idea of a new Russia) and at the hearings of Duma’s Committee on 
Geopolitics. For a brief summary of the debates, see Hill, Fiona, and Clifford G. Gaddy. Mr. Putin: 
operative in the Kremlin. Brookings Institution Press, 2013. 
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debate. However, many commentators recognize that since the late 1990s the official 
rhetoric has significantly changed (Tsygankov 2002, Hill and Gaddy 2013). Instead of 
continuous references to the Western experience and principles of liberalism, themes 
such as patriotism, restoration of order, and primacy of the state have come to 
prominence. 
According to Tsygankov, the change in Russia’s discourse became visible around 
the time when chief of foreign intelligence service, Yevgeni Primakov, also known as the 
father of contemporary Russian statism, replaced Andrei Kozyrev at the office in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1996 (Tsygankov 2002:444). Since the second half of the 
1990s notions such as “national idea,” “great power,” “Eurasia,” and “geopolitics” have 
reemerged in the Russian public debates. These notions, according to Tsygankov, framed 
the debate about statism, which implies that Russia is not merely part of the West, but has 
its own unique interests to defend. Synthesizing both liberal and autocratic principles, 
contemporary statism maintains that Russia is an independent civilization and should be 
maintained as such. As Tsygankov has put it, for statists “establishing a market 
democracy was not a goal in itself, but something that should be subordinated to the 
building of a strong state” (Tsygankov 2002:435).435  
In this respect Yetsin’s poslaniye, an annual presidential message to the Russian 
parliament, in 1997 is exemplary. The address emphasized the importance of restoring 
order in the country and outlined the means of strengthening state capacity. The President 
                                                        
435 For a more detailed analysis of statism, see Oleg Kovalev, “Russian ‘Realism’: Theory and Policy 
Preferences,” Ph.D. dissertation (University of Delaware, 1997). Also, see various documents of SVOP 
(Council for Foreign and Defense Policy), an influential nongovernmental organization that was established 
with the purpose of challenging the liberal political philosophy associated with deputy prime-minister 
Yegor Gaidar and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. 
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identified the excessive weakness of state authority (vlast’) as the greatest danger facing 
Russia at the time. As Yeltsin put it, “Only a strong government authority which makes 
reasonable decisions and is capable of ensuring their effective implementation is in a 
condition for fulfilling its obligations.”436 According to Hill and Gaddy, the poslaniye 
was one of the key documents that highlighted the issue of state power and authority (Hill 
and Gaddy 2013:47). This theme would shape the official rhetoric in the 2000s. Analysis 
of President Putin’s several major public statements during his tenure in the Kremlin 
suggests that getting Russia’s peoples to unite around the idea of a strong state soon 
became one of the central goals of the country’s leadership.437 
The role of religion in the state’s new official rhetoric has acquired a particularly 
eminent position. As Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy pointed out, religion along with 
Russian history and language became “the core elements in Russian conservative 
political thought” in the 2000s (Hill and Gaddy 2013:44). In January 1997, the first 
public appeal was made for the reestablishment of Orthodoxy as an official ideology and 
the essential core of the Russian idea.438 Church representatives increasingly spoke about 
Orthodoxy as the central element of the Russian Idea and of religion’s ability to fill the 
spiritual and ideological vacuum in Russian society. In contrast to the Western liberal 
approach, which was largely indifferent to religion, the new approach of the state implied 
treatment of religion as its junior partner subordinated to the secular authorities.   
 
                                                        
436 “Poslaniye Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii Federal’nomu Sobraniyu. Poryadok vo vlasti – poryadok v 
strane.” March 5, 1997. Cited in Hill, Fiona, and Clifford G. Gaddy. Mr. Putin: operative in the Kremlin. 
Brookings Institution Press, 2013. 
437 See, for example, “Pis’mennoe interv’yu vyetnamskoi gazette ‘Nyan Zan’.” February 27, 2001. 
438 Meeting of the Russian Orthodox Church representatives with the Ministry of Interior. For details, see 
Hill, Fiona, and Clifford G. Gaddy. Mr. Putin: operative in the Kremlin. Brookings Institution Press, 2013.  
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2.1 – Historical and intellectual roots of statism 
The conception of Russian statism (gosudarstvennichestvo) is an historical notion 
deeply rooted in the idea of Russia as an independent sovereign state (derzhava). Some 
observers of Russian history and politics interpret the attempts to resurrect the country’s 
national greatness in the 21st century as a return to Soviet-style imperialism (Lucas 
2014).439 Some argue that “the search for useful history” in Russia goes back to the mid-
19th century doctrine based on the trinity of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality” (Hill 
and Gaddy 2013). Many more date the search to the Time of Troubles, the conquest of 
Kazan, or even Christianization of Kievan Rus in the 10th century (Petersson 2013, 
Romaniello 2007, Dubin 2014).440 However, most of those who are especially interested 
in the dynamics of state-religion relations in Russia, see the legacy of Peter the Great and 
Catherine II as a key element in the continuity of state-society relations from past to 
present.  
Indeed, understanding the legacy of Peter I and Catherine II is the first step to 
grasp the role of religion in the ideology of statism that became the dominant school of 
thinking in the early 21st century Russia. Historically speaking, it was Peter the Great 
who subordinated religion to the power and authority of the state in Russia. In 1721 he 
abolished the patriarchate and, to replace it, appointed a collegial board of bishops, the 
Holy Synod, which was subject to civil authority and similar in both structure and status 
                                                        
439 Lucas, Edward. The new Cold War: Putin's Russia and the threat to the West. Macmillan, 2014. 
440 Petersson, Bo. "The eternal great power meets the recurring times of troubles: twin political myths in 
contemporary Russian politics." European Studies: A Journal of European Culture, History and 
Politics 30.1 (2013): 301-326; Romaniello, Matthew P. "Mission Delayed: The Russian Orthodox Church 
after the Conquest of Kazan'." Church History (2007): 511-540; Dubin, Boris. "The ROC: The Church as a 
Symbol of Desired Wholeness."Russian Politics & Law 52.5 (2014): 73-86. 
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to other departments of the state (Knox 2004).441  Catherine the Great (1762-1796) 
continued Peter’s line of reforms by confiscating the church’s properties and subjecting it 
administratively to the state.442 Moreover, the Empress created a basis for loyalty to the 
Russian state among the Empire’s Muslims by introducing an organizational structure for 
Islam under the name of Muslim Spiritual Assembly. Ever since, the state has been the 
main regulator of public religious life in Russia and an arbiter in communal conflicts. 
Intellectually, proponents of restoring order and state capacity in post-Soviet 
Russia largely relied on the arguments raised by philosophical opponents of Westernism 
in the 19th century. However, rather than banking solely on classical Slavophile thought 
(I. Kiriyevsky, A. Khomyakov) in their reasoning, post-Soviet statists have been able to 
find a middle ground between nationalists (F. Dostoyevsky, K. Leontiev), adherents of 
the Eurasianist movement of the 1920s (P. Savitsky, N. Trubetskoy), and even 
accommodate views of some advocates of liberal-conservatism (B. Chicherin, N. 
Berdyayev, S. Frank).443 With nationalists statists shared some elements of the idea of 
Slav Orthodox unity, with direct references to the views of Tyutchev and Dostoyevsky 
(Agardjanian 2000:112).444 For example, Solzhenitsyn’s thesis on the natural union of the 
“three fraternal peoples” (Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians) was partially 
accommodated in signing the “Treaty on the Union between Belarus and Russia” in April 
                                                        
441 Knox, Zoe. “Episcopate” in James Millar, James Encyclopedia of Russian history. Thomson Gale, 2004. 
442 A (lay) over-procurator was empowered to supervise the church, appointing important officials and 
directing the activities of the Holy Synod. See Knox, Zoe. “Episcopate” in James Millar, 
James Encyclopedia of Russian history. Thomson Gale, 2004. 
443 For a brief review of these schools of thought, see Agardjanian 2000:102. 
444 In particular, Agardjanian points out the impact of this idea on public opinion after the war in Bosnia 
and Kosovo (Agardjanian 2000:112). According to this view, Orthodoxy is seen as a key expression of 
Russianness. Statists saw the role of the state in strengthening these reciprocal links. 
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1997.445   
Along with Eurasianists, statists share the idea of a spiritual proximity between 
Orthodoxy and Islam and in this respect see Russia as a unique nation being able to 
connect Muslim and Western civilizations (V. Polosin). For example, Yegor Stroyev, the 
speaker of the Federation Council of Russia described Russia as “the core of Eurasian 
civilization, the point of anchorage of the unique synthesis of Eastern Christendom and 
Islam.”446 Panarin describes this as a synthesis of the “great monotheistic traditions” in a 
Eurasian State.447 In 1996, by signing the Treaty on Increased Integration in the 
Economic and Humanitarian Fields, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Kyrgyzstan made a 
significant step toward creation of a Eurasian Economic Union. 
Liberal-conservatives appealed to statists by being able to stay in accord with 
Western democratic traditions but preserving Orthodoxy as a symbolic foundation insofar 
as it is the religion of the majority of Russia’s population (Agardjanian 2000:110).448 
Liberal-conservatives and statists largely agree that the project to build in Russia a 
Western-type liberal civil society “has failed” and that the country should “develop 
organically” basing itself on Orthodoxy and other national traditions.449 As Morozov has 
written, this tendency can be defined as a “liberal-conservative synthesis” - an ideology 
                                                        
445 Zulys, Audrius “Towards A Union State Of Russia And Belarus,” Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review. 
N:15-16, 2005 
446 Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 29 July 1998. 
447 Agadjanian 2000, Panarin 1995a, Panarin 1995b, Panarin and Il'in 1994. Also see the description and 
analysis of the views of the neo-Eurasianists in Laruelle (1999). 
448 Agardjanian cites NG-Religii 1997, No. 11 
449 See Nezavisimaya Gazeta-Religii (1997, No. 12). According to Agardjanian, the concept of “organic 
development” in the tradition of Russian thought is closely associated with the old discourse of the 
Slavophiles and the later theorists of “Russian thought”, including religious thinkers such as Sergey 
Bulgakov and I. Il'in. See Il'in's article in “Russia is a living organism”, 1956, Vol. I, 223-229. 
  213 
that is “pluralist and secular”, but “Orthodox in its content.”450 The debates on the 
meaning of the 1997 law on religion and its preamble point to the validity of this 
argument. 
Finally, statists to a certain degree share the Slavophiles’ nostalgia for a 
traditional Orthodox way of life, in line with the philosophy of I. Kirievsky. Solzhenitsyn 
adds to it a desire for a local form of democracy based on the revival of the Russian 
zemstvos and a very specific national isolationism. In some ways, creation of seven 
federal districts in the early 2000s, stressing the importance of national sovereignty, and 
even restoration of the canonical link between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian 
Orthodox Church Outside Russia speak in support of this claim. 
Overall, what united all of these “formulas of identity” was acceptance of the state 
as the main regulator of public life in Russia. By synthesizing nationalist, Eurasianist, 
liberal-conservative, and finally Slavophile principles, the statist approach gradually 
turned into a dominant school of thinking in Russia. The following section will discuss 
how these principles guided state policies toward Islam and Muslims in Russia in the 
2000s. 
 
2.2 – Statism and Islam in Post-Soviet Russia 
In 1998, a round table on religion and society in contemporary Russia declared 
that “Society needs a ‘vertical dimension of the sacred’, a ‘shared concept of 
civilization’” (NG-Religii 1998, No.1). This statement may well predate Vladimir Putin’s 
                                                        
450 Morozov in NG-Religii 2000 (3). According to Agardjanian, this is a reappearance of the tradition 
represented by Frank (1924), who writes on the post-religious “sacred foundations” of contemporary 
secularized societies (Agardjanian 2000:110). 
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launching of the vertical of power campaign aimed at centralizing the state apparatus in 
the 2000s.451 However, it fairly reflects the movement away from religious pluralism of 
the 1990s towards a much more complex hierarchical organization of religions, instituted 
by the 1997 law on religion. What role is reserved for Islam in this hierarchy, how the 
statist ideology affected relations between Muslim religious organizations and state, and 
what kind of role secular authorities play in the relationship among religions under the 
new framework has been a focus of considerable attention over the 2000s.  
2.2.1 – Islam in the post-pluralistic religious hierarchy 
One of the most important outcomes of a change of religious legislation in 1997 
was the establishment of a particular hierarchy among religions in Russia.452 Privileged 
access to the Russian public sphere under the emerging state-religion regime was 
reserved for traditional religions, which included Islam along with Judaism, Buddhism, 
and various denominations of Christianity. Nevertheless, the debates occasionally took 
place as some Christian Orthodox groups interpreted the law as a basis for treating 
Orthodoxy as the first among equals, because it has historically been a dominant religion 
in Russia (Agadjanian 2000:118, Shterin 1998). In fact, the preamble of the law indeed 
acknowledges “the special role of Orthodox Christianity in the history of Russia, and in 
the establishment and development of its spirituality and culture.”453 This is especially 
noticeable, given that the first draft of the preamble used the language that explicitly 
considered Islam to be equivalent to Christian Orthodoxy and gave them both a special 
status (Rossijskaja Gazeta 1997, 16 September). In the final text, this formulation 
                                                        
451 Vertical of power (Vertikal’ vlasti) – A centralized chain of government command. The term is used to 
describe the effort of Russian state authorities in the early 2000s to strengthen the position of the federal 
government by improving the linkages between the federal, regional, and local levels of government. 
452 See chapter three for a detailed discussion of the 1997 law on religion. 
453 Preamble of the 1997 federal law “On freedom of conscience and religious associations” 
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disappeared (Shterin 1998). 
Two episodes that attracted public attention most were the debates about 
integration of religious education into secular curricula and religious practice in the 
Russian armed forces. In both cases the point of contention was the role that the Russian 
Orthodox Church (ROC) played in the formation of Russian state policies. First, the 
introduction of an “Orthodox” element to education at all levels of public schooling, from 
kindergarten to the university has been a long-time wish of the Church (Papkova 
2011:669).454  In March 2006, Council of Russia’s Muftis released a statement, in which 
it expressed concerns that the introduction of the Orthodox component in the federal 
public school curriculum would undermine the constitution and contradict the laws that 
guarantee equality of all religions before the law.455 According to the Islamic Council, if 
such a course were to be introduced, it would need to get the approval of all traditional 
religions. Ultimately, as a result of long debates, in the spring 2010, the experimental 
course was first held, which gave fourth- and fifth-grade pupils a choice between 
modules on Orthodox, Buddhist, Islamic, and Jewish culture, as well as a module on the 
fundamentals of world religions and a course on secular ethics (Papkova 2011:675). The 
“Fundamentals of Religious Culture and Secular Culture” course was structured to reflect 
the multi-confessional nature of the Russian Federation.456 
                                                        
454 Papkova, Irina. "Russian Orthodox concordat? Church and state under Medvedev." Nationalities 
Papers 39.5 (2011): 667-683. 
455 Zajavlenie Soveta muftiev Rossii po voprosu prepodavanija «Osnov pravoslavnoj kul'tury» v 
gosudarstvennoj i municipal'noj shkole” 11 March, 2006. http://muslim.ru/articles/109/1094/ (Last 
accessed February 23, 2015). 
456 On average, 60% of students chose “secular ethics” or “history of religions”. Interesting to note that the 
first and the last lessons of each module are dedicated to the theme of patriotism (named, for instance, 
“Russia is our Homeland”), indicating the use of the course on religion as an ideological tool. See 
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Secondly, since the early 1990s the Russian Orthodox Church has been lobbying 
for the introduction of Orthodox chaplains into the armed forces (Papkova 2011:669). 
Similar to its position with respect to teaching fundamentals of world religions in public 
schools, the Council of Russia’s Muftis opposed the initiative. In a written statement the 
Council expressed its concern that such a move could lead to confrontations between 
believers of different religious traditions and to discrimination against some military 
personnel on the basis of national or religious identity. Ultimately, the Council warned, 
this might harm the relationship among the troops and undermine the fighting capacity of 
the army.457 After extended debates, in July 2009, President Medvedev announced that 
the position of chaplain would be introduced into the Russian military. The military, as 
part of this effort, has established a directorate for work with believers serving in the 
Russian armed forces. Although the position of military chaplains does not belong 
exclusively to the ROC (chaplains can be appointed from any of the four religions 
“officially recognized” by the Russian government – Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and 
Buddhism), some careful observers look at the initiative with skepticism (Gorenburg 
2012).458 As Vyacheslav Kotkov put it in a military-industrial publication, the goal is to 
inculcate an “Orthodox spirit in the spiritual-patriotic education” of those serving in the 
                                                        
Kovalskaya, Kristina. "The Traditional and the Non-Traditional in the Religious Life of the Russian 
Federation." Mundo Eslavo 12 (2013a): 69-78. Also, see Kovalskaya, K.V. (2013b). Sainte Connaissance? 
Le discours d’experts du fait religieux et leur impact sur les identités et les pratiques religieuses en 
Fédération de Russie depuis 1991. Mémoire de Master 2. Paris: Ėcole des Hautes Ėtudes en Sciences 
Sociales. 
457 “Pozicija Soveta muftiev Rossii po proektu Federal'nogo zakona «O voennyh svjashhennikah»” 11 
March 2006. http://muslim.ru/articles/109/1098/ (Last accessed February 23, 2015) 
458 Gorenburg, D. “The Army and the Church,” Ponars Eurasia 2012. 
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/node/5714 (Last accessed February 23, 2015). 
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military and in this way to strengthen discipline in the Russian military (Kotkov 2012).459 
 
2.2.2 – Collaboration between state institutions and the established Muslim clergy 
Since “legalization” of Islam under the reign of Catherine the Great, the central 
claim of the established Muslim clergy in Russia has been that there was no necessary 
contradiction between being Muslim and politically moderate and loyal citizens of the 
country. Architects of Russia’s post-Soviet statist ideological framework have been 
careful to ensure that their model benefits from this historic asset and emphasizes the role 
of Muftiyats in disciplining the country’s Muslim population. President Putin 
acknowledged this during his meeting with leading Muftis of the country at the 225th 
anniversary of the Muslim Spiritual Assembly in Ufa by pointing out that recognition of 
Islam as a traditional religion in Russia has helped Muslims become true Russian patriots. 
He added that Russian Muslims “have always been united in their service to society and 
the state, and against external enemies and all forms of extremism” (Putin 2013).460 The 
President reiterated his support of the Islamic officialdom and expressed his confidence 
in that this unity would be maintained and strengthened.  
Of particular importance were President Putin’s remarks about some of the issues 
that the country’s secular leadership and the Muslim clergy identified as common 
concerns. These issues included, but were not limited to, dealing with the forces that use 
Islam “to weaken Russia” and encourage dissent within the indigenous Muslim 
                                                        
459 Kotkov, V. “Pomoshh' batjushki neobhodima: Voennye i cerkov' v sovremennyh uslovijah,” Voenno-
Promyshlennyl Kuryer, N 30, (447), August 1, 2012. http://vpk-news.ru/articles/9098 (Last accessed 
February 23, 2015). 
460 Vladimir Putin’s speech at a meeting with muftis from Russia’s Muslim spiritual administrations on 
October 22, 2013. http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6157#sel=8:33,8:68 (Last access February 23, 2015). 
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community; socialization of Russia’s Muslims and developing traditional Muslim 
lifestyles; adaptation of [Muslim] people who come to live and work in Russia; 
countering religious radicalism; education of the Islamic clergy; reconstruction of 
indigenous Islamic theological school and ensure the sovereignty of Russia’s spiritual 
space; addressing the problems with translating theological and popular publications by 
foreign authors into Russian and ensuring the academic translation of key Muslim 
religious texts into Russian; preventing the spread of publications of destructive, 
extremist nature; educating Muslim youth; and developing a positive image of traditional 
Islam as an important spiritual component of Russia’s identity.461  
Many of these issues had already been identified as concerns in the early 1990s. 
For example, the established Muslim clergy and secular authorities in the regions have 
repeatedly expressed their worries about the shortage of adequately trained religious 
cadres in the context of a growing popular demand for religious services. For liberal 
reformers in Moscow, however, this was a natural process during the formation of a 
religious marketplace and did not require any involvement. The statists, on the other 
hand, saw the guiding role of the state as key in promoting moral and spiritual values, 
inculcating a sense of patriotism and a belief in necessity of a strong state. In doing so, 
they not only operated in the purely secular domain but also engaged with religious 
organizations. According to provisions of the 1997 law on religion, unrestricted access to 
the public sphere was reserved only for those Muslim religious communities that were 
registered with the state and affiliated with centralized Muslim Spiritual Boards. 
                                                        
461 Speech at a meeting with muftis from Russia’s Muslim spiritual administrations. October 22, 2013. 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6157#sel= (Last access February 23, 2015). 
Also see the section on Islam and the State in the “Conception on Islam and the Tatar World” developed by 
the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan. http://dumrt.ru/ru/concept/ (Last access February 23, 2015). 
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Organizations that failed to pass the state registration process before the end of the 
registration period on December 31 of 2001 were to be deprived of their privileges as 
religious organizations or be liquidated altogether.462  
In his speech at the meeting with muftis mentioned above, President Putin 
reminded that Russian Muslim religious organizations had “every opportunity to position 
themselves broadly through modern media” and invited to “take advantage of these 
opportunities” (Putin 2013).463 In combination with material support offered through the 
recently created Fund for the Support of Islamic Culture, Science and Education464 and 
multilevel cooperation between Islamic institutions and federal ministries and agencies 
(Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Defense, etc.)465 these policies indicate a 
clear departure from the state’s earlier attitude of indifference toward religious affairs.466 
 
2.2.3 – Secular Authorities and Interfaith Dialogue 
The shift from liberalism to statism has also been reflected in the role of the state 
in the relationship between religions. Since the late 1990s, the state has played an 
                                                        
462 See chapter three for a detailed discussion of the 1997 law on religion and differences in statuses 
between religious organizations and religious groups. 
463 Speech at a meeting with muftis from Russia’s Muslim spiritual administrations. October 22, 2013. 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6157#sel= (Last access February 23, 2015). 
464 In 2010, it was announced that the Fund will spend about $13m a year on educational, scholarship and 
publishing programs.  For details on the activities of the Fund, see the official website of the Fund 
http://www.islamfund.ru/index.php (Last accessed March 22, 2015). Also, see Nemtsova, Anna “Russian 
government funds select Islamic schools to stem radicalism,” Telegraph.co.uk (originally produced and 
published by Rossiiskaia Gazeta) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/rbth/society/7975826/Russian-
government-funds-select-Islamic-schools-to-stem-radicalism.html (Last accessed on March 22, 2015) 
465For example, for details on cooperation between secular state institutions and the Moscow Muftiyat, see 
“Sotsial'noe sluzhenie i mirotvorchestvo” Announcement of the Muslim Spiritual Board of Muslims of the 
European Part of Russia (DUMER), 24 November 2005. http://www.muslim.ru/articles/109/1090/ (Last 
access February 23, 2015). Also, see http://www.muslim.ru/articles/109/1041/ (Last access February 23, 
2015). 
466 For the discussion on church-state relations under Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, see Papkova, Irina. 
"Russian Orthodox concordat? Church and state under Medvedev." Nationalities Papers 39.5 (2011): 667-
683. 
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increasingly important role in Christian-Muslim relations in Russia. Given the expanding 
influence of the Church on Russian society and politics (Papkova 2011, Malashenko and 
Filatov 2012, Fagan 2012), Muslims have increasingly relied on the state to ensure 
observance of constitutional guarantees.467 These were reflected in the inter- and intra-
faith debates and controversies about construction of mosques in non-Muslim territories, 
the Muslim dress code in public schools, and the prospects for establishment of religious 
parties.468  
 
2.2.3a – The construction of mosques in non-Muslim territories  
In the period since the late 1990s, the issue of mosque construction has repeatedly 
become a topic of public controversy and heated discussions. On the one hand, 
construction of mosques in traditionally Muslim-majority regions continued. As long as 
the places of worship were under the protectorate of the state-recognized “traditional” 
Islamic institutions and there was a demand for such venues, Muslim communities have 
been able to acquire permissions for construction of mosques. On the other hand, 
proposals to build Islamic places of worship in “traditionally Russian regions” have 
repeatedly been rejected or significantly delayed, despite a considerable demand for new 
                                                        
467 Fagan, Geraldine. Believing in Russia: Religious Policy After Communism. Routledge, 2012; 
Papkova, Irina. The Orthodox church and Russian politics. Washington, DC Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 2011; Malashenko, Aleksei, and Filatov Sergei. Pravoslavnaya tserkov’pri novom patriarkhe. 
Moscow: Rosspen, 2012. Also see “Dialog v khristiansko-evreyskikh otnosheniyakh v sovremennoy Rossii 
i v mire.” Doklad zamestitelya predsedatelya OVTSS igumena Filippa (Ryabykh). 
http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1285461.html (cited in Curanović, Alicja. "Weaknesses of the Post-
Soviet Religious Model: The Kremlin and “Traditional” Religions in face of Interethnic Tensions in 
Russia."Politics and Religion (2014): 1-30).  
468 Within the established Muslim clergy, the sharpest critic of the growing influence of the Orthodox 
Church is Ravil Gaynutdin, the head of the Council of Muftis of Russia. Mufti Gaynutdin demands equal 
treatment of the ROC and muftiates in the public sphere, a kind of spiritual condominium rather than 
agreeing on the role of a “younger brother”. See Curanovic 2014. For position of Mufti Gaynutdin, see his 
interview to Kommersant. “Islam — religija korennyh rossijan,” Kommersant. 18 February 2011. 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1587146 (Last accessed on Februaty 23, 2015). 
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premises (Fagan 2012). As the tension over the issue grew, particular cases such as those 
in St. Petersburg, Sochi, and Maloyaroslavets, attracted public attention. The fact that in 
St. Petersburg, with five million residents, there were only two mosques spoke for itself. 
Public ceremonies on Muslim religious holidays, for example, gather tens of thousands of 
people to attend the service, causing crowds to fill adjacent streets of the mosque. 
In the Black Sea coastal town of Sochi, a local Muslim community has lobbied 
fruitlessly for a mosque for over 15 years. The community had hoped that Sochi's hosting 
of the 2014 Winter Olympics would boost their campaign for a place of worship. It was 
only in July 2009, upon the intervention of the Council of Russia’s Muftis, the voice of 
the community was heeded. Mufti Ravil Gaynutdin appealed to then President 
Medvedev, arguing that some international athletes and guests would seek out a mosque 
in the region. Medvedev approved the idea and added that this should not be just a 
temporary structure for the duration of the Olympics.  
Similar cases have been reported in Maloyaroslavets, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 
Moscow, Astrakhan, and other cities, where local Muslim communities either faced 
difficulties in securing a land for mosque construction (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), couldn’t 
comply with safety standards (Astrakhan), or met with public resistance (Moscow).469 
According to some observers of religious life in Russia, one reason for difficulties in 
opening new mosques in non-Muslim regions might have been position of the Church. 
According to Curanovic, for example, vision of interfaith dialogue implies that 
                                                        
469 See Bridge, Robert. “No need for new mosques in Russia,” Russia Today. 16 October 2012. 
http://rt.com/politics/russia-mosques-muslim-nationalists-moscow-538/ (Last accessed on March 22, 2015) 
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“traditional” religions don’t proselytize among ethnic groups which are considered 
traditional adherents of another religion. In other words, the ROC doesn’t proselytize 
among Tatars or Buryats and muftis don’t appeal to Slavic people (Curanovic 2014). In 
those cases where the involvement of Mufti Gainutdin into the process has lead to the 
resolution of the dispute in favor of local Muslim communities, representatives of the 
established clergy appealed to state authorities and demanded observance of 
constitutional guarantees. This occurred, for example in Sochi and Kostroma.470  
 
2.2.3b – The Muslim dress-code in public schools 
In October 2012, a scandal broke out in Russia’s southern region of Stavropol 
over the fact that a young female student was barred from her middle school because she 
wore a traditional Muslim headscarf. Marina Savchenko, the school's principal, justified 
her decision by referring to the school’s secular dress code. "Here everything should be 
very simple: it is an institution, so it's a secular dress code, business-dress style. That's all. 
End of discussion," she said.471 Shortly afterwards a Stavropol regional court outlawed 
Islamic veil at schools by imposing a single standard for the students' clothing. In July 
2013, the Russian Supreme Court upheld the local decision. For many in Russia this was 
striking news given that in several Russia’s regions, such as Tatarstan and Chechnya, 
female students freely wear headscarves to school. In Muslim-majority Chechnya, which 
borders Stavropol, a headscarf that covers a student's hair is part of an accepted dress 
code. The issue still remains a stumbling block to religious dialogue as some members of 
                                                        
470 See, for example, Forum 18 News Service reports on the issue http://www.forum18.org/ (Last accessed 
on March 24, 2015).    
471 Grove, Thomas. “Headscarf debate highlights Russian Muslims' grievances,” Reuters. October 21, 2012. 
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the established Muslim clergy continue to appeal to secular authorities in Moscow to 
resolve the problem in the regions where Muslims represent a minority population.472 
 
2.2.3c – Prospects for the establishment of religious parties in Russia 
The statist ideological perspective incorporates religion in Russia’s “formula of 
identity” but it does not tolerate political activism based on religious or ethnic rationale 
(Agadjanian 2010). Since 2001 the formation of political parties based on ethnicity and 
religion in the country has been officially banned.473 However, the revival of the 
Orthodox Church under Patriarch Kirill reanimated debate about whether it could be 
possible to establish an Orthodox Christian political party in Russia.474 A provocative 
web-posting by Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, a Russian Orthodox Church spokesman, 
regarding such a possibility triggered strong public reaction and once again exposed the 
fragile, yet very dynamic and intricate nature of the relationship between religious and 
secular authority in contemporary Russia (Akhmetkarimov and Parrott 2015).475 
Reaction of the established Islamic clergy to a possible emergence of an Orthodox 
religious party in Russia has been cautious, if not suspicious. Farid Asadullim, deputy 
chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of European Russia, evaluated 
Chaplin’s initiative as provocative and expressed concern on behalf of Russia’s many 
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rights of Russian citizens were rejected. 
474  Chaplin, Vsevolod. “Nuzhna li, vozmozhna li ‘pravoslanaiia’/‘khristianskaiia’ partiia?” Pravoslavnaиa 
politika. January 11, 2012. http://pravoslav-pol.livejournal.com/2030.html?thread=1518#t1518 (accessed 
April 14, 2014) 
475 Parrott, Bruce and Bulat Akhmetkarimov. “The Future of the Religious Party in Russia,” in Charles 
Doran et al., ed., The Future of the Religious Party (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press) 
(forthcoming). 
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indigenous Muslims that allowing such parties could lead to partition of the country. 
Being aware of the dominant status of the Church, the majority of Russia’s Muslim 
community, especially its part led by Mufti Gainutdin, upholds secular principles of the 
state. 
 
2.2.4 – Foreign policy and Islam 
Last, but not least, the transition from Western liberalism to statism has also been 
reflected in changing relations between Russia and the Muslim world. Andrei Kozyrev, 
Russia’s first foreign minister under President Yeltsin, clearly saw relations with the 
Muslim countries as of little significance. According to Malashenko, limited public talk 
of developing relations with the Muslim East was simply for the sake of politeness 
(Malashenko 2008).476 According to Malashenko, several factors explain limited interest 
of Russia in the Muslim world. First, Russia’s role in addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict 
had been devalued ever since the start of the Camp David process in 1977. Second, the 
Soviet Union left Russia no economic legacy of any worth in the Muslim world. 
According to Malashenko, the Soviets sponsored friendly countries but obtained no 
economic advantages in return. Therefore, he argues, Moscow excluded support for 
national movements from its foreign policy doctrine and abandoned independent 
initiatives in Middle East policy. Moreover, according to Tsygankov, the foreign policy 
concept of 1993 implied economic, political, and cultural separation of the new Russia 
                                                        
476 Malashenko, A. “Russia and the Muslim World,” Carnegie Moscow Center Working Paper N3, 2008. 
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even from the former Soviet Muslim republics (Tsygankov 2012).477   
Yeltsin’s appointment of Primakov as Foreign Minister in 1996 signified a major 
shift in Russian foreign policy (Tsygankov 2012). In contrast to Westernists, Tsygankov 
argues, statists wanted to pursue “multi-vector” policies, which also implied building 
stronger ties with the Muslim world. Malashenko interprets the decision to obtain an 
observer status in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as both Moscow’s 
attempt to rebuild its weakened standing in the Islamic world and a desire to offset its 
worsening relations with the West by building relations with other parts of the world.478 
Starting in 2004, President Putin made several visits to Muslim countries and received 
their leaders in Russia. As a result, relations with Saudi Arabia were improved, ties with 
Syria and Egypt were revived, contacts with Iraqi Sunnis and Iran were restored 
(Malashenko 2008). At home these all contributed to strengthening of relations among 
the established Muslim clergy, ethnic Muslim leadership in Russian regions, and the 
federal authorities. At the joint meetings with OIC representatives Russian delegations 
included large groups of influential Russian Muslim politicians and the clergy.479 More 
                                                        
477 Tsygankov, Andrei P. "Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy."Russian Analytical 
Digest 8.109 (2012). 
478 In 2004, the State Duma established the parliamentary group “Russia and the Islamic World: Strategic 
Dialogue.” This group’s stated aims, in the words of Duma deputy Shamil Sultanov, are to: “provide the 
legislative foundation for developing Russia’s relations with the Muslim countries and international Islamic 
organizations, above all the OIC…; propose initiatives for participation in integration processes in the 
Islamic world; ...create the conditions for constructive dialogue between the political and economic elites in 
Russia and the Islamic world,” etc. (Malashenko 2008).  
On 28 June 2011 during the 38th Council of Foreign Ministers meeting (CFM) in Astana, Kazakhstan the 
organization changed its name from Organisation of the Islamic Conference to its current name, 
The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. 
479 An impressive Russian delegation headed by Vladimir Putin took part in the OIC summit in Kuala 
Lumpur in 2003. The delegation included a large group of influential Russian Muslim politicians – 
property minister Farit Gazizulin, deputy chief of staff of the Presidential Administration Djakhan Pollieva, 
the presidents of Bashkiria and Kabardino-Balkaria, and chairman of the Coordinating Center of the North 
Caucasus Muslims Ismail Berdiev. The President of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, was also in the 
delegation (Malashenko 2008). 
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and more often on various occasions, state officials referred to “dialogue between 
civilizations” and even lectured the West on the necessity of showing more understanding 
towards the Islamic world.480 
  
2.3 – Statism: conclusion 
At the 2014 National Unity Day Celebration, President Putin declared, “Russia’s 
sovereignty has the same fundamental value as freedom and democracy.”481 The 
statement squarely fits into the statist doctrine which since the late 1990s has gradually 
come to dominate Russian politics (Evans 2008).482 As Dannreuther has put it, “the 
principal concern of the doctrine was to promote Russia’s sovereignty rather than its 
democracy, emphasizing that the Russian state gains its legitimacy from the organic 
‘general will’ of the Russian people, that outside powers have no right to criticize 
Russia’s distinctive political path” (Dannreuther 2010:123). After all, what statism 
privileges is the authority and primacy of the state.483 
Meanwhile, during the early 2000s, religion has become essential to Russia’s 
political legitimacy and social cohesion. Some authors have gone so far as to claim that 
“traditional” religious organizations have become one of two pillars that the whole 
                                                        
480 When the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, reprinted in 
several European media outlets, which stirred up a storm of protest in the Muslim world, Vladimir Putin 
not only expressed understanding for the Muslims’ position, but even compared the cartoons to child 
pornography, saying that “if the state is not able to prevent something, it should at least apologize for not 
being able to act (Malashenko 2008:11) 
481 Vladimir Putin’s speech at the reception marking 2014 National Unity Day. November 4, 2014. 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/23177#sel=10:60,10:71 (Last access February 26, 2015). 
482 According to Evans, “Putin’s actions have been guided by core values and long-term goals whose 
general outlines were delineated even before he took office as the President of Russia (Evans 2008:901) 
Evans, A.B. “Putin’s Legacy and Russia’s Identity,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 6, August 2008, 
899 – 912. 
483 Orlov, D. Suverennaya demokratiya: Ot idei k doctrine. Moscow: Evropa, 2007. 
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Russian system rests on (Curanovic 2014:789).484 Religion in Russia, according to 
Curanovic, is not just a private affair of an individual but also a matter of state security 
and stability. Therefore, she argues, state authorities “strived to form and control this area 
of social life”(Curanovic 2014:792). As cooperation between secular state and religious 
institutions in selected areas of the public sphere grew, the model came to be known as 
social partnership.485 
The emphasis of the statist ideology on the homogenous society, the value of 
patriotism and strong statehood also entails promoting civic nationalism. For Putin, as 
March has put it, “the ‘Russian idea’ is Rossiiskaya rather than Russkaya.”486 Thus, a 
combination of the non-ethnic regime and the collaboration between religious 
organizations and the Russian state defines the statist approach toward diversity 
management in Russia in the early 2000s. Regulatory policies of the state toward Islam, 
therefore, reflect domination of the statist ideology in Russia during the second decade 
after the Soviet collapse.  
 
3. Conclusion: Ideologies in Transition 
Throughout the 1990s and into the early 21st century, Russian political elites as 
well as the general public were deeply divided on questions of what constitutes the 
Russian nation, what are the natural boundaries of the state where they live, and how to 
                                                        
484 According to Curanovic, another pillar is the Russian security service FSB (Curanovic 2014:789). 
485 In this study I used the term ‘confessional collaboration’ to describe the relationship between secular 
state and religious institutions in the 2000s in Russia. However, it is also important to keep in mind that 
traditional religious organizations are not just tools of the state, but are themselves powerful social 
institutions. See conclusion for further discussion of this point. 
486 March, Luke. "Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications of the New 
‘Russian Idea’." Europe-Asia Studies 64.3 (2012): 401-425. 
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define the national interest. These uncertainties, which were reflected both in domestic 
and foreign policy areas, had an important impact on state-Islam relations and Muslim 
religious practice in Russia. Competition between western liberal and statist ideologies, 
as this study suggests, has largely defined state policies toward Islam in the first two 
decades after the Soviet collapse. The dominance of the liberal ideology explains the 
laissez-faire approach of the state toward Islam in the 1990s. Accordingly, Russia’s 
diverse population was managed in compliance with the norms of passive secularism and 
multiethnic ethnicity regime. Domination of the statist ideology, on the other hand, 
accounts for the regulation of Islamic affairs in the early 2000s. Consequently, state 
policies toward Islam and its Muslim population were shaped by a transition to a non-
ethnic regime and development of the “traditional religions” paradigm. 
This framework stresses the importance of ideologies in the formation of 
individuals’ preferences. Western liberalism and statism, therefore, like other ideologies, 
can impact policies only if there are human actors who embrace these ideologies. These 
human actors form particular policy preferences based on particular ideologies and 
struggle to materialize these policy preferences. As Kuru has pointed out, the 
establishment of a new dominant ideology generally requires a long historical process. 
First, ideologies manifest themselves in the intellectual discourse, often through the 
works of some native thinkers. They find supporters among the elites through a variety of 
means, including publications, public discussions, and education. Over time these 
supporters organize to challenge the dominant paradigm (Kuru 2009: 238). 
In the case of Russia, this offers a perspective to interpret the transition from 
Communism to Western liberalism during perestroika and from Western liberalism to 
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Statism in the late 1990s. In the 1980s, criticism of the socialist order convinced 
influential members of the communist party in the need of a comprehensive political 
reform. Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev the perestroika initiative turned into 
an overarching conception that ultimately transformed the system. Similarly, during the 
1990s, frustration with the attempted transition to Western liberal democracy revived the 
old debates about Russian national identity, which soon reached the country’s senior 
leadership. Since the late 1990s Russia’s intellectuals, policymakers, as well as the 
general public have been searching for a common narrative that could unite the country’s 
diverse population. Statism, in part, emerged as a reaction to the failure of the early post-
Soviet model, which came to be seen as out of touch with Russian traditions and 
specificities (Agadjanian 2000: 105). State policies toward Islam in Russia have largely 
shaped under the shadow of these larger debates about what Russia is and where it is 
headed. 
It is important to point out that ideological dominance is never absolute and does 
not last forever (Kuru 2009:238). A liberal camp was able to develop and advance its 
reformist agenda under the communist regime. During the perestroika, supporters of 
religious freedom managed to convince the state leadership to stop sponsoring atheism 
and in the early 1990s this permissive attitude continued. Similarly, statists, who believed 
in subordination of religion to the state, relied on “traditional religions” rhetoric to 
criticize principles of western liberalism, which in the early 1990s seemed to be a 
dominant paradigm.487 Statists put a limit on religious freedoms by marginalizing newly 
                                                        
487 According to Kovalskaya, the spread of the concept of “traditional religions” is part of a larger process – 
designing “tradition” as a core value of modern Russian ideology. Kovalskaya suggests that the content of 
this “tradition,” or these “traditions,” is provided by the given ideal of patriotism, loyalty to the state and 
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emerging religious groups and depicting them as dangerous sects that posed a security 
threat to the state. These interactions define the dynamics of ideological struggles that 
ultimately result in policy changes toward religion. 
Finally, neither of these transitions would have been possible without convenient 
structural conditions and committed agency that would allow the replacement of old 
dominant ideologies with new ones. For ideas to occupy the intellectual discourse, find 
support among the elites, and mobilize a critical mass of supporters, certain structural 
conditions have to be met. These can be wars, economic crises, critical elections, or 
pivotal events that evoke historical grievances and cause public resonance. The next 
section will discuss structural factors that played a key role in ideological transitions that 
led to changes in state policies toward Islam. 
 
Part II: Structural Determinants of a transition from Western liberalism to Statism 
Various social science approaches have different explanations for institutional 
stability and change. According to the rational choice theory, for example, institutions are 
stable as long as nobody has incentives to change them. Equilibrium, therefore, may 
become different when agents’ preferences change (Eriksson 2011:206).488 Historical 
institutionalists, on the other hand, claim that the notion of punctuated equilibrium may 
account for the emergence of new historical paths. Punctuated equilibrium is used for 
understanding particular formative moments when much of the old system breaks down 
                                                        
demographically effective model of family. “Traditional” religions are engaged by the state as one of 
channels to broadcast pertinent information (Kovalskaya 2013:75). 
Kovalskaya, Kristina. "The Traditional and the Non-Traditional in the Religious Life of the Russian 
Federation." Mundo Eslavo 12 (2013): 69-78. 
488 Eriksson, Lina. Rational choice theory: Potential and limits. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
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and new paths can be chosen (Eriksson 2011:163). Both approaches acknowledge the 
importance of exogenous shocks that either affect institutional goals or create an 
incentive for people to take action to change the existing order. Therefore, identifying 
and assessing the key events in Russia’s recent history is crucial for understanding 
ideological shifts in the country.  
I argue that a set of structural challenges that the Soviet Union and Russia were 
facing in the 1980s and early 90s respectively prepared certain conditions and served as 
catalysts for ideological shifts. In particular, security and economic concerns played an 
important role in transitions from communism to post-communist Russian liberalism and 
from liberalism to statism. Various aspects of a transition from Communism to early 
post-communism and some reasons of the Soviet collapse have been relatively well 
researched (Gans-Morse 2004).489 This section will focus on some structural reasons of a 
shift from western liberalism to statism in Russia in the late 1990s. In particular, it will 
demonstrate how institutional strength relates to the stability of ethno-confessional 
regimes. In doing so, it will explain how security and economic dynamics in the early 
1990s contributed to the disillusionment with the norms of multiethnic passive secularism 
and facilitated the rise of a non-ethnic confessional collaboration model. 
 
1. Security 
One prevalent narrative among some observers of Russian politics as well as 
Russian politicians and intellectuals is that the Russian state in the 1990s had fallen into 
                                                        
489 See Gans-Morse for a critical assessment of the literature on post-communist transitions. Gans-Morse, 
Jordan. "Searching for transitologists: Contemporary theories of post-communist transitions and the myth 
of a dominant paradigm." Post-Soviet Affairs 20.4 (2004): 320-349. 
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another smutnoye vremya (time of troubles).490 Within less than a decade the country 
fought two devastating wars on its soil, witnessed bloody consequences of a political 
standoff between the Russian legislative and executive branches, and experienced a surge 
of organized crime that cost the nation thousands of civilian casualties. 
 
1.1 – Chechnya and Terrorism 
After a series of unsuccessful attempts to resolve contested issues with the 
Northern Caucasus Republic of Chechnya, in December 1994, the Russian government 
launched a full-scale military assault on the republic. As Hill and Gaddy pointed out, the 
war became the largest military campaign on Russian soil since World War II (Hill and 
Gaddy 2013:26). Nevertheless, despite massive civilian and military casualties and 
almost complete destruction of the city of Grozny, federal forces did not achieve the 
expected results.491 In 1996, the Yeltsin government was forced to conclude a truce with 
the Chechen government, an agreement that some military officers perceived as a 
humiliation. These officers believed that Moscow would eventually subjugate Chechnya 
again (Hill and Gaddy 2013:26, 304).  
                                                        
490 Smutnoe vremya was the historical period that marked the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th 
century in Russia. It is a period of political crisis that followed the demise of the Rurik dynasty (1598) and 
ended with the establishment of the Romanov dynasty (1613). During this period foreign intervention, 
peasant uprisings, and the attempts of pretenders to seize the throne threatened to destroy the state itself and 
caused major social and economic disruptions, particularly in the southern and central portions of the 
country. 
491 It is estimated that casualties and losses during the first Chechen War between 1994 and 1996 exceeded 
100,000 people, including more than 5,000 Russian troops, 17,000 armed Chechen separatists, and over 
80,000 civilians. In the second Chechen war, which began in 1999, more than 50,000 people have gone 
missing. For the period from 1994 to 2003, estimates ranged from 50,000 to 250,000 civilians and 10,000 
to 50,000 Russian servicemen killed. The figures are not confirmed by academic sources or researchers, 
and are difficult to verify. For some details, refer to 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/news/newsid_2773000/2773997.stm (Last accessed on March 15, 2015); 
http://www.gazeta.ru/2003/10/15/poteriv4e4ne.shtml (Last accessed on March 15, 2015); 
http://www.jamestown.org/nc/?articleid=2373419 (Last accessed on March 15, 2015); 
http://www.watchdog.cz/index.php?show=000000-000005-000003-000001&lang=1 (Last accessed on 
March 15, 2015). 
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Indeed, the war in Chechnya did not end in 1996. Rather, an ethno-nationalist 
struggle transformed into a religiously motivated jihad, which was no longer defined 
territorially or directed by the rules of conventional wars. As Chechen separatists invaded 
Dagestan in August 1999 and series of bombs exploded in Moscow and elsewhere in 
Russia, Russian federal forces entered Chechnya in September 1999, launching the 
second round of war. As terrorist attacks continued well into the 2000s, commentators 
continued to blame the liberal reforms of the early 1990s that allegedly paved the way for 
infiltration of radical religious ideologies to Russia.492 
 
1.2 – The constitutional crisis of 1993 
The political deadlock between the Russian executive and legislative branches in 
1993 also couldn’t be resolved peacefully. Upon the outbreak of an open conflict between 
President Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament, in October 1993 supporters of the 
parliament marched on the Moscow television tower Ostankino. As a result of a clash 
between protesters and the police a few demonstrators were killed. The next day Yeltsin 
ordered the military to open fire on the Russian White House. According to the official 
figures, one hundred forty-five people were killed and eight hundred wounded in the 
attack and associated street fighting. Careful observers state that the events of October 
1993 were “the most violent political confrontation in the Russian capital since the 
Revolution of 1917” (Hill and Gaddy 2013).493 
 
                                                        
492 Some of the most infamous attacks were: taking of around 850 hostages in a Moscow theater in 2002; 
several bombings of passenger trains and the Moscow metro; downing of commercial Russian airplanes in 
2003-04; and a seizure of more than a thousand children in a school in Beslan in North Ossetia in 2004. 
493 For the official casualty figures, see Izvestiya, December 25, 1993 
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1.3 – Organized Crime 
At the very beginning of Yeltsin’s economic reforms there was a boom of 
organized crime. According to Lokk, the number of murders and attempted murders rose 
from 16,000 in 1991 to 32,000 per year in the mid-1990s. At the same time, contract 
killings rose from 102 in 1992 to an average of 560 per year in the mid-1990s (Lokk, 
2003).494 Meanwhile, the level of police pay remained relatively low and working 
conditions were poor. The lack of state funding and the neglect of the police’s basic 
needs caused many police officers to exploit professional relationships for personal 
benefit, thereby undermining professionalism and the public’s trust in the state’s security 
services (Dubova and Kosal’s 2013).495 
By the late 1990s there was a pervasive sense that Russia faced a deep crisis. 
Many saw the reason in the absence of a strong state and the rule of law. In particular, 
terrorist attacks, according to Dannreuther, had a traumatizing effect on Russians, 
generating a sense of deep insecurity (Dannreuther 2010:115). It was around this time 
that Vladimir Putin moved to Moscow, first as a deputy chief in Kremlin property 
department and then as deputy prime minister. Later deterioration of the situation in the 
Northern Caucasus would prove instrumental in Putin’s rise to the presidency in 1999. As 
he noted himself when he came to power, ‘My mission, my historic mission—it sounds 
pompous, but it is true—is to resolve the situation in the North Caucasus’” (Gevorkian 
                                                        
494 Lokk, R. V., Zakaznye ubiistva. Kriminilogicheskiy analiz (Contracted Assasinations. Criminological 
analysis). Moscow: Bylina, 2003. Cited in Kosals, Leonid and Anastasia Dubova "Commercialization of 
Police and Shadow Economy: The Russian Case." Economic Sociology_the european electronic 
newsletter Vol 13. N2. (2012): p. 23. 
495 Dubova, Anastasia and Leonid Kosal’s “Russian Police Involvement in the Shadow Economy,” Russian 
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2000).496 In such a way, Putin “sought to distance himself from Yeltsin’s legacy, which 
was increasingly associated with the dynamics of state disintegration, penetration and 
subversion by foreign forces, and the weakening of state structures as a result of 
criminality and terror” (Dannreuther 2010:115). 
 
2. Economic Hardships 
In January 1992, President Yeltsin launched an ambitious economic reform 
program, which soon came to be known as “shock therapy.” The program, which aimed 
to transform Soviet economic system into a market economy, imitated the recent 
experience of transition in Poland and some other former communist countries. 
Accordingly, this implied the privatization of government enterprises, abolition of central 
planning, rapid liberalization of prices, and severe cuts in budget. These measures did 
indeed have a shocking effect on the Russian population, which was used to fixed prices, 
strong welfare system, and employment guarantees (Hill and Gaddy 2013). Those who 
had accumulated household savings soon found them to be worthless as deregulated 
prices jumped to unprecedented levels. Enterprises were left without orders and the 
government provided no provisions for compensation. Unemployment rates skyrocketed 
as factories shut down having lost its main customer (Hill and Gaddy 2013:18).  
The team of economic reformers led by Yegor Gaidar expected that the painful 
period would not last long and recovery would soon be under way. However, these 
expectations proved largely illusory. Deficits ballooned while the provision of 
                                                        
496 Quoted in Natalia Gevorkian, A. V. Kolesnikov and Natalia Timakova, Ot pervogo litsa (Moscow: 
Vagrius, 2000), p. 133. 
Also, see Dannreuther, Roland. "Islamic radicalization in Russia: an assessment."International Affairs 86.1 
(2010): 109-126. 
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government services almost collapsed. Prices continued to grow: in 1992 annual 
consumer inflation was 2,500 percent, in 1993 it was 840 percent, in 1994 and 1995 the 
inflation was recorded at the level of 215 and 131 percent respectively (Hill and Gaddy 
2013:302). Unemployment rates grew every year from 1992 to 1999.497 In 1998, the 
Russian government and the national Central Bank devalued the ruble, defaulted on 
domestic debt, and declared a moratorium on payment to foreign creditors. In short, the 
economy was in full-blown crisis. 
The economic collapse has had grave consequences for Russia’s general public. 
Reportedly, by 1 August 1998 approximately $12.6 billion in back wages was owed to 
Russian workers. Thousands of people across the country protested rising prices and 
demanded unpaid wages and pensions. In May 1998, coal miners went on strike over 
unpaid wages, blocking the Trans-Siberian Railway. From the demographic perspective, 
the country’s population was steadily shrinking, mortality levels were nothing short of 
catastrophic, and the human resource base appeared to be on a trajectory of dangerous 
erosion (Eberstadt 2010).498 As Russians suffered from poor public health, high levels of 
alcohol and illegal drug consumption, in Eberstadt words, the country’s demographic 
travails qualified “as nothing short of a humanitarian catastrophe in the modern world” 
(Eberstadt 2010:2).499 
                                                        
497 Unemployment rates in Russia between 1992 and 1999: 4.768 (1992); 5.285 (1993); 7.233 (1994); 8.534 
(1995); 9.606 (1996); 10.819 (1997); 11.889 (1998); 13.001 (1999). Data retrieved from the International 
Monetary Fund.  
498 Eberstadt, Nick. Russia's peacetime demographic crisis: Dimensions, causes, implications. Seattle, WA: 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010. 
499 Estimated alcohol intake levels for Russia overall surged in the 1990s, hitting levels above the peak 
years from the Soviet era. For evidence and estimates, see Eberstadt, Nick. Russia's peacetime 
demographic crisis: Dimensions, causes, implications. Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 
2010. Also see A.V. Nemtsov, “Alcohol-Related Human Losses in the 1980s and 1990s,” Addiction 97, 
no.11 (November 2002): 1,413–25; Yurii Andrienko and Alexander Nemtsov, “Estimation of Individual 
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Moreover, according to Transparency International, Russia’s global ranking on 
the Corruption Perceptions Index was average for a sub-Saharan state. In 1997, Russia 
was ranked 49th out 52 countries that were surveyed.500 According to Mark Levin and 
Georgy Satarov, corruption became an integral part of economic activity in the country 
(Levin and Satarov 2000).501 As one opinion poll revealed, more than 60% of Russians 
believed corruption had become a factor threatening Russia’s national security (Levin 
and Satarov 2000). According to the estimates of the Audit Chamber of Russia, in 1997, 
the losses from improper uses of state budgetary funds amounted to tens of trillions of 
rubles, or billions of dollars. In addition, there was also massive grassroots corruption, 
which not only harmed economy but also had a devastating social impact. An image of a 
citizen lacking any kind of protection emerged in the public consciousness (Levin and 
Satarov 2000). As a result, trust in state authorities significantly declined as people 
became increasingly disillusioned with the attempted transition to democracy. 
 
3. Conclusion: Structural underpinnings of the ideological change 
Between 1991 and 1996, Russian domestic and foreign policy had experienced a 
long series of humiliating setbacks (Hill and Gaddy 2013). The economy was in collapse 
and the largest military conflict on Russian soil since WWII was under way in the North 
Caucasus. In addition, relations between Moscow and Russia’s provinces became 
increasingly dependent on bilateral treaties, which not only threatened the legal 
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uniformity of the country but also raised fears that Russia might fall apart like the USSR. 
In foreign affairs, Russia’s position was disregarded in the international handling of 
conflicts in the Balkans and the country was pushed out of the Baltic States.  
The Western liberal ideology gradually became a scapegoat for the causes of the 
national turmoil that peaked at the end of the 1990s. Liberalism came to be perceived as 
“contradictory to the rule of law” and as “the antithesis of order” (Zhussipbek 2015:1).502 
According to Zhussipbek, for many in Russia, liberalism has become associated with 
unlawfulness, chaos, unfair privatization, economic hardships, loss of social benefits, 
deterioration of medical services, moral and social degradation, and even destruction of 
family values. In short, liberalism in the eyes of its critics was guilty not only of 
destroying the Soviet system but also of creating a society of “spoiled people” “without 
moral standards” (Zhussipbek 2015:3).503 
Moreover, some opponents of Western liberalism in Russia argue that those 
Russians who claimed to be liberals were not merely westernized, but were outright 
compradors committed to destroying Russian power and greatness. A number of anti-
liberal Russian public figures believe that the elite who seemed to be pro-liberal were 
agents of Western neo-colonial powers. For example, a group of Russian economists in 
their book Krepost Rossiya (Fortress Russia) suggest that Russia “has a great future 
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2015, Rethink Institute, Washington, DC. 
503 See also Daniel, Alexander, “Eshe raz o liberalnih tsennostyah i interpretatsiyah” (“Once again about 
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ahead if the authorities finally say goodbye to the liberalism that is hated by the 
people.”504  
In such a context, the reactionary rise of alternative ideologies should not be 
surprising. The narrative of the statist ideology that came to replace Western liberalism 
sought to address the deficiencies outlined by secular and religious critics during the 
early 1990s. Statism promised to establish the rule of law and economic prosperity at 
home as well as return Russia’s great power status. Moreover, by integrating religion as 
an element of social cohesion, statism intended to leave no space for chaos or religious 
radicalism.  (Malashenko and Trenin 2002). Ideas, which were initially articulated in the 
works of native thinkers such as Solzhenitsyn (nationalism), Dugin, Polosin 
(Eurasianism), representatives of the Orthodox Church and other intellectuals such as 
Igor Chubais, soon were absorbed by influential elites in the decision-making 
community. Policymakers, in their turn, supported by the population, translated these 
ideas into actual policies.505 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter tried to answer the question of what accounts for the continuity and 
change of ethno-confessional regimes in post-Soviet Russia, which, in their turn, define 
state policies toward Islam in the country. It argues that domination of principles of 
western liberalism during the perestroika era and in the early 1990s largely explains 
                                                        
504 Leontyev, Mihail, “Proschaniye s Liberalizmom (Farewell to Liberalism)” in Leontyev, Mihail et al. 
Krepost Rossiya (Fortress Russia), Moscow: Yauza, Moscow: EKSMO, 2008,   
505 Although there cannot be direct evidence that these works are progenitors of the Russian dominant 
political thought in the 2000s, the conceptual and substantive overlap is striking. History, language, and 
religion remain at the core of Russian conservative political thought to the present day. 
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laissez faire attitude of the Russian state toward Islam and the institutional support for 
expression of ethnicity. Adoption of the 1990 law on religion and assuming the 
multiethnic ethnicity regime led to the emergence of a multiethnic passive secularism that 
guided the state approach toward managing social diversity during the 1990s. 
Disillusionment with the process of transition from communism to post-communism 
called into question the legitimacy of the liberal ideology. The rise of the rhetoric about 
restoration of order and the need for a strong state in the works of native thinkers and 
then in the public utterances of politicians brought about a gradual transition to a statist 
ideology. With regards to the question of managing the diversity the transition was 
manifested in adoption of the 1997 law on religion and abolition of ethnicity line in the 
internal passports. These changes symbolized the transition to a non-ethnic confessional 
collaboration model, which assumed cooperation between the state and “traditional” 
religious organizations in selected areas of public life, in education, and social care. 
Structural factors prepared conditions necessary for the post-communist 
ideological shift in Russia. Liberal ideology, which was dominant in the early 1990s, 
largely failed to deliver security, socio-economic stability, and basic order. Moreover, 
some people blamed it for being the source of moral and social degradation of the 
population. The statist approach that replaced western liberalism in the 2000s promised to 
reestablish order. Re-creation of an authoritative centralized state apparatus, which soon 
became known as vertikal’ vlasti, implied resolving economic and security concerns 
along with embracing values such as patriotism, collectivism, solidarity, derzhavnost’ – 
the belief that Russia is destined always to be a great power exerting its influence abroad 
(Hill and Gaddy 2013:36). More importantly, from the perspective of this study, statism 
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based part of its legitimacy on religion by collaborating with traditional religious 
organizations. In this relationship, however, the role reserved for religious organizations 









Ideologies, regimes, and policy: The dynamics of state policies toward Islam in post-
Soviet Russia 
The only solid and lasting peace between a man and his wife is, doubtless, a separation.  
Philip Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield 
 
As a wealthy and highly respected man in his community, Molla Nasreddin had 
several wives. One day when he felt that two of them are having issues with each other, 
Molla bought two beautiful necklaces with a single stone pendant, a piece of jewelry, 
hanging from a chain and secretly presented one to each of the two wives. As he was 
handing them over to the women, he warned each not to show the present to anyone. One 
day these two wives argued with each other again and came to Molla Nasreddin. “Tell, 
which one of us do you love best?” they demanded. “I love you both,” replied Molla, 
“but the one who has a necklace with a single stone pendant is a queen of my heart.” 
Both wives were thrilled to hear the answer but did not show it and happily returned to 
their daily work. We don’t know how the family ended up living, but what the story 
teaches us is that good management is often an art. Addressing critical situations before 
they break out and being able to find appropriate approach to delicate issues, taking into 
consideration a broader context and small nuances, requires a great deal of understanding, 
maturity, wisdom, and sometimes a sense of humor. 
The story of Molla’s family is instructive for observers of state-Islam relations in 
Russia. In a sense, one could think of Russia as an example of a polygamous family, 
where the state represents a head of the household, or a husband, and major “traditional 
religions” symbolize his multiple wives. Complex relationships in the family unfold as 
  243 
husband and his wives raise generations of children, or the people, all of whom share a 
father but have different mothers. Among the four religions, recognized as traditional 
faiths in Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church has the longest history of presence in the 
country. Many historians indeed start the history of Russia from Christianization of Rus, 
which happened shortly after Prince Vladimir’s marriage with Anna, a sister of the 
Byzantine Emperor Basil II.506 Some scholars believe that Anna's hand was considered 
such a prize that Vladimir became Christian just to marry her.507 Interesting to note that, 
according to some accounts, Vladimir did not align with flourishing Baghdad, another 
superpower at the time, precisely because he did not like their religion. Prince Vladimir 
told Muslim emissaries that drinking alcohol, a sin according the Islamic faith, was the 
joy of the Rus’ and the Russian people could not exist without it.508 
From this perspective, the union that Anna and Vladimir created was a foundation 
of a new family, or a country, where religion assumed a central role in disciplining the 
population.509 Over time, the Orthodox Church developed into a supreme religious and 
                                                        
506 According to the early 12th-century Rus’ chronicle [Povest’ vremennykh let], foundations of the ‘land of 
Rus’ were laid when Prince Vladimir united region’s diverse peoples under the Christian rule.  
507 In fact, that there were also significant military and political motives, underlying the alliance between 
Kievan Rus’ and Byzantium, that ultimately led to the baptism of the Rus’. See Leong, Albert, ed. The 
Millennium: Christianity and Russia, AD 988-1988. St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1990. 
508 Scholarship on the history of religion in Russia suggests that Vladimir’s choice of Christianity in 988 
A.D. was not accidental. Vladimir made a deliberate choice of faith for himself and the people of Kievan 
Rus from among “religions of the book” – Judaism, Islam, and Orthodox Christianity. After a preliminary 
investigation, he felt apprehensive about Judaism because it was a religion of a stateless people and had 
qualms about Islam because it forbade alcohol. For a brief discussion of this see two volumes dedicated to 
the Millennium of Christianity in Russia: Leong, Albert, ed. The Millennium: Christianity and Russia, AD 
988-1988. St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1990; House, Francis. Millennium of Faith: Christianity in Russia, 
AD 988-1988. St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1988. This version of the story is also verified by the Muslim 
writers of the time. See, for example, Abu ‘l-Faraj Yahya Ibn Said Ibn Yahya’s Tarikh (ca. 1066) where he 
describes the “marriage alliance” between Byzantium and Rus’ that led to Christianization of Rus. 
509 Many historians agree that before adoption of Orthodox Christianity there was no unified or a 
centralized Russian state. At the most, there was an association of semi-independent principalities, which 
cooperated on some issues. Orthodoxy became a key element that united pagan Slavic tribes of the region. 
As Orthodox Christianity took its place at the core of the Russian state-building process, the country 
continued its development as a religious state. Christianity turned into a central pillar of Russian politics 
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premier public institution.510 As a mother in most of the families, the Russian Orthodox 
Church established its own dogmas for domestic order and made the state a permanent 
guardian of its principles abroad.511  
The conquest of Kazan, one of the Muslim successor states of the Golden Horde, 
by Ivan the Terrible in 1552 marks the beginning of a new era in the history of Russia 
and its relations with Islam.512 In our analogy it symbolizes the arrival of a second 
woman in the family, who may symbolically be called Suyumbikhe.513 She was 
subordinated by force and treated as a maid rather than a legitimate mistress in her new 
house.514 Suyumbikhe was young, stubborn, and mysterious, as some would expect an 
                                                        
and culture. A popular notion of Orthodoxy being a founding element of the Russian state largely depends 
on this narrative. 
510 Neither the shift of a spiritual, cultural, and economic activity from Byzantium to Rome, nor the rise of 
the Mongol Empire and the emergence of the powerful Lithuania diminished the role of the Church in 
Muscovy. On the contrary, the relative power of the Church increased, as it was the only institution in Rus’ 
that was tolerated under the Mongol yoke. 
511 Upon the Byzantine emperor’s decision at the Council of Florence in 1438, the Russian Orthodox 
Church became independent of the Greek Church. After the fall of Constantinople religion took its place at 
the center of a newly emerging ideology, which entitled Moscow to a status of a Third Rome. Henceforth, 
the state became dependent on Orthodoxy for its political legitimacy and assumed the role of a defender of 
the Church’s ecclesiastical autonomy. As the Church established its own Patriarchate in 1589, the Tsar 
continued to serve as the “guardian of the Church’s dogmas” and subsidize Church’s activities.  
512 According to Khalid, the conquest of Kazan was a turning point, for it opened up the steppe to gradual 
Muscovite expansion (Khalid in Millar 2004). In fact, Muscovy acquired its first Muslim subjects as early 
as 1392, when the so-called Mishar Tatars, who inhabited what is now Nizhny Novgorod province, entered 
the service of Muscovite princes. The khans of Kasymov dynasty, who lost out in the succession struggles 
of the Golden Horde, came under Muscovite protection in the mid-fifteenth century and became a 
privileged service elite. 
513 Suyumbikhe was a female Tatar ruler, who had been forcibly moved to Moscow upon the fall of Kazan 
to the army of Ivan the Terrible in 1552. More broadly, according to some scholarly observations, Islam 
has played a critical role in the formation of Muscovite identity. Actually it had a dual impact. On the one 
hand, during the Mongol yoke, Islamic faith was perceived in Moscow as a foreign threat. This, experts 
argue, consolidated the Slavic people against the Mongol domination and contributed to the rise of 
Muscovy. On the other hand, many blame Mongol influence for being one of the main reasons for Russia’s 
separation from European Christianity. One way or the other, Islam is considered to have made a 
significant contribution in strengthening of the Russian Orthodox identity at the early stages of state 
development. 
514 Incorporation of a sizable population practicing an alien religion did not change the status of the 
Orthodox Church in Russia. As rulers of a religious state, Russian Tsars approved enforced Christianization 
as a measure to discipline individual conduct and public order in conquered lands. Aimed at attaining 
uniformity in the emerging empire, in the following couple of centuries, Russia’s further territorial 
expansion was accompanied by involuntary conversion to Christianity. Under conditions of unchecked 
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oriental woman to be. She was submissive but never gave up her faith or convert. It was 
not until the decision of the head of the household to modernize and revise the order at 
home that secular principles replaced religious dogmas as a new code of conduct in the 
family.515 Comprehensive modernization and secularization efforts initiated by the 
executive order in the 18th century were aimed at creating a rational state, where Church 
would be subordinated to the state and function as a “department” in the bureaucratic 
government structure.516 Soon Islam in Russia was also legalized and Suyumbikhe 
acquired the status of a second wife.517 As the head of the household continued to rely on 
his wives to discipline the children, the relationship between the women determined the 
climate at home. 
The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution symbolizes the beginning of yet another distinct 
period in Russian state-religion relations. In our analogy it exemplifies the divorce of the 
man from his life-long partners in marriage.518 As the man tried to rely on his iron fist 
                                                        
power of the Church, religious minorities, including Muslims, were systematically purged. In Russia, under 
a religious state regime, the way to show your loyalty to the state was through accepting a Christian faith. 
As the state pursued its imperial goals, it continued to view the Church as its main partner. 
515 Peter the Great, who grew up in he wake of the Old Believer Schism in the Orthodox Church, realized 
that competing centers of authority could inflict on the land and its people. The Emperor believed that 
consolidation of the state depended of the subordination and subjugation of the Church. Peter utterly 
rejected the idea of Moscow being the Third Rome. Instead, inspired by western examples, he initiated a 
comprehensive modernization project of Russia, which envisioned a different role for the Church.  
516 In a sense, Peter laid foundation of a new state-religion regime, where religion was subordinated to the 
state. Service to the state, rather than Christianization, became the ultimate measure of loyalty and the 
source of privilege. This statist approach toward religion opened up new opportunities for Russia’s 
Muslims. Through the service to the state, those Muslim subjects, who survived the dispossession of the 
earlier periods, were allowed to keep their land and were even able to own Orthodox serfs.  
517 According to Werth, the government of Catherine the Great “came to recognize the utility of non-
Orthodox religions as sources of order and stability” (Werth 2014: 49). By making religious tolerance an 
official policy, legalizing and institutionalizing Islam, she created a basis for loyalty to the Russian state in 
the Muslim lands. The Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly, at the time a unique in the Muslim world 
organizational structure imposed on Islam, became an essential mediator between the state and its Muslim 
subjects. 
518 The Bolshevik government did not want to rely on religious institutions to govern its highly diverse 
society. Guided by Marxian view of religion as an “opium of the people” and Lenin’s vision that religion 
was “merely a product and reflection of economic yoke within society,” Bolsheviks sought to construct a 
community based on non-spiritual values (Khalid in Millar 2004). Throughout the Soviet era, the 
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and the help of nannies to raise a new cohort of children, he was inculcating to his 
offspring a new source of deep affection that would replace the love and caring of their 
mothers.519 After decades of painful struggle, the husband allowed women to return and 
reunite with their children. Nevertheless, the reality that all had to discover for 
themselves was shocking. The transformative impact of a lived experience in a single-
parented family was huge.520 The following two decades were spent in family members’ 
adapting to each other and negotiating the new rules of family life.  
The long history of the relationship between the partners in a family that I call 
Russia has experienced substantial periods of tension and uncertainty as well as accord 
and cooperation. It hasn’t been static since the end of the Soviet Union either. The initial 
period of reconciliation was accompanied by concrete efforts aimed at accommodating 
moral and spiritual needs of the children, who suffered most during their parents’ 
separation. The following decade was marked by the parents’ reassertion of their 
traditional roles as primary caregivers. The analogy could be extended further to describe 
the details of the complicated relationship between the husband, his wives, and the 
children. What is important here, as in the case with Molla Nasreddin, is to note that the 
                                                        
communist government vigorously discouraged the practice of all religions, including Islam. In other 
words, under the Soviet regime, it was no longer enough to show your loyalty to the regime through the 
service to the state. To become a Soviet man one had to abandon his/her faith in the supernatural. 
519 The establishment of a socialist order also meant the introduction of atheism as an absolute dogma 
(Riasanovsky 1990:15). 
520 The overall impact of the Soviet era on religion and on Islam in particular was brutal. During seven 
decades of ruthless anti-religious policies and atheist propaganda, thousands of mosques were destroyed or 
given over to “more socially productive” uses, such as youth clubs, museums of atheism, or warehouses; 
religious endowments were confiscated; religious schools closed; religious authorities arrested and 
deported to labor camps or executed (Khalid in Millar 2004). Moreover, connections between indigenous 
Muslims and the Islamic world were cut, religious knowledge was vastly circumscribed and the site of its 
reproduction pushed into private or covert realms; continuity with the past made difficult by changes in 
script. Although destructive anti-religious campaign could not eradicate the religion completely, it largely 
managed to render “Islam” synonymous with “tradition”. For the most part, this key element of the Soviet 
legacy has determined the dynamics of Islamic revival in Russia in the first decades after the collapse of the 
communist regime. 
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attitude of the head of the household toward his wives plays an essential role in 
maintaining peace and harmony at home.  
 
Islam, ideologies, and ethno-confessional regimes: The dynamics of interaction in 
post-Soviet Russia. 
 Post-Soviet Russian state policies toward religion have had a huge impact on 
religious life of indigenous Muslims. This study has demonstrated that various Islamic 
groups have had different experiences in the 1990s and the 2000s, most notably 
manifested in terms of their access to the Russian public sphere. This dissertation has 
asked what explains the change in state attitudes toward religion. In particular, it has 
explored why state policies toward Islam changed during the first two decades after the 
Soviet collapse. The analysis suggests that religious policies are often a product of 
ideational struggles. Ideas about particular models of societies first emerge in the works 
of some native thinkers, or they are imported from other intellectually influential 
countries. Then they find followers among the elite and policymakers through 
publications and public discussions. Next, these followers organize and mobilize to 
challenge the dominant ideology. Finally, these activists replace the dominant ideology 
with the new one. The last step usually requires suitable structural conditions. 
 This study suggests that neutral policies toward Islam in Russia in the early 1990s 
were a result of an ideological domination of Western liberalism, which displaced the 
communist mentality. Western model of development, which has historically had its 
supporters in Russia, envisioned a secular, liberal, and democratic path to nation building. 
In the 1980s, dissenting intellectuals such as Andrei Sakharov revived Western liberal 
ideas in the country. Soon the rhetoric about human rights and freedoms was supported 
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by the elites in the policymaking community and developed into a full-fledged reform 
movement under the Gorbachev regime. Economic stagnation and other structural factors 
contributed to the formation of the conditions that led to the collapse of the communist 
regime and abandonment of the atheistic approach toward religion. Under Western liberal 
ideology religion was treated as an element of culture. This allowed adoption of passive 
secular state-religion and multiethnic ethnicity regimes to govern Russia’s diverse 
population in the late perestroika and early post-Soviet years. A central feature of the 
passive secular state-religion regime was accommodationist policies toward Islam. Both 
granting religious groups unrestricted access to the Russian public sphere and supporting 
the institutionalization of ethnic diversity facilitated the Islamic revival in the country. 
 In the late 1990s, the ideology of Western liberalism was renounced in favor of 
the norms and principles of Statism, which envisaged the state playing a guiding and 
regulating role in the society.521 Religion, including Islam, according to this perspective, 
was an important element in building Russia’s new “formula of identity.” In particular, 
“traditional” religious organizations were expected to positively contribute to building 
and maintaining the patriotic consensus. However, religion and its institutions had to be 
subordinated to the state. The idea that Russia should follow its own path of development 
is deeply rooted in Russian philosophical tradition of the Slavophiles. In the 1990s, 
Russian thinkers and theoreticians such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Igor Chubais, and 
Aleksandr Dugin revived the debate in the country about different elements of this idea. 
Soon the rhetoric about Russia’s unique posture as a bridge between East and West found 
                                                        
521 Putin, V. Millennium Message (Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheletii), December 29, 1999, available in 
Russian on the Nezavisimaya Gazeta website at http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millenium.html 
(Last accessed on February 14, 2015). 
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supporters among the elites and in the policymaking community. A wide public 
disillusionment with the Western model of development speeded up the beginning of a 
state-sponsored search for a new national identity. The ideological shift from Western 
liberalism to Statism resulted in a change of state-religion regime, which then gradually 
took the shape of a confessional collaboration between state institutions and “traditional” 
religious organizations. This transition, combined with a movement toward a non-ethnic 
‘ethnicity regime’, explains the prevalence of regulatory policies of the state toward 
Islam in Russia since the late 1990s. Both granting a privileged access to the public 
sphere for state-approved religious organizations and reducing support for 
institutionalization of ethnic diversity indicates a novel approach toward “managing the 
diversity” in Russia. 
 A set of structural challenges that Russia was facing in the 1990s prepared the 
necessary conditions and served as a catalyst for the ideological shift. In particular, 
security and economic concerns accelerated the formation and mobilization of a critical 
mass against the defenders of liberal reforms. Thus, the outbreak of violence in the 
Russian North Caucasus, the spread of terrorist attacks across the country, and the 
economic collapse diminished the trust in advocates of liberalism, rapidly disillusioned 
the people about the process of transition to liberal democracy, and contributed to the rise 
of an alternative ideology.  
 In this respect, my argument differs from analyses that focus primarily or even 
solely on security concerns in explaining the post-Soviet dynamics in state-Islam 
relations in Russia. This study reveals that secular state authorities were already aware of 
security challenges posed by Islamic radicalism in the 1980s. Soviet policymakers, 
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nevertheless, were committed to liberalization of religious policy despite ongoing 
conflicts in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Iran. On the other hand, starting in the late 
1990s restrictive measures were also applied to “non-traditional” religious groups that are 
widely regarded as non-violent (e.g. Jehovah’s Witnesses and Muslim readers of Said 
Nursi). This study suggests that focusing on the criteria for access of religious groups to 
the public sphere offers a better perspective for the analysis of post-Soviet state-Islam 
relations. 
 In contrast to many other studies on the subject, this dissertation does not rely on 
the essentialist approach, which suggests that inherent distinctions between certain 
religions and religious communities have a direct impact on politics. In particular, it 
avoids the argument that Russian state policies toward Islam are guided by the fact that 
Russia is a Christian-majority state, which, according to many, has historically struggled 
to suppress Muslims. Essentialist arguments may be attractive for their simplicity, but 
they have little to say about state-religion relations and neglect issues related to interfaith 
dialogue and religious freedom. This study demonstrates that Russian state policies 
toward Islam are better understood in the context of changing state-religion regimes, 
which also include Church-state relations. Moreover, essentialism often ignores the fact 
that Islam is internally diverse. People and communities of one particular religious 
tradition may take different views and positions. There is no religious hierarchy in Islam 
and no single individual is qualified to say the last word on questions of belief or 
practice. The history of Russia’s indigenous Muslims demonstrates that relations between 
the state and various Islamic communities have varied not only over time but also across 
different cultures, geographies, religious traditions, and schools of thought.  
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This study has taken the discussion about Islam in Russia beyond securitization 
and essentialist contexts toward a comparative framework of ethno-confessional regimes. 
It suggests that the analysis of Russian state policies toward Islam in the context of state-
religion and ethnicity regimes can help to better assess the historical dynamics of the 
relationship and compare it to those of other states. Besides, by taking structural factors 
seriously, this study also has aimed to control for a variation in country-specific 
ideological struggles. Despite the unique ideological contexts that historically developed 
in many countries, many believers and non-believers share things in common as human 
beings and equal members of their societies. The discussion bellow will demonstrate the 
importance of the notions such as meritocracy, transparency, fairness, justice, and 
ultimately religious freedom to various religious groups and their relations with the state.   
 
 The challenges and limits of the “Confessional collaboration” model. 
At the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third term as the President of Russia in 
2012, an observer of Russian politics might have thought that the country’s population 
was in the midst of a wave of patriotism and social cohesion unprecedented in its post-
Soviet history. Has the fundamental ambiguity about Russia’s national identity ultimately 
been resolved? Has the post-Soviet ideological vacuum finally been filled? Has the 
Russian government found a right approach to govern its religiously diverse population? 
Looking at the attempts to build a patriotic consensus based on traditional values and 
beliefs, one may suggest that the “confessional collaboration” model between secular 
state institutions and “traditional” religious organizations is working and receiving a 
significant amount of social support. Established clergy of all traditional religions, 
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including Islam, have made use of a privileged access to the Russian public sphere and 
indeed have worked hard to revive their old connections with the society. Nevertheless, 
as in the past under the “multi-confessional establishment” framework, issues related to 
religious freedom, interfaith dialogue, and a range of structural problems facing Russia 
still remain largely unaddressed.  
 
A) Religious freedom and Islamic religious pluralism 
First and foremost, relying on traditional religious organizations to build a 
patriotic consensus raises fundamental questions about religious freedom for most of the 
period. Since Peter the Great the bureaucratic Russian state has been regulating various 
aspects of religious life in the country. Over time, subordination of religion to the Russian 
state has been so deeply internalized by both religious and secular authorities, that today 
even some careful observers of religious life in Russia describe the establishment of the 
post-1997 order in the country as the process of normalization of state-religion relations 
after the turbulence of the early post-Soviet era (Krawchuk and Bremer 2014).522 Indeed, 
given Russia’s historical record of state-religion relations, the early post-Soviet years 
demonstrated an unprecedented tendency towards the expansion of religious freedoms. 
Despite the fact that “freedom of conscience” and secularism remain declared principles 
of the Russian state, since adoption of the 1997 law on religion, the country has gradually 
                                                        
522 Krawchuk, Andrii, and Thomas Bremer, eds. Eastern Orthodox Encounters of Identity and Otherness: 
Values, Self-reflection, Dialogue. Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
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moved away from these stated goals.523 The instrumental approach toward religion that 
the state has adopted raises concerns about prospects of religious freedom in Russia. 
As shown in the previous chapters, the state-religion regime since the late 1990s, 
is, at its core, a system of state control over religious institutions, and with their help, 
control over society.524 Arguably, even more serious weakness of the confessional 
collaboration model is that the secular bureaucracy works through religious institutions, 
which are loyal to the state and serve its interests rather than represents the society. 
Curanovic notes that the “elitist” club of “traditional” religions “is not fully 
representative of the increasingly complex Russian society” (Curanovic 2014:793). This 
is particularly evident in the case of Islamic muftiyates, which are internally conflicted, 
fragmented, and are loosing authority among young Russian Muslims. “The promotion of 
a moderate Russian Islam,” according to Dannreuther, “has struggled to counter the 
appeal of radical Islam, particularly among young Russian Muslims, since an avowedly 
‘traditional’ Islam appears to lack theological rigor, deviating from the purist standards of 
the Salafist movement, as well as being continually compromised by the official state 
support that it receives” (Dannreuther 2010:126).525 A conscious disregard of the 
pluralistic reality and the constraints of traditional religious organizations in addressing 
religious diversity bear the danger of forcing many religious communities to go 
                                                        
523 The Russian 1993 constitution grants extensive religious rights, including the right to “disseminate 
religious or other convictions,” and declares that no religion can be instituted as state-sponsored or 
mandatory.  
524 Curanović, Alicja. "Weaknesses of the Post-Soviet Religious Model: The Kremlin and “Traditional” 
Religions in face of Interethnic Tensions in Russia."Politics and Religion (2014): 1-30. 
525 Various studies pointed out a limited ability of Muftiyats to represent the diverse community of Russia’s 
Muslims. However, so far, no major work has been conducted on peaceful “non-traditional” Islamic groups 
in Russia and their ability to positively contribute to the society (e.g. the Gulen Movement). 
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underground.526 This, in turn, risks not only curbing religious innovation but also 
stigmatizing traditional religious organizations themselves.527 In this context, the key 
question is how the Kremlin will continue to manage its diverse Muslim population and 
whether it can maintain the allegiances of such a heterogeneous group. Will the Russian 
government’s approach toward religion, which apparently has had some success, 
continue to assuage the demands and needs of the religious communities in Russia and, if 
not, how will future disaffection of religious communities be expressed (Dannreuther 
2010:126)?528 Much of the answer depends on intra-faith dialogue and the ability of 
Muslims to listen to each other. 
It is also important to keep in mind that “traditional” religious organizations are 
not formal tools of the state, but are themselves powerful social institutions, which, at 
least in theory, can develop their own agenda. According to Smolkin-Rothrock, 
historically the interests of Russia’s traditional religious institutions have not always and 
necessarily overlapped with those of the Russian state.529 If the unity of interests between 
the Russian state and religious institutions were put into question, and if religious 
organizations withheld or even withdrew their support for Russian state policy, the state 
                                                        
526 For a discussion of the ban on Islamic texts and persecution of the followers of Said Nursi in Russia, see 
Chapter 4. Also refer to Sova-Center Reports on inappropriate enforcement of anti-extremist legislation in 
Russia in 2008, 2009, and 2011 by Alexander Verkhovsky: 
http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2009/04/d15800/ (Last access March 3, 2015). 
http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2010/04/d18482/ (Last access March 3, 2015). 
http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2012/04/d24302/ (Last access March 3, 2015). 
527 In its extreme form, the attempt to “confine Islam to the official mosque” is not too different from the 
Soviet era practice of isolating indigenous Muslims from the Muslim world. When people were allowed to 
expressed their opinion, Soviet era Muftiyates, as this study has shown, became the first target of public 
condemnation. 
528 Dannreuther, Roland. "Islamic radicalization in Russia: an assessment." International Affairs 86.1 
(2010): 109-126. 
529 Victoria Smolkin-Rothrock. A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: The Spiritual Life of Soviet Atheism 
(forthcoming). 
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would find itself without an essential social base, and its moral claims would lose much 
of their power, thereby undermining the existing patriotic consensus. 
 
B) Interfaith dialogue 
Moreover, a patriotic consensus built on traditional religions paradigm will 
remain fragile as long as there are unresolved issues regarding interfaith relations. In 
today’s Russia, the role of the Orthodox Church within traditional religions framework 
raise concerns among the established Muslim clergy and careful observers of secularism 
in Russia. As has been shown above for regions where Muslims represent a minority 
group in an Orthodox majority culture, influential figures within the official Orthodox 
and Muslim clergy sometimes disagree with each other (e.g. construction of mosques and 
Islamic dress code for school girls). Some members of the Orthodox Church interpret the 
public visibility of Islam in Russian-majority regions as Islamic proselytism and even 
expansion (Curanovic 2014).530 Muslim clergy, on the other hand, criticize the attempts 
to introduce elements of Orthodox religious education in public schools across the nation 
and to establish military chaplaincy. Especially the Council of Russia’s Muftis has 
opposed these initiatives, referring to them as unconstitutional and dangerous 
(Verkhorsky 2007).531 According to Verkhovsky, since converting people of other faiths 
cannot be banned by the Patriarchate and no one has the authority to ban the Islamic 
dawah (Islamic proselytism), missionary work on both sides continues. Periodic 
                                                        
530 Here we have to admit that neither the Russian Orthodox Church nor the Muslim clergy are monolith-
like structures and various views expressed by some members of the established clergy do not necessarily 
represent the opinion of the whole community (Fagan 2012). 
531 Verkhovsky, A. Public Interactions between Orthodox Christian and Moslem Organizations at the 
Federal Level. May 2007. http://www.sova-center.ru/en/religion/publications/2007/05/d10814/ (Last access 
March 2, 2015). Also see chapters three and four. 
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occurrence of such instances, in turn, mars relations between the Russian Orthodox 
Church and the Islamic establishment. 
Observers of religious freedom in Russia note that since the late 1990s, the 
official rhetoric of the Russian Orthodox Church has increasingly emphasized the idea of 
"the Church of majority" based on the premise that "Russia is a predominantly Orthodox 
country with some national and religious minorities" (Verkhovsky 2007). Accordingly, 
Russia is perceived by leading Church leaders as "ethnic Russian and Orthodox 
civilization.”532 This rhetoric is not uniformly received by members of the established 
Muslim clergy, who often argue that they represent up to 15 percent of the Russian 
population which is spread all over the country. Ravil Gainutdin of the Council of 
Russia’s Muftis is the most ardent defender of the constitutional rights of Russian 
Muslims. In his opinion, Islam deserves an equal status with Russian Orthodoxy and 
should not be treated as a regional phenomenon. Ultimately, Mufti Gainutdin envisions 
institutionalizing Russia's bi-religious nature in the future by introducing a government 
position of vice president to be held by a Muslim.533 On the other hand, the Central 
Spiritual Board of Muslims led by Mufti Tadzhuddin almost always sides with the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Many Muslim supporters of Mufti Tadzhuddin see themselves 
                                                        
532 For example, see Kovalskaya, Kristina. "The Traditional and the Non-Traditional in the Religious Life 
of the Russian Federation." Mundo Eslavo 12 (2013): 69-78. According to Kovalskaya, “since the 
dominant position of the Russian Orthodox Church is not in question, the representatives of the Orthodox 
Church do not focus on the inclusion of Orthodoxy among the traditional religions of Russia, because there 
is no particular need for this. The word “traditional” is more often used by the representatives of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in relation to other areas, particularly in reference to the concept of “traditional 
values.” Denominations that do not have such a large congregation, in contrast, insist on the fact that they 
are “traditional religions” or at least use references to something “traditional” (p.72). 
533 In defending his position, Ravil Gainutdin often refers to secular foundations of the state. As this was 
denoted in the Council’s official position on the issue about symbols on the Russian national coat of arms, 
in a secular state, everyone, including Muslims, must respect symbols adopted through a democratic 
process. See Gainutdin, R. “K voprosu o gosudarstvennoj simvolike.” 6 December 2005. 
http://www.muslim.ru/articles/109/1092/ (Last access March 2, 2015) 
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as a specific Islamic component of Russia's rebirth as a traditionally Orthodox country. In 
contrast, Muslim spiritual leaders of Russia’s North Caucasus region rarely get involved 
in arguments on all-Russian issues. They are more focused on advocacy for regional 
interests and do not claim a contribution to the overall "Russian identity" (Verkhorsky 
2007).  
Despite these complicated relations between the Islamic clergy and the Russian 
Orthodox Church, they all, nevertheless, seem to be united in their criticism of Western 
liberalism. Arch-priest Vsevolod Chaplin, for example, argued that he was more 
concerned about Western secularists' attacks against both Christianity and Islam than 
about tensions in Orthodox-Islam relations. According to Verkhovsky, Chaplin’s 
statement is “consistent with ROC’s numerous appeals to all religiously-defined 
‘civilizations’ to oppose the ideological expansion of the liberal and secular western 
civilization” (Verkhovsky 2007). Muslim leaders make similar statements with regard to 
Western ‘freedom of expression’ rhetoric, what has been demonstrated in their fairly 
aggressive anti-secularist reaction to the "Danish cartoons."534 
 
C) Nationalisms, immigration, and integration 
The third element that calls into question a patriotic consensus built on traditional 
religions is the issue of interethnic dialogue or maybe lack of it. Alas, over the 2000s, 
expressions of intolerance toward groups that are perceived in the Russian public 
                                                        
534 According to Verkhovsky, Russia’s Muslim leaders have different attitudes toward secularism at home 
and abroad. At the international level, "secular enemies" are very strong, so the differences in foreign 
policy assessments for them are not so important. In contrast, Russian domestic secularism is on the 
decline, while political differences are greater. See Verkhovsky, A. Public Interactions between Orthodox 
Christian and Moslem Organizations at the Federal Level. 9 May 2007. http://www.sova-
center.ru/en/religion/publications/2007/05/d10814/ (Last access March 2, 2015) 
  258 
consciousness as strangers have reportedly been on the rise (Verkhovsky 2007, Pain 
2007, Schnirelman 2011).535 Levada Center survey of 2013, for example, indicates that 
66% of participants in a nationwide survey fully or to some extent agreed with the slogan 
“Russia for Russians” (Rossiya dlya russkikh). 62% of the respondents believed that 
violent clashes on ethnic grounds were possible in contemporary Russia. This is a notable 
increase from the figures that were recorded in 2002. Back then 55% of survey 
respondents expressed support for the slogan “Russia for Russians”, and 49% thought 
that bloody conflict on ethnic grounds could happen in the country.536  
According to Curanovic, in today’s Russia strangers there are of two kinds: 
immigrants and ethnic minorities, a great majority of whom are Muslims (Curanovic 
2014:793). If ethnic minorities force the majority to face the question of national identity, 
immigrants bring along the challenges of integration and assimilation. As a result, a 
combination of caucasophobia and migrantophobia emerged as major destabilizing forces 
in the country.537 This tendency to “ethnisation of [interpersonal] relations” in the context 
of growing Russian nationalism presents a challenge to the ideology of statism, which, as 
this study has shown, aims to build a non-ethnic regime based on a confessional 
                                                        
535 Verkhovsky, Alexander, ed. 2007. Verkhi i nizy russkogo natsionalizma. Moscow: Informatsionno-
analiticheskiy tsentr «Sova”; Pain, Emil. 2007. “Xenophobia and Ethnopolitical Extremism in Post-soviet 
Russia Dynamics and Growth Factors.” Nationalities Papers 35: 895–911; Schnirelman, Viktor. Porog 
tolerantnosti: ideologiya i praktika novogo rasizma. Moscow: Novoye literaturnoye obozreniye, 2011. 
536 “Rossijane o migracii i mezhnacional’noj naprjazhennosti,” Levada Center. 5 November 2013. 
http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti (Last access 
Match 3, 2015) 
537 A. Malashenko, What the North Caucasus means to Russia. Russie.Nei.Visions, ifri, No. 61; А. 
Verkhovskiy. Religioznaya ksenofobiya: mezhkonfessional’ny i vnutrikonfessional’ny aspekty. 
http://www.sova-center.ru/religion/publications/2003/04/d351/(Last accessed on March 15, 2015); V. 
Mukomel, Problemy migratsii v sovremennoy Rossii. Doklad Moskovskogo bjuro po pravam cheloveka 
Prepared for the project on  «Obshhestvennaja kampanija protivodejstvija rasizmu, ksenofobii, 
antisemitizmu i jetnicheskoj diskriminacii v mnogonacional'noj RF» 
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collaboration between secular state institutions and “traditional” religious organizations. 
(Curanovic 2014: 795, Schnirelman 2011:234-288).538  
 
D) Dealing with chronic diseases: Facing structural problems and building a just 
society. 
Last, but not least, the prospects of the “Confessional collaboration” model also 
depend on the regime’s ability to deliver comfortable living conditions, offer material 
benefits, and provide incentives for all parties involved to sustain the given model. This 
study suggests that ideological shifts happen when opponents of the dominant ideology 
take advantage of available structural conditions to replace the old system. On the one 
hand, violent conflicts, economic crises, and social upheavals often present an 
opportunity for mobilization of critical masses against the ruling regime. On the other 
hand, factors such as economic growth, comprehensive, transparent and reliable upward 
mobility system, and good governance contribute to the stability of political systems. 
Indigenous Russian Muslims have a long history of living side-by-side with 
Orthodox Christians and representatives of other faiths and cultures. Despite particular 
differences in cultures, languages, and religious traditions, the country’s diverse peoples 
share a lot in common. The argument that Russia’s indigenous Muslims can be good 
citizens and would like to be present in every field of Russia’s social and political life has 
been repeated for decades and even centuries by native religious leaders and 
demonstrated in practice by generations of successful Muslim academics, scientists, 
                                                        
538 Curanović, Alicja. "Weaknesses of the Post-Soviet Religious Model: The Kremlin and “Traditional” 
Religions in face of Interethnic Tensions in Russia."Politics and Religion (2014): 1-30; Schnirelman, 
Viktor. 2011. Porog tolerantnosti: ideologiya i praktika novogo rasizma. Moscow: Novoye literaturnoye 
obozreniye. 
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musicians, businessmen, and politicians.539 A state that provides equal opportunities to 
all, respects minority rights, and does not discriminate between followers of different 
religious traditions should only strengthen the links between Russia’s various peoples. 
Moreover, aiming at fairness, accountability, transparency, rule of law, and social justice 
will make the biggest contribution to the demystification of the radical Islamist ideology, 
which as a manifestation of a protest rests more on earthly promises than on the 
hereafter.540 Support for justice, objectivity, honesty and resistance to corruption, fraud, 
and misconduct are some of the principles that most Russia’s Muslim believers share 
regardless of their attitudes toward the established Muslim clergy and “traditional 
religions” paradigm.   
The vertical of power built over the 2000s has been able to offset some of the 
perceived shortcomings of the “alien” Western liberal ideology at the expense of 
transparency and accountability. Increasing public awareness of corruption, the opaque 
system of cover-ups, and ambiguous reasons for successful upward mobility weakens the 
ideological appeal of statism and strengthens the position of alternative philosophies. 
Many young Muslims, for example, find some of the answers in Islamism, which, for 
them, is centered on the notion of justice and a utopian future.541 This suggests that 
addressing structural problems facing the society is a precondition for uprooting religious 
radicalism and might be much more effective than applying rigid anti-extremism 
measures. 
                                                        
539 Fahretdinov R. Dini vje izhtimagyj masalalar. – Orenburg, 1914. 
540 According to Naumkin and Makarov, since the early 1990s Islamists have created a romantic aura of 
fighters against corrupted state bureaucracy (Naumkin and Makarov 2007). Naumkin V.V., Makarov D.V. 
Islamskiy faktor v mirovoy politike i interesy Rossii // Strategiya Rossii. 2007. No. 7.  
541 According to Dannreuther, “Islamic radicalization probably represents a lesser threat than it did in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, though its ideological appeal, and the underlying conditions which foster 
support for it, remain strong” (Dannreuther 2010:126).  
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The religious revival in Russia is not yet complete. Coming to terms with the 
Soviet legacy, rediscovering of the pre-Soviet era practices and traditions, and adapting to 
the new challenges of the twenty-first century are ongoing processes. On the one hand, 
attempting to establish a monopoly over traditional values in the name of a new political 
ideology poses a threat of polarizing the society and delegitimizing both secular and 
“traditional” religious institutions. On the other hand, if Russia addresses some of the 
above concerns, it is well endowed to become a model for the rest of the world as a lived 
example of a cultural and interfaith mosaic. As a country, where representatives of 
various faiths and nationalities have lived together for centuries, Russia could develop 
into a natural practical field for the nurturing of a new utopia, which potentially could 
refute the idea of the inevitability of the clash of civilizations. 
What is clear is that the story does not end here. Russia’s intellectual life is alive, 
just like its internal ideational struggles. Various ideological poles maintain their own 
view of an ideal Russia. Some would like to see it democratic, capitalist and secular, 
some as conservative and morally grounded on traditional values. Some envision it as a 
genuine federation, some as a strong unitary state. Some see it as complete within its 
present borders, while some others still think that borders are yet to be determined. 
Ultimately, some perceive the country’s internal diversity as an asset, others think of it as 
a potential source of a threat and strive for homogeneity. All of these intellectual 
struggles support the claim that ideas matter and they will continue to determine the 
dynamics of state policies toward various issues in Russia, including religion. 
 
Avenues for further research 
  262 
The study identifies several avenues for further research. First and foremost, the 
question of interfaith relations and dialogue, as this study suggests, plays an important 
role in the formation and maintenance of state-religion regimes, especially in multi-
confessional societies. Whether the established clergy of Russia’s traditional religions 
can exist in mutual respect and tolerance despite different ideologies or interests is key 
for the success of the “confessional collaboration” model. More broadly, the ability and 
willingness of the country’s indigenous communities to coexist with each other is crucial 
for maintaining peace and stability in Russia. As of today, to my knowledge, no major 
academic work has been conducted on Christian-Muslim relations and on the topic of 
interfaith dialogue in post-Soviet Russia more broadly. 
Secondly, comparing Russia’s experience in dealing with its Muslim population 
and other minorities with practices in other countries could help us better understand both 
state-religion and ethnicity regimes in Russia and further develop the concept of ethno-
confessional regimes. What accounts for differences in various combinations of ethnic 
and religious policies that different states chose to pursue? Does type of political regime 
(e.g. democracy vs. authoritarianism) affect how states approach the question of 
“diversity management”? This study makes a step toward development of a more 
nuanced approach toward the study of different forms of religious nationalism and the 
challenges it presents. 
Finally, researchers can further examine the relationship between ideological 
struggles and state policies toward other aspects of social and political life. Looking into 
other domains of identity politics such as race or gender, for example, could further 
explain whether, how and why ideologies shape state policies. The story of Molla 
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Nasretdin has taught us that managing diversity often requires art. It is my hope that 
politicians reflect on this wisdom when making difficult decisions on seemingly 



















Glossary of Key Terms 
Ideology – In a narrow sense, it is a set of proposals made by individuals to define clear 
and consistent criteria for membership in a proposed polity.542 More broadly, and in the 
context of this study, ideology is a collection of ideas that refer to an ideal socio-political 
system.543 Ideologies need to be formal, explicit, and relatively consistent.  
Western liberalism – In the context of post-Soviet Russia, it is an ideology that 
focuses on the promotion of human rights, civil liberties, market economy, and 
democratic government broadly defined. While liberalism has indigenous 
intellectual history in Russia, it borrows heavily from the Western philosophical 
tradition and experience.   
Statism – An ideology, according to which the state should have substantial 
centralized control over social and economic affairs. 
Regime – A coherent set of principles, norms, and rules that systematically regulates 
state policies. 
State-religion regime – A coherent set of principles, norms, and rules that 
systematically regulates state policies toward religion. According to the role that 
religion plays in any given polity, state-religion regimes can take multiple forms. 
Five models of state-religion regimes described in the scholarly literature are 
‘Religious state’, ‘State with an established religion’, ‘Passive secularism’, 
‘Assertive secularism’, and ‘Anti-religious state’.544 Refer to the figure below to 
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Table 11: Matrix of Ethno-confessional Regimes. 
Ethnicity Regimes  
Mono-ethnic Multi-ethnic Non-ethnic 
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Anti-religious    
 
Nationalism – A belief, creed or political ideology that involves an individual identifying 
with, or becoming attached to, one's nation. 
Ethnic nationalism – a type of nationalism based on a belief in the ethnic purity 
of the nation or in unity of language, religion, or culture. 
Civic nationalism – a type of nationalism based on a belief in common 
citizenship in a state embracing a specified territory and common allegiance to the 
institutions governing that territory.547 
Traditional religions – In this study the term refers to four religions – Russian 
Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism. In the Russian legal context, the concept is 
not formally defined. However, it is widely accepted that the notion was inspired by the 
preamble of the Russian Federation 1997 “Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Associations,” which acknowledges “the special role of Orthodox Christianity in the 
history of Russia, and in the establishment and development of its spirituality and culture, 
…respecting Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions, that comprise 
the inalienable part of the heritage of the Russian people.”548 
                                                        
547 For further discussion of differences between civic and ethnic nationalisms, see Brubaker, Rogers. "The 
Manichean myth: Rethinking the distinction between 'civic' and' ethnic' nationalism." In Kriesi et al (eds.) 
Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective. Zurich: Ruegger, 1999. Pp. 55-71. 
Also see, Yack, Bernard. "The myth of the civic nation." Critical Review 10.2 (1996): 193-211. For him, 
ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism are not dichotomous. Rather they are two extremes on a spectrum 
of nationalisms that mix ethnic values and opportunities for outsiders to become members in varying 
proportions. 
548 Kovalskaya, Kristina. "The Traditional and the Non-Traditional in the Religious Life of the Russian 
Federation." Mundo Eslavo 12 (2013): 69-78. 
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Traditional religious organizations – In this study, the term refers to state-registered 
religious organizations representing traditional religions in Russia. More broadly, these 
are religious organizations that have demonstrated that they had significantly influenced 
the formation and development of Russian statehood, played an important historical role 
in the development of national consciousness and that a significant proportion of Russian 
citizens belonged to or expressed a preference for it.549  
Traditional religions paradigm – a pattern of thought based on the assumption that 
traditional religions deserve special privileges because of their size, geographical range, 
as well as the history of presence in Russia.550 The idea has been inspired by the 
preamble of the Russian Federation 1997 “Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Associations.” 
Confessional collaboration – The relationship between the state and traditional religious 
organizations (most notably between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Kremlin) 
which manifests itself in cooperation taking place in selected areas of the public sphere, 
in education and social care. 
Multi-confessional establishment – a religious order that framed the exercise of faith 
and defined the scope of religious freedom in Russia from the reign of Catherine II 
(1762-96) through that of Nicholas I (1825-55) until the end of the Tsarist era. It implies 
recognition of religious institutions and production of legal statutes for the regulation of 
spiritual affairs in the country. In other words, it describes a framework wherein the state 
partly relies on state-approved religious organizations to socialize the population and 
provide moral discipline.551   
Official Muslim (Islamic) establishment – In the context of this study, the term refers to 
the body of people ordained by Islamic training and recognized by the state as ritual and 
spiritual leaders of Russia’s Muslim community, the clergy. 
Mufti – A Muslim religious leader who should be able to interpret Islamic law.  
Muftiate – A council of muftis. 
(Islamic) religious market – a physical and virtual space where (Islamic) religious ideas 
and goods are exchanged.552 
Religious revival – In this study the term refers to a social phenomenon, which reflects a 
significant growth in public interest towards religion in Russia after the renouncement of 
an atheistic ideology. 
                                                        
549 Fagan, Geraldine. Believing in Russia: Religious Policy After Communism. Routledge, 2012. 
550 Fagan, Geraldine. Believing in Russia: Religious Policy After Communism. Routledge, 2012. 
551 Werth, Paul W. The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial 
Russia. Oxford University Press, 2014. 
552 Sengers, Erik. "The religious market and its regulation: A sociological perspective." Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal 9.03 (2007): 294-301. 
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Public sphere – In this study the term refers to a space to which all citizens have access 
and in which common issues of concern to citizens and all available opinions can be 
articulated and deliberated.553 According to Taylor, it is “a common space in which the 
members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and 
also face-to-face encounters to discuss matters of common interest and thus to able to 
form a common mind about these.”554 
Private sphere – In the context of this study the term refers to the domain of a home, 
where social relations are based on family and kin.555 More broadly, private domain is an 
area of individual choice and autonomy.  
Parade of sovereignties – a political movement by the underrepresented peoples of the 
Soviet Union in the 1990s. 
Shock therapy – In economic policy, the term is used to describe powerful austerity 
measures designed to break spirals of rapid inflation. More recently, it has been used as a 
blanket term for policies designed to reform the post-socialist economies of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
Vertical of power (Vertikal’ vlasti) – A centralized chain of government command. The 
term is used to describe the effort of Russian state authorities in the early 2000s to 
strengthen the position of the federal government by improving the linkages between the 
federal, regional, and local levels of government. 
Hajj – The Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca that takes place in the last month of the year 
(according to the Islamic calendar), and that all Muslims are expected to make at least 
once during their lifetime. 
Imam – An Islamic leadership position. Typically used to describe a person who leads 
prayers in a mosque. 
Madrasa – A type of Islamic educational institution. 
Minaret – A tall slender tower, typically part of a mosque, with a balcony from which 
Muslims are called to prayer. 
Ummah – The community of Muslims bound together by ties of religion. 
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